M.A.Rumugam vs Kittu @ Krishnamoorthy

Excerpt:

For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eight and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bonafide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.

Supreme Court of India
M.A.Rumugam vs Kittu @ Krishnamoorthy on 7 November, 2008
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph
                                                                      REPORTABLE

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1749             OF 2008
               [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 237 of 2007]


M.A. Rumugam                                            ...Appellant

                                     Versus

Kittu @ Krishnamoorthy                                  ...Respondent




                            JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Applicability of the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of a complaint petition filed by the respondent herein against the appellant under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 8.09.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal O.P. No. 10819 of 2006.

3. Appellant herein is a retired teacher. He is said to be the owner of a land admeasuring 0.83 acres in new survey No. 246/1B at Naluvedapathi Village. About 180 numbers of coconut tress are said to have been planted on the said land.

4. On 3.06.2003, when the appellant allegedly visited his land, he found that 9 coconut trees were dead. Upon enquiry, he allegedly came to know that one Namasivayam son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village had damaged the said coconut trees by pouring acid mixed with kerosene thereon allegedly on the advice of the respondent herein.

5. On 4.06.2003, the appellant filed a complaint before the Sub- Inspector of Police, Thalaignayar Police Station, contending:

“…On 30.4.2003, the Panchayat Union Committee member and Panchayat Board President approached me and wanted land on south side of my coconut grove to lay road through the grove. I did not give consent for the proposal. In these circumstances when I visited the grove on 3.6.2003 about 9 coconut yielding trees on the south side were found slide down. When I enquired about this I came to know that Namasivayam son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village were standing on the south side of my coconut grove some time back with tins on their hands. Met them and told that they were responsible for the sliding of tender coconut trees as they were seen near the trees by some people of the village. They confessed that they on the advice of the Kittu alias Krishnamurthy son of Vedaiya Gounder of Naluvedapathi Village along with him poured acid mixed kerosene into the coconut trees and that they have done it since I did not give consent to lay road through my coconut grove.”

In the said complaint, the appellant requested the Sub-Inspector of Police to take action against those persons and sought protection for himself and his property.

6. On 5.06.2003, the appellant filed a suit before the learned District Munsif Court at Nagappattinam against the President, Union Council Member and other persons for grant of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from causing damage to the footpath in his property under the pretext of widening and laying road. In the said suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to find out whether any coconut trees were found dead. The Advocate Commissioner submitted its report on 15.06.2003 stating:

“Adjacent to the path on east end 9 coconut trees were found dead with loss of chlorophyll. There were 10 bunches carrying 100 to 150 coconuts. There were in an average 20 branches in each tree. There were heap of coconut under the 9 trees.”

7. On 25.06.2003, a First Information Report was lodged on the basis of the complaint given by the appellant. In the said FIR, the names of the respondent herein and two others were mentioned in the column of `doubtful persons’ portion. As the police authorities neither filed any chargesheet within six months nor sought for extension of time for the purpose of conducting further investigation, the learned Magistrate ordered stopping of further investigation and consequently closure of the matter.

8. On 6.09.2005, the respondent herein filed a private complaint, which was marked as C.C. No. 179 of 2006, in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi against the appellant for commission of the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code.

Taking cognizance of the said complaint, the learned Magistrate issued summons to the appellant.

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, he filed a Crl. O.P. No. 10819 of 2006 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying to call for the records pertaining to the complaint petition filed by the respondent being C.C. No. 179 of 2006 and quashing the same.

9. Before the High Court, a contention was raised that the backdrop of events and the manner in which the complaint petition had to be filed by the appellant would clearly establish that the action on his part was not in good faith.

The said contention was negatived by the High Court stating:

“5. The accusation have been made the accused (sic) and there are prima facie materials to proceed against the petitioner. When there are specific allegations made in the complaint against the accused, such allegation may have to be rebutted during the course of trial. In such circumstances by invoking the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the pending proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold, I do not find any merit in the case, hence the petition is dismissed. Consequently connected Crl. M.Ps are closed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to establish that the statement has been made in good faith, during the course of trial.”

10. Mr. G. Sivabalamurugan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the complaint preferred by the appellant against the respondent and two others before the police authorities does not amount to `defamation’ as the ingredients of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code are not satisfied.

The learned counsel would contend that from a perusal of the complaint petition filed by the appellant before the police authorities, it would be evident that he had taken due care and caution before filing the same. He, thus, acted bonafide and in good faith.

As the police authorities were authorised to entertain the said complaint, no case has been made out for proceeding against the appellant for alleged commission of an offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code.

11. Mr. P. Somasundaram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the complaint was made by the appellant before the police authorities on a wholly false premise, as much prior thereto, viz., on 27.05.2003, the respondent had left his village and in fact on 1.06.2003, he had left India for Malaysia and, thus, the question of his remaining at the place of occurrence on 3.06.2003 did not arise.

It was urged that the purported statement made by one of the co- accused in the earlier case, viz., one Namasivayam cannot be relied upon at this stage particularly when even therein they were represented by different counsel and furthermore his statement as a co-accused could not have been relied upon for the purpose of securing conviction of the respondent.

12. Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code reads, thus:

“499 – Defamation Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.”

Eight and Ninth Exceptions, to which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel, read as under:

“Eight Exception.–Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Ninth Exception.–Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.”

The word “good faith” has been defined in Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code to mean:

“52 – “Good faith”

Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.”

13. The complaint petition filed by the respondent herein contained a statement that he was implicated allegedly on the basis of an information received by the appellant from one Namasivayam son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village that they had damaged nine coconut trees by pouring acid mixed kerosene on the respondent’s advice.

The aforementioned allegation against the respondent was published in various newspapers, viz., Maalai Murusu, Maalai Malar, Dhina Boomi, Dhina Karan, Dhina Malar as well as in some weeklies.

On the aforementioned backdrop, he alleged to have been defamed as thereby, “false propaganda among the village people and implication his name in the complaint against the enemies Kakliappan and Namasivayam besides publishing the same in the dailies and weeklies” was made against him. It was furthermore stated:

“Since there was no basic evidence in the complaint, it was given with the sole intention of defaming the petitioner herein and the complainant did not cooperate for the investigation the case registered in Thalaignayiru police station in Crime No. 360/2003 could not be proceeded further and the charge sheet could not be filed. Therefore, the case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Tiruthuraipoondi was closed on 7.4.2005. Because of the illegal activities of the respondent, the petitioner/ complainant herein is unable to make his foreign trips and suffered heavy financial loss and lost his status among his relatives and the people of the Village and suffered enormous mental agony.”

14. Allegations made in the said complaint petition, thus, in our opinion, make out a case for proceeding against the appellant under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code as thereby imputation concerning the respondent had been made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm his reputation.

15. For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eight and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good.

16. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bonafide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.

17. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to consider the materials placed by the appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the said complaint before the police authorities.

18. Respondent was furthermore discharged by the learned Magistrate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that the police authorities could not complete the investigation within a period of six months.

19. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Sivabalamurugan on a decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande Etc. v. Uttam and Another [1999 (1) SCR 580]. Accusation against the accused therein related to the conduct on his part before the Treasury Officer. The learned Magistrate, when the complaint was filed, instead of issuing process called upon the Treasury Officer to hold an inquiry and submit a report in the court. Pursuant thereto and / or in furtherance thereof, a report was submitted. In the said report, the Treasury Officer clearly indicated that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been made and the complainant was found guilty. It was in the aforementioned situation, the Magistrate’s order refusing to issue summons was upheld by this Court.

20. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment. Furthermore, the question, as to whether a totally false complaint has been made as against the respondent or not as he was not even in India prior to the date of occurrence, is required to be gone into by the learned Trial Judge.

21. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

………………………….J.

[S.B. Sinha] …………………………..J.

[Cyriac Joseph] New Delhi;

November 07, 2008

Essentials of defamation

Excerpt:

For an offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC, three essential ingredients are required to be fulfilled:-

(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;

(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations.

      (iii)     The said imputation must have been made

                with     the    intention   to   harm    or   with

knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.

Whether any imputation made is with a motive or malafide intention to lower the reputation or is made in good faith is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. Undisputedly, the requirement of good faith and public good, both, are to be satisfied and the failure to prove good faith would exclude the application of 9th exception in favour of the accused even if the requirement of public good is satisfied. The words „good faith‟ as appearing in exception 9th not only require logical infallibility but also due care and attention.

 

 

 

Delhi High Court

Standard Chartered Bank vs Vinay Kumar Sood & Ors.

on 6 February, 2009

Author: Aruna Suresh

                   "REPORTABLE"
*            HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+      Crl.M.C.3828/2007 and CMA 14040/2007

                         Pronounced on: February 06, 2009

#     STANDARD CHARTERED BANK ..... PETITIONER
!         Through :  Mr. Sanjay Gupta, Advocate
                     Mr. Ajay Monga, Advocate
                     Mr. Manish Paliwal, Advocate

                            Versus

$     VINAY KUMAR SOOD & ORS. ....RESPONDENTS
^         Through :   Mr. Sidhartha Yadav, Adv. for
                      R-1.
                      Mr. O.P. Saxena, APP.

%
      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH

     (1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
         allowed to see the judgment?

     (2) To be referred to the reporter or not?          Yes

     (3) Whether the judgment should be reported
         in the Digest ?                                 Yes

ARUNA SURESH, J.

1. Respondent Vinay Kumar Sood filed a complaint against the petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank as well as four others being its employees before the Metropolitan Magistrate alleging that the petitioner Bank had been repeatedly corresponding with him and demanding a sum of Rs.3,62,373.01, being the outstanding balance amount in his credit account which he never had with the petitioner bank. During the course of correspondence petitioner sent a telegram dated 17.9.2002; contents therein were allegedly defamatory in nature. One of the official of the bank i.e. Mr. Jishant Narang (accused No.4) had telephoned his wife on 21.9.2002 intimating her that the complainant had an account with the petitioner bank (accused No.1) in which there were no outstanding dues to be claimed from the petitioner and the bank‟s letters if any be ignored. On receipt of this telephone call wife of the complainant made an inquiry from friends and employees in the office of the complainant. The complainant also received telephone call at his office and business place from accused No.4 and 5, namely, Mr. Jishant Narang and Mr. Sudhanshu Gupta. Complainant found credit card statement dated 28.7.2002 and correspondence dated 19.8.2002, 17.9.2002, 21.9.2002, 4.10.2002, 7.10.2002 and other written and oral communications as defamatory and maliciously made with a view to tarnish his image, integrity, respect and reputation amongst his family, social circle, friends, his colleagues and other business circle. Complainant alleged that an offence under Section 499/500 Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟) was made out against the accused persons and they should be accordingly summoned and convicted.

2. After appreciating the deposition of the witnesses and the relevant documents available on record, the court found sufficient material to proceed against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC and accordingly issued summons for appearance of the accused persons in the court.

3. Aggrieved by the said order of summoning dated 20.12.2006, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner Bank. It is made clear that other accused persons who happen to be the employees of the bank are not a party to this petition and have not challenged the impugned summoning order qua them.

4. Complainant had earlier filed a suit for damages against the petitioner bank on 13.11.2002 alleging that the bank had wrongly demanded payment of credit card dues from him thereby causing him mental harassment as well as the said demand lowered his image and prestige in the eyes of others including his family members. The present complaint was filed on 4.2.2003. The civil suit filed by the complainant (respondent herein) has been decreed by the Civil Judge whereby a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- with costs besides future interest @ 8% per annum was awarded to the complainant. The said amount admittedly has been paid by the petitioner bank in full and final settlement of the decretal amount.

5. Mr. Sanjay Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that perusal of letters/correspondences addressed by the bank to the complainant would only indicate that demand was made bonafidely and the ingredients of Section 499 IPC which defines “defamation” are not made out as per averments contained in the complaint. He further argued that the letters were written by the bank bonafidely. The criminal intention i.e. malice on the part of the petitioner bank to harm the reputation of the complainant which is pre- requisite of Section 499 IPC is missing in the complaint. Bank had no intention to harm the reputation of the complainant when it corresponded with him with a view to get cleared the due amount of Credit Card as per their own records. He has further submitted that the conduct of the petitioner bank falls in the 9th exception of Section 499 IPC and, therefore, the Magistrate without appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case erroneously took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. He has prayed that complaint, therefore, be quashed.

6. Mr. Sidharth Yadav, learned counsel for the complainant (respondent No.1 herein) while refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the correspondence of the bank received by the petitioner, especially the credit card statement and the telegram dated 17.9.2002 contain defamatory words and these documents were seen by his family members and also that Mr. Jishant Narang, accused No.4, also talked to the wife of the complainant on telephone and intimated her that the account of the complainant was cleared and there were no dues to be claimed from him and that complainant should ignore any letter which might be received from the petitioner bank in future. He has, therefore, emphasized that defamation within the meaning of Section 499 IPC is made out against the petitioner bank and the court has rightly taken the cognizance of the offence and issued summons for appearance against the bank and other accused persons.

7. For an offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC, three essential ingredients are required to be fulfilled:-

(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;

(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations.

      (iii)     The said imputation must have been made

                with     the    intention   to   harm    or   with

knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.

8. Thus, it is clear that intention to cause harm is the most essential sine qua non for an offence under Section 499 IPC. An offence punishable under Section 500 IPC requires blameworthy mind and is not a statutory offence requiring no mens rea.

9. 9th Exception of the Section takes away the imputation made in good faith by a person for protection of his or other‟s interest or for public good from the purview of defamation as defined in the Section. This exception relates to private communication which a person makes in good faith for the protection of his own interest. This exception covers not only such allegations of facts as can be proved true but also expression of opinions and personal inferences.

10. 9th exception has been incorporated to protect the interests of the parties in their business transaction which are generally done bonafidely and, therefore, the rule of public good on which this principle is based is, that honest transaction of business and social intercourse would otherwise be deprived of the protection which they should enjoy.

11. Whether any imputation made is with a motive or malafide intention to lower the reputation or is made in good faith is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case. Undisputedly, the requirement of good faith and public good, both, are to be satisfied and the failure to prove good faith would exclude the application of 9th exception in favour of the accused even if the requirement of public good is satisfied. The words „good faith‟ as appearing in exception 9th not only require logical infallibility but also due care and attention.

12. The court has to consider as to how far erroneous actions or statements are to be imputed for want of due care and caution in a case in reference to the general circumstances, the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule for deciding whether an accused acted in good faith within the meaning of 9th exception, as it is an issue to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case, nature of imputation made, the circumstances under which it was made, the status of the person who made it, and if there was a malice in his mind when he made such imputation, whether he made any inquiry before any such imputation was made and if there were reasons to accept his story, that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that imputation was true.

13. In “Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1965) 2 SCR 235”, Exception 9 of Section 499IPC has been interpreted in para 20 and 21 as follows:-

             "20. Another       aspect    of     this
             requirement      has    been     pithily
             expressed by the Bombay High
             Court in the case of Emperor v.
             Abdool Wadood Ahmed.             "Good

faith,” it was observed “requires not indeed logical infallibility, but due care and attention. But how far erroneous actions or statements are to be imputed to want of due care and caution must, in each case, be considered with reference to the general circumstances and the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question”. “it is only to be expected”, says the judgment, “that the honest conclusions of a calm and philosophical mind may differ very largely from the honest conclusions of a person excited by sectarian zeal and untrained to habits of precise reasoning. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that good faith in the formation or expression of an opinion, can afford no protection to an imputation which does not purport to be based on that which is the legitimate subject of public comment.”

21. Thus, it would be clear that in deciding whether an accused person acted in good faith under the Ninth Exception, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rule or test. It would be a question to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case – what is the nature of the imputation made; under what circumstances did it come to be made; what is the status of the person who makes the imputation;

was there any malice in his mind when he made the said imputation;

did he make any enquiry before he made it; are there reasons to accept his story that he acted with due care and attention and was satisfied that the imputation was true? These and other considerations would be relevant in deciding the plea of good faith made by an accused person who claims the benefit of the Ninth Exception……………….”

14. Telegram dated 17.9.2002 received by the complainant at his house and allegedly read by his family members i.e. his wife reads as below:-

                   "CARD     NO.5404     6112   0055


                   TOTAL              AMOUNT
                   OUTSTANDING             IS
                   RS.362373.01 AAA DESPITE
                   AMPTEEN       EFFORTS  TO
                   CONTACT YOU AT YOUR
                   OFFICE     AS    WELL  AS
                   RESIDENCE NUMBER AAA WE
                   HAVE NOT HEARD FROM YOU
                   SO FAR AAA YOUR CARD
                   ACCOUNT IS IN A SERIOUS
                   STAGE OR DELIQUENCY AND
                   ANY FUTHER DELAY ON
                   YOUR PART TO ADDRESS THE
                   MATTER MAY PROOF COSTLY
                   IN TERMS OF MONEY AS
                   WELL AS LITIGATION/BOTH


                    CIVIL  AND    CRIMINAL/IN
                   YOUR NAME CALL BANK
                   RIGHT AWAY AT 3705254."



15. According to the complainant the imputation on his character in this telegram were ” and any further delay on your part to address the matter may prove costly in terms of money as well as litigation/both civil and criminal/in your name”. This telegram in no manner can be considered as defamatory in nature. This telegram only expressed the concern of the bank/petitioner to get the dues of the credit card cleared well in time and in case there was default, it would invite criminal as well as civil liability.

16. Mens Rea; a mandatory pre-requisite of an offence of defamation is clearly missing in the said communication. This communication made bonafidely by the petitioner bank upon the subject matter contained therein, in which the petitioner had an interest or it had the duty to correspond with the complainant asking him to clear the dues under the circumstances would be privileged and would attract exception 9th. Petitioner bank had no reason to lower the dignity and character of the complainant in the eyes of anyone. The bank was not reckless in sending this telegram to the complainant. The complainant upon responding to the correspondence though denied his liability to pay the amount having no concern with the card in question as he never held the said card in his name. Action of the bank was in good faith as also in public good as the entire process of correspondence with the complainant was with a view to protect the public money safely invested with the bank and found due from the complainant (as per the bank‟s record) was repaid.

17. Besides, requirement of publishing any imputation concerning the complainant is also missing in this case. This telegram was sent to the complainant only. The alleged information by accused No.4 to the wife of the complainant cannot in any manner be considered as defamatory. The intimation communicated to the wife of the complainant was that there were no dues left to be claimed in the account of the complainant and in case any communication was received from the bank in future, the same should be ignored.

18. This information in no manner lowered the dignity of the complainant in the eyes of his wife. This intimation was bonafidely made with a view to save the complainant from future harassment at the hands of the petitioner and other accused persons. The wife of the complainant on receipt of the information on telephone from accused No.4 of her own motion made inquiries from friends of the complainant about the alleged account without any realm or reason and, therefore, such inquiries made by her from the friends of the complainant do not invite the provisions of Section 499/500 IPC.

19. The Civil Court in a suit for mandatory injunction and for damages decreed the suit of the complainant awarding damages to him against the bank. The observations of the Civil Court in the said suit that the persistent acts of the bank without any ground was defamatory in nature and harmed the reputation of the complainant might be relevant, however, they are not conclusive and binding on the Magistrate to be followed and accepted. The reason being the Civil Court has to appreciate the evidence of the plaintiff in a suit for damages based on defamation with a different yardstick and is not required to assess the evidence with a view to find out if any criminality was involved. In other words, the Civil Court is not concerned whether such acts of defamation were malafidely done with an intention to lower and harm the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of his family members and others. For inviting the provisions contained in Section 499/500 IPC which are penal in nature, a Magistrate has to consider if the requirement of mens rea which is a mandate for a criminal defamation punishable under Section 500 IPC was fulfilled. If mens rea or criminal intention is lacking or is missing in the act of the accused, he cannot be held guilty for an offence of defamation within the meaning of Section 499 IPC. In this case the image or reputation of the complainant was not tarnished in any manner by the petitioner bank. None of the correspondence were ever published or sent to any other person other than the complainant himself. Besides, none of these correspondence indicate that the bank used such language in the letters sent to the complaint which could be termed as defamatory, especially the telegram dated 17.9.2002 or the telephone call received by his wife. Therefore, prima facie, the complaint did not disclose any offence of defamation made out against the petitioner bank.

20. Undisputedly, the petitioner is a bank incorporated in England with limited liability by Royal Charter, 1853 and, therefore, is a corporation/company. A company cannot be in any case held to have committed an offence under Section 500 IPC because, most essential ingredient of the said offence i.e. „mens rea‟ would be missing as a company is a juristic entity or an artificial person, whereas a Director is not a company. The company may be made liable for offences, however, if there is anything in the definition or context of a particular Section of a particular statute which would prevent the application of the said section to a limited company, the limited company cannot be proceeded against. There are number of provisions of law in which it would be physically impossible by a limited company to commit the offence. A limited company, therefore, cannot generally be tried for offences where mens rea is essential. Similarly, a company cannot face the punishment of imprisonment for obvious reasons that company cannot be sent to prison by way of a sentence.

21. Under these circumstances, petitioner being a company cannot be held to have committed an offence under Section 500 IPC.

22. Under the circumstances of the case, the trial court did not appreciate the contents of the complaint and the material placed on record by the complainant along with complaint in the right perspective while taking cognizance of offence under Section 500 IPC and consequent summoning of the petitioner bank.

23. Hence, petition is allowed. Complaint No.144/1/2003 and the impugned order dated 20.12.2006 passed therein are hereby quashed qua the petitioner/bank only. The trial court is within its rights to proceed against the other accused persons as per the provisions of law. Attested copy of the order be sent to the trial court.

(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE February 06, 2009 vk