Cause of action is date of offence not date of acquittal

Excerpt:

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Yashvant Malhotra vs A.K.Sinha on 20 December, 2019
CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                                   -1-



           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
                          CHANDIGARH
(1)
                                             Crl. Misc. No. M-11992-2017 (O&M)
                                             Date of decision: December 20, 2019

Yashvant Malhotra
                                                               ..... PETITIONER(s)

                          Versus

A.K. Sinha
                                                            ....RESPONDENT(s)

Crl. Misc. No.M-13649 of 2017 (O&M) J.N. Parsad ….. PETITIONER(s) Versus A.K. Sinha and another ….RESPONDENT(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER GUPTA Present: Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arshdeep Singh Cheema, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-11992-2017.

Mr. Sumeet Goel, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-13649-2017.

Mr. Mohan Singla, Advocate for respondent No.1.

Mr. Sukant Gupta, AP.P. for U.T. Chandigarh. SURINDER GUPTA, J(Oral) The complaint describes the brief facts of the case in para 3, which are reproduced as follows:-

“That the brief facts leading to the present complaint are 1 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -2-

as under:

(a) when the complainant was working as Commissioner and Secretary to Govt., Haryana Govt., at Chandigarh the accused no. 1, suo moto, registered a preliminary enquiry (hereinafter referred to as ‘PE’) in a transaction conducted during the period 1979-80, alleged to have been connected with some purchase order for WEEDICIDE issued by the complainant as the Director of Agriculture Haryana in 1980.

(b) the accused no. 1, thereafter, marked the same enquiry to accused no. 2 and ordered him to submit a P.E. report. The accused no. 2 conducted the whole P.E. within a span of 4-5 weeks and submitted a P.E. report to the accused no. 1.

(c) the accused no. 1, thereafter, suo moto registered an FIR bearing No. RC 5 of 1987 u/s 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 5(2) r/w 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (& Sec. 5(2) r/w 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947) on dated 23.12.1987 against the complainant and two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of FIR dated 23.12.1987 is annexed as Annexure C-1.

(d) The accused No. 3 who was the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana signed the sanction order for the prosecution of the complainant on the behalf of His Excellency Governor of Haryana without having shown the concerned sanction order to the then Excellency Governor.

(e) the accused no. 1, thereafter, handed over the investigation in the above-mentioned FIR to accused no. 4 who was then DSP, CBI. The accused no. 4 had completed the investigation in 28 months and after a long period of 2 years and 4 months i.e. 28 months, he filed a charge sheet on 22.08.1990 against the complainant and 2 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -3-

two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of charge sheet is annexed as Annexure C-2.

(f) the complainant was never examined by the accused No. 4 during the period of so-called above mentioned investigation on any aspect.

(g) the trial, thereafter, was conducted and during the trial prosecution examined 28 witnesses numbered as PW1 to PW29 except numbered as PW10 and produced so many documents on record.

(h) the trial Court after going through, thoroughly, all the statement of witnesses and the documents on record and arguments of the counsels of the parties pronounced its final judgment on dated 11.09.2014 and acquitted the complainant and two others from all charges. The copy of judgment of the trial Court is annexed as Annexure C-3.”

Learned trial Court on the basis of statement of complainant in preliminary evidence, observed that the accused named in the complaint have not followed the ordinary practice of registration of case, investigation, grant of sanction and putting the complainant to trial in the case registered against him.

Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that respondent has been victimised and the commission of offence under Section 166 and 499 of Indian Penal Code (for short-IPC) was disclosed against petitioners Yashvant Malhotra, J.N. Parsad along with co-accused Kulwant Singh, Purshotam Lal, and Bhaskar Raj Saxena and ordered their summoning vide order dated 25.09.2015.

Petitioners filed separate revisions against the summoning order, which were dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh 3 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -4-

vide separate orders dated 23.01.2017.

Both the petitioners have filed above captioned petitions under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (for short-Cr.P.C.) challenging the orders passed by learned Magistrate and learned Sessions Judge, Chandigarh.

The first point raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that FIR against the respondent was registered in the year 1987 and the complaint was filed on 22.04.2015 i.e. after a period of 28 years and is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 403.

Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the offence of defamation is a continuing offence giving recurring cause of action to the complainant-respondent. He was defamed from the year the FIR was registered against him till he was acquitted. From the date of acquittal, complaint is within limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in cases of Ajay Agarwal Vs. Union of India 1993(3) SCC 609; State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and another 1972(2) SCC 890; and Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P. 1984 (4) SCC 222.

To find answer to the query as to whether the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent is within limitation, reference can be made to the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (supra), wherein a similar question was directly answered. Order of Magistrate was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC as the limitation prescribed under Section 4 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -5-

468 Cr.P.C. had expired. The appellant before the Hon’ble Apex Court, who was working as General Secretary, had filed a complaint against respondent Ascharaj Lal Chopra, who was working as Special Assistant in the bank and Amrik Singh, working as Clerk, for the offence punishable under Section 406, 420 IPC on 15.03.1972, alleging some misappropriation by them. They were convicted by the trial Court but acquitted by the Appellate Court vide judgment dated 01.04.1975 and the judgment of acquittal was upheld by this Court. Ashcharaj Lal Chopra (respondent) filed a complaint against Surinder Mohan Vikal (complainant in complaint case) on 11.02.1976 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Learned Magistrate summoned him and the petition filed by him under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed by this Court. Taking note of all the above facts, Hon’ble Apex Court observed in para 5 and 6 as follows:-

“It will be recalled that the complaint for the commission of the offence under section 406/420 I.P.C. was. filed on March 15. It has specially been stated in the respondents complaint under section 500 I.P.C. that the defamatory matter was contained in that complaint. So, according to the complaint, the offence under section 500 I.P.C. was committed on March 15, 1972, which was the date of the within the meaning of section 469 (1) (a) of the Code, and the period of three years’ limitation would be calculated with reference to that date for purposes of the bar provided by section 468. But, as has been stated, the complaint under section 500 I.P.C. was filed on February 11, 1976, much after the expiry of that period. It was therefore not permissible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.

                                   5 of 7

 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                               -6-



The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground the “cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not before he (respondent) was acquitted by the Court of Session.” the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appears that High Court took the view that the “protection of section 468(c) was not available to the appellant. We are constrained to say the question of “cause of action could not really arise in this as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. It been stated, sub-section (1) of section 469 of the Code specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in section 468, in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore follow that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for purpose of calculating the three years’ period of limitation. High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.”

The citations referred by learned counsel for respondent that it is a continuing offence, as such, are not applicable to the facts of the present case as defamation is by a particular act and is not a continuing offence. The complaint filed by respondent is clearly barred by limitation and learned trial Court and the Court of revision have committed error while overlooking this fact. As such, both these petitions deserve to be allowed on this short ground.

In view of the above settled proposition of law, it is not required to examine the other plea raised by petitioners. Both these petitions have merits and are allowed. Criminal Complaint No.76 of 2015 (Annexure P-4) and summoning order dated 25.09.2015 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, 6 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -7-

Chandigarh along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

                                                    (SURINDER GUPTA)
December 20, 2019                                       JUDGE
Sachin M.

            Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

            Whether Reportable:              Yes/No




                                   7 of 7

Vishveshwar Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Another

Excerpt:, I am of the view that in the present case as well, it would be appropriate to have a full-fledged trial so as to gather the intention of the accused, whether it was there to defame the opposite party no. 2 in order to lower his image in the estimation of the public and with that motive the news item was printed or whether it was simply a statement of fact. This Court cannot prejudge this issue without the full trial.
Allahabad High Court
Vishveshwar Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Another on 2 September, 2019
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Singh-I
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Judgment Reserved on : 08.08.2019
 
Judgment Delivered on :  02.09.2019
 

 
Court No. - 65
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 38158 of 2012
 

 
Applicant :- Vishveshwar Kumar
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Imran Ullah
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt.Advocate,N.L.Pandey,Pankaj Srivastava
 

 
Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J.

Heard learned counsel for the applicant Shri Imran Ullah and in opposition, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 Shri N.L. Pandey, learned A.G.A. for the State Shri G.P. Singh and perused the record.

2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Code’) has been moved on behalf of the applicant with a prayer to quash the entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 583 of 2012 (Natthu Lal Yadav v. Pradhan Sampadak and others), under Sections 500, 501 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’), Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi, pending in the court of A.C.J.M.-II, Varanasi.

3. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant and the contentions made in the affidavit filed on his behalf, it would be pertinent to refer here in brief, the complainant’s case as narrated in the complaint and the evidence which has been adduced in support thereof. According to the complaint, one Sessions Trial No. 642 of 1999 was initiated against the opposite party no. 2/complainant under Sections 302, 120B of I.P.C., Police Station – Chowk, District – Varanasi pertaining to Crime No. 10 of 1999, in which he was acquitted vide judgment and order dated 05.08.2002 by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5. The Advisory Committee of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) had communicated by FAX to the opposite party no. 2 that his detention was found to be against law and a direction was issued for his immediate release. Earlier, the District Magistrate had cancelled the license of S.B.B.L. gun of the opposite party no. 2, but subsequently, a report was sent by Inspector, Kotwali pertaining to Crime No. 10 of 1999 in respect to the cancellation of gun license of the opposite party no. 2 and after consideration of the same, the District Magistrate vide order dated 25.08.1999, had cancelled his gun license, against which an appeal was preferred by him before the Commissioner, Varanasi under Section 19 of the Arms Act, 1959 and vide order dated 26.02.2001, the order of District Magistrate was confirmed, against which the opposite party no. 2 had preferred a writ petition No. 20298 of 2010 before the High Court, in which the orders of the District Magistrate and the Commissioner were set aside and the said gun was released in favour of opposite party no. 2 and his armed license gun was renewed up to 2009 and was valid till then. The accused-applicant along with two other co-accused were fully aware of these facts, but in order to assail his dignity, at the instance of co-accused (Sanjay Singh, Inspector, Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi), on 13.06.2007, untrue facts were published in the newspapers, which were derogatory to the opposite party no. 2 and considerably dented his esteem in the eyes of public and people started looking upon him in adverse light and this also led to the breakage of betrothal (‘sagaai’) of the complainant’s son and people started avoiding to meet him so much so that it became very difficult for him to move around and live peacefully a dignified life. This caused immense physical, mental and financial loss to him.

4. The said complaint was registered as Complaint Case No. 2025 of 2007 against the applicant and two other co-accused and on 25.06.2007, the statement of the opposite party no. 2 was recorded under Section 200 of the Code, in which he narrated the same version which has been stated above in the complaint, further clarifying that all the three accused, which included the applicant, in conspiracy with each other, published news item in ‘Hindustan’ and ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspapers on 13.06.2007. The local editors of the said two daily newspapers were made accused along with the S.I. Sanjay Singh who were stated to have deliberately published the said news item, which led to the defamation of the opposite party no. 2 and therefore, it was mentioned that a sum of Rs. 10 lacs should be directed to be paid by the accused to compensate the opposite party no. 2.

5. In support of the complaint, one Manoj Kumar Srivastava was examined by the opposite party no. 2 as P.W.1 under Section 202 of the Code, who has stated that he knew the opposite party no. 2 and had read news item in ‘Amar Ujala’, Varanasi edition dated 13.06.2007, carrying news item pertaining to the opposite party no. 2, after reading which, he received a big jolt that the opposite party no. 2 was a man with criminal antecedents, having case under Section 302 of I.P.C. and he was a history-sheeter. His other friends were having the same kind feeling towards him after having read the news and started avoiding to meet him. The other witness, namely, Kashi Seth was also examined by the opposite party no. 2 as P.W.2. He also has stated that he read the Varanasi Edition of the ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspaper dated 13.06.2007 and came to know about the opposite party no. 2 being a history-sheeter and this led him not to have confidence in the opposite party no. 2 as his reputation had gone down badly. The marriage of opposite party no. 2’s son which was likely to take place also had broken because of the said news item having been widely read by the general public.

6. Based on the said evidence, the trial court passed the order dated 10.01.2008, wherein it was recorded that the news item which was published by the accused-applicant was nothing but publishing correct news and therefore, the same would not fall in the category of any offence. The accused being an editor of the ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspaper, had published the said item only thinking that the said news item was correct and it would not appear to him that if the same was published by him, it would bring down the esteem of the opposite party no. 2 in the eyes of public. As regards the third accused Sanjay Singh, Inspector, Kotwali, the action taken by him fell within the domain of his official duty in respect of cancellation of arm’s license of opposite party no. 2. Merely on account of opposite party no. 2 being acquitted, it could not be said that accused no. 3 had proceeded to take action for cancellation of arms license in order to damage his reputation. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. Against the said order, a revision (Criminal Revision No. 09 of 2008) was preferred in which the Sessions Judge, Varanasi vide judgment and order dated 29.02.2008, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate mentioned above and remanded the matter back to the trial court to decide the matter afresh after hearing the counsel for the complainant and considering the evidence on record. While passing the said order, the learned revisional court observed that although the complainant had been acquitted in the cases pending against him, getting benefit of doubt, but in the publication dated 13.06.2007, it was written ^^fgLVªh’khVj Hkh ysdj ?kwe jgsa ykblsalh vlygk^^. The name of the opposite party no. 2 was also mentioned therein, therefore, it was not appropriate for the newspaper to publish such news without proper enquiry. The opposite party no. 2 had been acquitted by the Additional District Judge on 05.08.2002 and by the order of High Court in Writ Petition No. 20298 of 2001, the petition of opposite party no. 2 was allowed and his arm’s license was restored in the year 2003. Thus, after 2003 till 2007, there was nothing against the opposite party no. 2 which could be the basis for publishing such news item that he was a history-sheeter detenue of “RASUKA” (Rashtriya Suraksha Kanoon). Further, it is mentioned in the said judgment that the publication of the fact mentioned in the complaint could not be said to be bona fide and the conclusion drawn by the learned trial court that true facts were published could not be said to be in accordance with evidence on record and accordingly, the revision was allowed.

7. Thereafter, the trial court passed the impugned order dated 09.07.2009, in which it has been recorded that the revisional court, while allowing the revision on 29.02.2008, has directed it to pass fresh order on the basis of evidence, after hearing the parties again. The revisional court in its order while drawing the conclusion, has mentioned that the publication made in the newspapers did not appear to have been published bona fidely and hence, according to the conclusion drawn by the revisional court, the accused deserves to be summoned to face trial under Section 500 of I.P.C. and accordingly, summons were issued against the applicant along with other two co-accused.

8. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant was that the impugned order was totally illegal because the same was not passed on the appreciation of the evidence on record by the learned Magistrate, rather it has been passed in accordance with the wishes/opinion formed by the revisional court, which is wrong. The learned Magistrate was directed to consider the evidence afresh and after hearing the parties, he should have passed fresh order, expressing his own opinion as to whether prima facie case under the relevant sections were made out or not and it should not have passed the order merely because the revisional court had expressed opinion that the said offence was found to be made out.

9. Attention of this Court was also drawn to the order of the District Magistrate, Varanasi dated 15.10.2007 at page no. 85 of the paper book, in which as many as four criminal cases are shown to have been recorded against opposite party no. 2 and it was also mentioned therein that on the basis of police report, showing those cases to have been initiated against opposite party no. 2, was held to be the basis for cancelling the arm’s license of the opposite party no. 2. He was issued notice to show cause on 19.07.2007. In response to the said notice, the opposite party no. 2 had filed objection on 17.08.2007, stating therein that the Crime No. 10 of 1999 was registered against him because a widow lady had received a bullet injury and concerning that, proceedings were also initiated against him under N.S.A. His arm’s license was also cancelled vide order dated 25.08.1999, against which he had preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, which too was dismissed and thereafter, a writ petition No. 20298 of 2001 was preferred by the opposite party no. 2 and in the said petition, vide order dated 14.05.2003, the orders of District Magistrate and the Commissioner were set aside and the arm’s license of the opposite party no. 2 was directed to be restored and on that basis, the show cause notice was taken back with immediate effect and the gun was directed to be restored to opposite party no. 2. It was argued after having shown the said order, that the said order was passed on 15.10.2007, while the publication of news item was made on 13.06.2007, which was stated to be derogatory and defamatory against the opposite party no. 2. Therefore, it is apparent that the accused-applicant did not have any knowledge that any such order was passed by the District Magistrate, restoring the arm’s license to the opposite party no. 2 after having found that the criminal case shown pending against him had resulted in acquittal and the High Court had passed a direction in his favour to restore the license and the weapon as well.

10. The sole basis of making publication of the said news item was that there was report of the co-accused Sanjay Singh to the effect that the above-mentioned four cases were pending against him and hence, he had made the said publication simply on the basis of the police report. There was no intention while publishing the said news item to defame the opposite party no. 2, rather it was simply a news item, which was statement of fact, basis of which was police report, which later on came to be set aside by the order of District Magistrate dated 15.10.2007, hence, he cannot be held liable for having caused offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C.

11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the quashing of the proceedings against the applicant because according to him, it was very much in the knowledge of the accused-applicant that those criminal cases, which are cited above, had already been closed and the accused-applicant had been acquitted and the license of the gun was also restored to the opposite party no. 2 and yet, knowing full well, the said news item was published in the said papers with a view to maligning the image of the opposite party no. 2, hence, offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C. were made out on the basis of evidence which has been recorded by the trial court.

12. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Sitaram and Another v. CFL Capital Financial Service Limited and Another1. In the above-mentioned case, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that when a person files a complaint and supports it on oath, rendering himself liable to prosecution and embezzlement, if it is false, he is entitled to be believed unless there is some apparent reason for disbelieving him; and he is entitled to have the person, against whom he complains, brought before the court and tried. The only condition requisite for the issue of process is that the complainant’s deposition must show sufficient ground for proceeding.

13. From the side of the applicant, in paragraph no. 32 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that a perusal of the order dated 15.10.2007 passed by the District Magistrate would itself demonstrate that the D.M. was not in the knowledge of earlier proceedings and as such if at all he had given any statement against opposite party no. 2, that was on the basis of criminal proceedings and relying on the police report. However, the reporting of the publishing was done only on the basis of the statement given by the then-District Magistrate and after doing preliminary enquiry by the reporter concerned, whereby he was shown the papers regarding criminal prosecution as well as the reports given by the police station concerned to the District Magistrate and as such, it cannot be said that the said reporting was done with laxity and without proper investigation, with an intention to defame any person. The petitioner/applicant, at the time of the said reporting, was Resident Editor of Hindustan Times Media Ltd. The said reporting was not done by him. There was no intention nor any personal enmity with the complainant to publish false report against him, rather it was a plain and simple reporting of the fact as narrated by the then District Magistrate, Varanasi and there was no ulterior motive against the complainant to defame him or tarnish his image. The trial court has ignored the settled principle of law that in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have intention as well knowledge to have aided in the commission of the offence.

14. In the instant case, the applicant cannot be said to be an abettor as there was no intention or knowledge to commit the offence. There was no prima facie case made out against the applicant. There is not an iota of single specific allegation against the applicant in relation to the publication of the said news item and yet he has been summoned. Further, it was mentioned that under Section 7 of the Press and Regulation of Books Act, 1867, it is only the office of the “editor” as defined under Section 1(1) of the Act who can be held responsible for the publication and no other person. The said Act has been reproduced in the affidavit. It was necessary that the editor should have been directly responsible for publishing any news item.

15. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Alagh v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, in which it is held that there is no concept of vicarious liability under criminal law. The trial court has miserably failed to appreciate the evidence on record and has taken cognizance erroneously, which needs to be set aside.

16. From the side of opposite party no. 2, counter affidavit has been filed, in which all the submissions made in the affidavit have been rebutted and it has been asserted that there was sufficient evidence on record for the trial court to summon the accused under the aforesaid sections.

17. In the rejoinder affidavit filed from the side of the applicant, the same facts have been reiterated, which have been mentioned in the affidavit and nothing new has been stated.

18. The facts in the case are very much clear, as has been mentioned above. It is a fact that the opposite party no. 2 was an accused under Section 302 of I.P.C., but he had been acquitted for the same by the trial court way back in the year 2002 and the gun license was issued in favour of opposite party no. 2, which was cancelled by the District Magistrate and thereafter, the said decision was upheld by the Commissioner. Both the orders were set aside by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 20298 of 2001 vide order dated 14.05.2003 and the said license was restored to the opposite party no. 2, while the news item in question has been published in 2007. It is apparent that the said news item appears to have been printed in newspapers without taking proper care and making proper enquiry and the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same could have been published in order to bring down the image of the opposite party no. 2, as has been stated in the complaint and supported by the two witnesses named above. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant had no intention to defame opposite party no. 2 and that he had simply printed the news item on the basis of his information which he had received from the District Magistrate and also on the basis of police report, is something which needs to be decided by the trial court after having appreciated the evidence on record of both the sides and after having appreciated in the light of cross-examination made as to whether the evidence to be adduced by the parties proves the offence as has been committed by the accused-applicant or not. In case the trial court comes to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence on record to hold the accused guilty of having published the said news item deliberately in order to lower his image in the estimation of public, then the accused may get acquittal from the trial court, but at this stage, prima facie there is evidence against the applicant which discloses commission of offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C.

19. Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C. are reproduced herein below :-

500. Punishment for defamation.–Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.–Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

20. It is apparent from the above definition of offence under Section 501 of I.P.C. that if someone prints or engraves any matter knowing that such matter is defamatory of a person, he shall be punished with two years’ simple imprisonment or with fine or with both.

21. In the present case, there is certainly a news item printed, which is found by the trial court to be defamatory against the opposite party no. 2, as two witnesses have stated that when they read the said piece of evidence, they started viewing the opposite party no. 2 in poor light, considering that he was a criminal and tried to stay away from him and the marriage of his son had also broken on that account. Therefore, the fact as to whether the said news item was printed in the said newspapers knowingly that the same would tarnish the image of the opposite party no. 2 or not, is a matter of evidence and a full-fledged trial is required to be held for the same. Therefore, at the initial stage, the proceedings against the applicant cannot be nibbed in the bud and reliance may be placed by me upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Md. Abdullah Khan v. Prakash K.3, wherein it was held that it must be established that matter printed and offered for sale is defamatory within the meaning of expression under Section of 499 of I.P.C. If so proved, the next step would be to examine the question whether the accused-respondent committed the acts which constitute the offence of which he is charged, with the requisite intention or knowledge, etc. to make his act culpable. The answer to question depends upon facts. If the respondent is the person who either made or published the defamatory imputation, he would be liable for punishment under Section 500 of I.P.C. and if he is the person who “printed” the matter, then within the meaning of expression under Section 501 of I.P.C. Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent for the said offence, is a matter that can be examined only after recording the evidence at the time of the trial. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the High Court did not choose to give any reason, whatsoever, for quashing the complaint, except concluding that the prosecution of accused would lead to miscarriage of justice, which was held to be wrong and it was considered proper that the trial ought to have been held.

23. Adopting the above principle of law in the present case, I am of the view that in the present case as well, it would be appropriate to have a full-fledged trial so as to gather the intention of the accused, whether it was there to defame the opposite party no. 2 in order to lower his image in the estimation of the public and with that motive the news item was printed or whether it was simply a statement of fact. This Court cannot prejudge this issue without the full trial.

23. In view of the aforesaid, the prayer for quashing the entire proceedings in the aforesaid case is refused and resultantly, the instantly application stands rejected.

Order Date :- September 02, 2019 I.Batabyal [Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J.]

Bikramjit ahluwalia vs simran ahluwalia

Excerpt:It is also an established principle of law that the burden to prove that a case falls within the exceptions to section 499 IPC is on the party who contends it to exist.

To constitute „defamation‟ under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with intention of harming or with a knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made.

In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged.

From the perusal of the records and the complaint of respondent No. 1 it is observed that the averments made by the petitioner do prima facie appear to be defamatory and injurious to the image of  Page 12 of 14 respondent No. 1. The said imputations are directed towards the character of the said respondent. Thus, at this stage this Court is not convinced with the arguments of the petitioner that not even a prima facie case is established against the petitioners for the offence alleged.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alleged defamatory statements made by the accused persons in the pleadings of previous civil proceedings and statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant case. This contention does not find favour with this court. The pleadings form a part of the judicial records and form a part of public documents. Anything stated in such pleadings, therefore, amount to the publication of the defamatory statements. Further the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections 499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only “qualified privilege” and not “absolute privilege”.

 

 

 

 

 

Delhi High Court

Bikramjit Ahluwalia & Ors. vs Simran Ahluwalia & Anr.

on 1 May, 2015

Author: V.P.Vaish

*         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                Reserved on: 13th March, 2015
%                                              Date of Decision: 01st May, 2015

+         CRL.M.C. 447/2013

BIKRAMJIT AHLUWALIA & ORS.            ..... Petitioners
                Through: Mr. Y.P. Narula, Sr. Adv. with
                           Mr. Aniruddha Choudhury,
                           Mr.Abhay Narula & Mr.Ujas
                           Kumar, Advs.

                                           versus

SIMRAN AHLUWALIA & ANR.                                   ..... Respondents
                Through:                        Ms.Anu Narula, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.P.VAISH

                                      JUDGMENT

1. By way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as „Cr.P.C.‟) the petitioners seek quashing of the criminal complaint case No. 49 of 2012 filed by respondent No.1 in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06 (East), Karkardooma Court, Shahdara, Delhi alleging offences under Section 499 read with Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟) alongwith quashing of the summons issued pursuant thereto.

2. Succinctly stating the facts of the present case as emerging from the petition are that marriage between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 was solemnized on 26.11.2001 as per Hindu rites, customs and Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 1 of 14 ceremonies. Out of the said wedlock a female child was born on 04.09.2002. Thereafter, certain differences arose between the said parties and respondent No.1 left petitioner No.3 in April, 2008. At that time, she took along with her their minor daughter who was only five years old. Since then, there have been continuous inter se disputes between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 which are pending adjudication before various courts. During the course of the said proceedings, pleadings were filed by the petitioners which were taken to be defamatory by respondent No.1 and accordingly a criminal complaint was filed.

3. On the basis of the said complaint case No. 49/2012, the petitioners received summons on 01.02.2013 from the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi under Sections 500/34 IPC.

4. It is against the said complaint case and the summons received by the petitioners that the petitioners have filed the present petition.

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the complaint is not maintainable as the respondent No.1 has not specified the averments in the pleadings on the basis of which she is resting her claim for defamation. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate committed an error in law in taking cognizance of the complaint for defamation on the basis of records of pending civil proceedings and on the basis of statements recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., during the course of investigation of criminal complaints filed by the respondent No.1. Pleadings filed by the petitioner in the civil proceedings as well as the statement made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be made the basis of the complaint for defamation. Respondent Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 2 of 14 No.1 has not identified any specific allegations/imputations made by the petitioners against her constituting an offence of defamation of respondent No.1 in public.

6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the inferences drawn by respondent No.1 on the basis of circumstances and statements made during litigation between the parties cannot be considered defamatory under Sections 499/500 IPC. The police officer, who investigated the complaint of respondent No.1 and witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the police, cannot be made co-accused in a defamation complaint. Admittedly, respondent No.1 is litigating with the petitioners and the averments made by the petitioners in civil proceedings, which are under adjudication, cannot be made the subject matter of a complaint for defamation. Even if it is presumed that the statements made by the petitioners are defamatory in nature, they would be covered by the fifth exception to Section 499 IPC.

7. It was lastly contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that from the allegations made in complaint and keeping in view the conduct of respondent No.1, it is apparent that respondent No.1 is only interested in implicating the petitioners in false criminal cases by filing false complaints and the said conduct of respondent No.1 amounts to an abuse of the process of Court.

8. In supports of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon a catena of judgments which include, ‘Raminder Kaur Bedi v. Jatinder Singh Bedi’, 1989 (16) DRJ 154; ‘S.P. Satsangi v. Krishna Kumar Satsangi’, II (2007) DMC 425; ‘Alli Rani Joseph Mathew v. P. Arun Kumar’, 2013 (1) CTC 661;

Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 3 of 14 ‘Gopi R. Mallya v. Smt. Pushpa’, 1997 Kar LJ 216 ; ‘Geetha v. A.K. Dhamodharan’, CDJ 2011 MHC 3809; ‘Re: P. Ramaswami Mudaliar’, (1938) 1 MLJ 810; ‘M.P. Singh Sahni v. State’, Crl.M.C. No. 3779 of 2003 decided on 30.05.2013; ‘Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd & Ors.’, AIR 2006 SC 2780 and ‘Shatrughan Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi & Ors.’, (1996) 6 SCC 263.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that the present petition is not maintainable on the face of it as the trial court is seized with the matter and has taken cognizance on the basis of pre-summoning evidence led by respondent No.1. The trial court summoned the petitioners only after being prima facie convinced by the act of defamation by the petitioners. The sole purpose of the petitioners is to malign and defame the image of respondent No.1 before the courts by averting that she has demanded huge sum of money for settlement. The petitioners have always made highly defamatory false statements. In the present petition also the petitioners tried to do the same thing by showing that respondent No.1 has demanded huge sum for settlement of dispute. The petitioners have kept this court in dark by not filing the entire documents on record with the present petition which are relied upon by respondent No.1 before the trial court on the basis of which trial court established a prima facie case against the accused persons. The chain of circumstances established by the respondent No.1 in her complaint clearly show the common intention shared by the petitioners and other accused persons in connivance with each other to defame and malign respondent No.1‟s character.

 Page 4 of 14

10. It was further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that pleadings filed by the petitioners in civil proceedings, can be quoted out of context and used for filing a complaint for defamation. Any averment made in judicial records containing defamatory statements, amounts to publication as the judicial records are public documents. Fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is not applicable to the present proceedings as it is solely based upon the proposition of good faith, which cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined after completion of trial. This Court while exercising its inherent powers cannot quash the complaint only on the basis that the trial will not result in conviction of the accused persons. The opinion given by the IO in the closure reports without any substantive proof on record are not the acts done in official capacity and may have an effect of tarnishing the image of respondent No.1 before the public.

11. It was also contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that despite the defamatory allegations made by the petitioners and other accused persons against respondent No.1, the trial court has ordered to file supplementary chargesheet against the petitioners after finding the truth in the protest petition of the respondent No.1 in FIR No. 273/2010 under sections 498A/406/34 IPC.

12. It was lastly submitted by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. has already been served on the petitioners and the trial in the complaint case has already commenced. The petitioners did not challenge the notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.

13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the material on record.

Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 5 of 14

14. At the outset it may be mentioned that the petitioners have not filed copy of the summoning order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi.

15. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to reproduce relevant provisions of Section 499 IPC which read as under:

“499. Defamation.–Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1-3 Explanation 4.–No imputation is said to harm a person‟s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

xxx xxx xxx Fifth Exception. – Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and other concerned – It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

                                                 Page 6 of 14

16. To constitute „defamation‟ under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with intention of harming or with a knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made.

In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged.

17. Ingredients of Section 499 IPC were discussed by this Court in „Standard Chartered Bank v. Vinay Kumar Sood‟, 2010 CrlLJ 1277 wherein it was observed as under:-

“7. For an offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC, three essential ingredients are required to be fulfilled:-

(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;

(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations.

(iii) The said imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.”

18. Further, as per Explanation 4 to the aforementioned Section, no imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, in the estimation of others or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

19. The fifth exception to the said Section provides immunity to an imputation expressed in good faith regarding the merits of any case decided by a Court of justice or to the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent in any such case. So far as the protection under fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is concerned it states that accusations preferred in good faith against a person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusations will not amount to defamation. Good faith of the person making accusations is therefore an essential condition of exemption from liability for defamation under this Exception.

20. It is a settled law that to decide whether the imputations amount to defamation, a court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 IPC triable by the Magistrate. In ‘Shatrughna Prasad Sinha vs. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi and Ors.’ (1996) 6 SCC 263 the Apex Court was of the view that:

“13….. It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence underSection 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 8 of 14 might come within the definition of ‘defamation’ under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500, IPC.”

It is also an established principle of law that the burden to prove that a case falls within the exceptions to section 499 IPC is on the party who contends it to exist.

21. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the allegations of defamation raised by respondent No.1 against the petitioners were made on the basis of the imputations made by the petitioners in the civil proceedings and the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 273/2010 under Sections 498A/406 IPC registered at P.S. Preet Vihar, Delhi. Respondent No.1 has filed the complaint before the trial court in view of the following defamatory statements made by the petitioners and other co-accused:

a) Illicit relation of respondent No.1 with Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma for which reason the complainant left the company of her husband;

b) Respondent No.1 is a money digger who is instituting false and frivolous complaints in order to extort some good amount of money from her in laws as well as using her daughter as a pawn for this purpose;

c) Respondent No.1 ran away with all her belongings including items not belonging to her;

                                       Page 9 of 14
        d)     Respondent No.1 marries for money and troubles

her in-laws at the time of Divorce/break-up for marriage;

e) Respondent No.1 is a characterless person who has/had many relationships;

f) Respondent No.1 blackmailed and pressurized the accused No.2 to marry her; and

g) Respondent No.1 is introducing Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma as the father of the child.

22. The law is also well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, F.I.R. or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, the law is equally settled that where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the F.I.R. or complaint may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the leading case of „State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.’, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 certain guidelines were issued for the exercise of these powers by the Courts. In guideline number 3 it was laid down that where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused, the Court may quash the F.I.R. as well as the investigations. A note of caution was added by observing that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It was held that the Court would not be justified in embarking Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 10 of 14 upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. Similarly, in „Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill’, (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059 and „Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi‟, (1999) 3 SCC 259, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. A note of caution was added that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful.

23. Even at the time of summoning, the Magistrate is not required to conduct a minute analysis of the evidence produced by the complainant. All that is required to be seen is whether the Magistrate has applied his mind and found sufficient reason to proceed against the accused persons. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in „Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta and Ors.‟, (2015) 3 SCC 424, held as under: –

“8. …..At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not.”

24. Further, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine. The Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 11 of 14 inherent powers of the High Court under the said Section are meant to act in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. The scope of the inherent powers of the High Court vested with it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been settled by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. In ‘Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors.’, 2007 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court reiterated the scope and powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. while stating that:

“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”

25. From the perusal of the records and the complaint of respondent No. 1 it is observed that the averments made by the petitioner do prima facie appear to be defamatory and injurious to the image of  Page 12 of 14 respondent No. 1. The said imputations are directed towards the character of the said respondent. Thus, at this stage this Court is not convinced with the arguments of the petitioner that not even a prima facie case is established against the petitioners for the offence alleged.

26. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alleged defamatory statements made by the accused persons in the pleadings of previous civil proceedings and statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant case. This contention does not find favour with this court. The pleadings form a part of the judicial records and form a part of public documents. Anything stated in such pleadings, therefore, amount to the publication of the defamatory statements. Further the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections 499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only “qualified privilege” and not “absolute privilege”.

27. The other point for consideration in the present case is whether such statements are covered by the exceptions provided under Section 499 IPC. In the opinion of this court the question whether or not such statements are covered under the said exceptions or whether such statements have been made in good faith or not cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined at the time of hearing and not under a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In ‘BalrajKhanna and Ors v. Moti Ram’, AIR 1971 SC 1389 the Apex Court in this regard was of the view that:

“30. …It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499, I.P.C, as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint.”

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is devoid of any merit, same deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed.

Crl. M.A. No.1432/2013 and 8899/2013 The applications are dismissed as infructuous.

                                        (VED PRAKASH VAISH)
                                               JUDGE
MAY 01st, 2015
hs