M.K.Varghese Cor Episcopa vs State Of Kerala

Excerpt:

PARAGRAPH NO 19.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of any of the exceptions provided to Section 499 I.P.C, whether he had made the statements in the writ petition in good faith for protection of his interest etc. are matters which cannot be decided by this Court in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Ordinarily, the question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused.

PARAGRAPH NO 20.

As noticed earlier, the question whether the petitioner had made the imputations against the complainant in the writ petition in good faith for the protection of his interest is a matter which cannot be decided in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C (See Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi :(1996) 6 SCC 263). It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C as well as all other defences that may be available to the accused will have to be gone into during the trial of the case (See Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram : AIR 1971 SC 1389 and Jeffrey J. Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 Diermeier v. State of West Bengal : (2010) 6 SCC 243).

 

Kerala High Court
M.K.Varghese Cor Episcopa vs State Of Kerala on 8 January, 2020
               IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                    PRESENT

          THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

  WEDNESDAY, THE 08TH DAY OF JANUARY 2020 / 18TH POUSHA, 1941

                       Crl.MC.No.6794 OF 2019(H)

  IN CONNECTION WITH CC 119/2019 OF CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
                       COURT, ERNAKULAM


PETITIONER/ACCUSED:

               M.K.VARGHESE COR EPISCOPA
               AGED 58 YEARS
               S/O. M.J. KOSHI, NOW WORKING AS VICAR, ST. MARYS
               ORTHODOX CHURCH, KOIPALLY, KAYAMKULAM, RESIDING AT
               MUTHALAVANAPARAMBIL, KOLLAKADAVU P.O, MAVELIKKARA.

               BY ADVS.
               SRI.K.R.VINOD
               SMT.M.S.LETHA
               KUM.K.S.SREEREKHA
               SRI.NABIL KHADER

RESPONDENTS:

      1        STATE OF KERALA
               REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
               KERALA, KOCHI-682 031

      2        PAPPACHAN PHILIPPOSE,
               AGED 64 YEARS
               S/O. T. PAPPACHAN, C/O. HOTEL GRAND SEASON,
               CHITTOOR ROAD, ERNAKULAM, PIN-682 016

                 SMT.V.SREEJA.P.P


     THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD         ON
07.11.2019, THE COURT ON 08.01.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
 Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019
                                      2



                                                                    "CR"

                    R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, J
                    ************************
                      Crl.M.C.No.6794 of 2019
             ---------------------------------------------
              Dated this the 8th day of January, 2020


                                 ORDER

The petitioner is the sole accused in the case C.C.No.119/2019 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam.

2. The aforesaid case is one instituted upon the complaint filed against the petitioner by the second respondent.

3. According to the petitioner, he is accused of committing an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. However, the petitioner has not produced copy of the order passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences on the complaint filed against him by the second respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the complainant’).

4. Annexure-A1 is the copy of the complaint filed against the petitioner. The material averments in Annexure-A1 complaint Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 are as follows: The accused filed W.P.(C) No.12448/2018 before this Court seeking police protection against certain persons who were accused in the case which was registered as Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station. In the aforesaid writ petition, the complainant was arrayed as the seventh respondent. There were various allegations and imputations made against the complainant in the aforesaid writ petition which are extracted in the complaint. Such statements made about the complainant in the writ petition filed by the accused are defamatory and the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. On 09.04.2018, the accused made a visit to the hotel in which the complainant was residing. The accused met the Manager of the hotel and made statements defamatory to the complainant to him in front of the staff and the customers of the hotel. The accused told the Manager of the hotel that the complainant is the kingpin who is arranging contract killers. Such imputation was made by the accused intentionally with the knowledge that the goodwill and reputation of the complainant would be put to danger. The accused has caused irreparable  injury to the prestige and reputation of the complainant by making the defamatory statements.

5. This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing Annexure-A1 complaint and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to that complaint.

6. Notice was served on the second respondent but he has not chosen to make appearance in this petition. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the averments in Annexure-A1 complaint do not attract the offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the averments and the statements in the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the complainant enjoy absolute privilege and on the basis of those statements, no complaint for an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C is maintainable.

8. Section 499 I.P.C states that, whoever, by words, either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. Four explanations and ten exceptions are also provided to this provision.

9. Under Section 499 I.P.C, in order that an offence of defamation may be committed, there must be making or publication of any imputation concerning any person by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. To constitute the offence of defamation there must therefore be making or publication of an imputation concerning any person and the making or publication must be with intent to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. Unless there is publication there can be no commission of an offence of defamation.

10. The writ petition filed by the petitioner against the complainant contained a statement that, the persons who were Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 accused in the case registered as Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station, are the hired goons of the complainant. The writ petition also contained a statement that the crime committed which led to the registration of Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station is the handwork of the complainant and that respondents 8 to 10 in the writ petition are the contract killers hired by the complainant. Prima facie, these statements in the writ petition filed by the petitioner, are defamatory to the complainant.

11. If the pleadings filed in the court contain defamatory statements, it amounts to publication (See Thangavelu Chettiar v. Ponnammal : AIR 1966 Mad 363). Once a statement is filed in a court of law, it can be considered as published (See Prabhakaran v. Gangadharan : 2006 (2) KLT

122).

12. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statements made by the petitioner in the writ petition filed before this Court enjoy absolute privilege. In Shybimon v. Haridas : 2010 (2) KHC Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 607: 2010 (2) KLT 158, it has been held as follows:

“If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for the criminal offence of defamation in respect of a statement made in such judicial proceeding either on oath or otherwise, his criminal liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 IPC alone. The English common law doctrine of absolute privilege can be set up as a defence only in a suit for damages under the Law of Torts. No such privilege is recognized by the Indian Penal Code beyond the limits of the exceptions embodied in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The said provision together with its exceptions forms a complete code in itself with regard to the criminal liability of a person accused of the offence of defamation. Every defamatory statement not coming within any of the 10 Exceptions to Section 499 IPC is punishable under Section 500 IPC. The Court cannot engraft thereupon any further exceptions derived from the common law of England or based on grounds of public policy”.

13. The privilege defined by the exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code must be regarded as exhaustive as to the cases which they purport to cover and recourse cannot be Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 had to the English Common Law to add new grounds of exception to those contained in the statute (See Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal: AIR 1926 Mad 906). If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for defamation in respect of a statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 I.P.C and the court cannot engraft thereupon exceptions derived from the Common Law of England or based on grounds of public policy. Consequently, a person in such a position is entitled only to the benefit of the qualified privilege (See Satis Chandra Ckakrabarti v Ram Dayal : AIR 1921 Cal 1).

14. The decision in Tiruvengada Mudali (supra) has been referred to by the Supreme Court in M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan : AIR 1970 SC 1876 and it has been held as follows:

“In Thiruvengadda Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal, ILR 49 Madras 728 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that the exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C must be regarded as exhaustive as to the cases which they purport to cover and recourse cannot be had to the English common law to add new grounds of exception to those Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 contained in the statute. A person making libellous statements in his complaint filed in court is not absolutely protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation, for under the Eighth Exception and the illustration to Section 499 the statements are privileged only when they are made in good faith. There is therefore authority for the proposition that in determining the criminality of an act under the Indian Penal Code the courts will not extend the scope of special exceptions by resorting to the rule peculiar to English common law”.

15. Reliance on the decision in Gopalankutty Nair v.

Sankunny Ezhuthassan : 1971 KLT 393 made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to claim absolute immunity from prosecution for defamation in respect of the statements made by the petitioner in the writ petition, on the ground that they are statements made in a judicial proceedings, is misplaced. The aforesaid decision was rendered in considering the maintainability of a suit filed for realisation of damages for defamation.

16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman v. Aneesh-ul-HaK : (2011) 10 SCC 696 also does not help the petitioner to show that the complaint filed against him is not Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 maintainable. It was a case in which the offences punishable under Sections 211 and 500 I.P.C were alleged against the accused. In that case, the Apex Court considered the applicability of the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C in respect of the offence punishable under Section 211 I.P.C. The Apex Court held that the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C would apply to taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 211 I.P.C committed in relation to a judicial proceedings and the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of that offence on the basis of a private complaint. It is pertinent to note that the Apex Court gave liberty to the complainant in that case to proceed with the complaint so far as the same related to commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C.

17. There is yet another aspect which requires consideration. Annexure-A1 complaint also contains averments regarding the defamatory statement allegedly made by the petitioner about the complainant when the petitioner visited the hotel in which the complainant was residing. There is a specific allegation in the complaint that the petitioner told the Manager of  the hotel that the complainant is the kingpin who is arranging contract killers and that such statement was made by him in front of the staff and the customers of the hotel. The Manager of the hotel is a witness cited in the complaint. The aforesaid words, allegedly spoken to by the petitioner to the Manager of the hotel, are, prima facie, defamatory to the complainant.

18. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of any of the exceptions provided to Section 499 I.P.C, whether he had made the statements in the writ petition in good faith for protection of his interest etc. are matters which cannot be decided by this Court in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Ordinarily, the question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused.

19. The Ninth Exception to Section 499 I.P.C provides that it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for  the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person or for the public good. The Ninth Exception deals with statement made for the protection of the interest of the person making it. The ingredients of the Ninth Exception are, first that the imputation must be made in good faith; secondly, the imputation must be for protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. Good faith is a question of fact. So is protection of the interest of the person making it.

20. As noticed earlier, the question whether the petitioner had made the imputations against the complainant in the writ petition in good faith for the protection of his interest is a matter which cannot be decided in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C (See Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi :(1996) 6 SCC 263). It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C as well as all other defences that may be available to the accused will have to be gone into during the trial of the case (See Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram : AIR 1971 SC 1389 and Jeffrey J. Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 Diermeier v. State of West Bengal : (2010) 6 SCC 243).

21. The result of the discussion above is that the prayer made by the petitioner for quashing Annexure-A1 complaint and the criminal proceedings initiated against him by the complainant cannot be allowed.

Consequently, the petition is dismissed.

(sd/-) R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JUDGE jsr/04/01/2010 Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 APPENDIX PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS:

ANNEXURE A1 THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE COURT, ERNAKULAM THAT WAS TAKEN IN FILES AS CC NO. 119/2019 ANNEXURE A2 THE COPY OF THE WPC NO. 12448/2018 ANNEXURE A3 THE COPY OF THE REPLY NOTICE SENT BY THE PETITIONER.

RESPONDENTS’ EXHIBITS: NIL TRUE COPY PS TO JUDGE

Cause of action is date of offence not date of acquittal

Excerpt:

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Yashvant Malhotra vs A.K.Sinha on 20 December, 2019
CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                                   -1-



           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
                          CHANDIGARH
(1)
                                             Crl. Misc. No. M-11992-2017 (O&M)
                                             Date of decision: December 20, 2019

Yashvant Malhotra
                                                               ..... PETITIONER(s)

                          Versus

A.K. Sinha
                                                            ....RESPONDENT(s)

Crl. Misc. No.M-13649 of 2017 (O&M) J.N. Parsad ….. PETITIONER(s) Versus A.K. Sinha and another ….RESPONDENT(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER GUPTA Present: Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arshdeep Singh Cheema, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-11992-2017.

Mr. Sumeet Goel, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-13649-2017.

Mr. Mohan Singla, Advocate for respondent No.1.

Mr. Sukant Gupta, AP.P. for U.T. Chandigarh. SURINDER GUPTA, J(Oral) The complaint describes the brief facts of the case in para 3, which are reproduced as follows:-

“That the brief facts leading to the present complaint are 1 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -2-

as under:

(a) when the complainant was working as Commissioner and Secretary to Govt., Haryana Govt., at Chandigarh the accused no. 1, suo moto, registered a preliminary enquiry (hereinafter referred to as ‘PE’) in a transaction conducted during the period 1979-80, alleged to have been connected with some purchase order for WEEDICIDE issued by the complainant as the Director of Agriculture Haryana in 1980.

(b) the accused no. 1, thereafter, marked the same enquiry to accused no. 2 and ordered him to submit a P.E. report. The accused no. 2 conducted the whole P.E. within a span of 4-5 weeks and submitted a P.E. report to the accused no. 1.

(c) the accused no. 1, thereafter, suo moto registered an FIR bearing No. RC 5 of 1987 u/s 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 5(2) r/w 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (& Sec. 5(2) r/w 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947) on dated 23.12.1987 against the complainant and two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of FIR dated 23.12.1987 is annexed as Annexure C-1.

(d) The accused No. 3 who was the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana signed the sanction order for the prosecution of the complainant on the behalf of His Excellency Governor of Haryana without having shown the concerned sanction order to the then Excellency Governor.

(e) the accused no. 1, thereafter, handed over the investigation in the above-mentioned FIR to accused no. 4 who was then DSP, CBI. The accused no. 4 had completed the investigation in 28 months and after a long period of 2 years and 4 months i.e. 28 months, he filed a charge sheet on 22.08.1990 against the complainant and 2 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -3-

two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of charge sheet is annexed as Annexure C-2.

(f) the complainant was never examined by the accused No. 4 during the period of so-called above mentioned investigation on any aspect.

(g) the trial, thereafter, was conducted and during the trial prosecution examined 28 witnesses numbered as PW1 to PW29 except numbered as PW10 and produced so many documents on record.

(h) the trial Court after going through, thoroughly, all the statement of witnesses and the documents on record and arguments of the counsels of the parties pronounced its final judgment on dated 11.09.2014 and acquitted the complainant and two others from all charges. The copy of judgment of the trial Court is annexed as Annexure C-3.”

Learned trial Court on the basis of statement of complainant in preliminary evidence, observed that the accused named in the complaint have not followed the ordinary practice of registration of case, investigation, grant of sanction and putting the complainant to trial in the case registered against him.

Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that respondent has been victimised and the commission of offence under Section 166 and 499 of Indian Penal Code (for short-IPC) was disclosed against petitioners Yashvant Malhotra, J.N. Parsad along with co-accused Kulwant Singh, Purshotam Lal, and Bhaskar Raj Saxena and ordered their summoning vide order dated 25.09.2015.

Petitioners filed separate revisions against the summoning order, which were dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh 3 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -4-

vide separate orders dated 23.01.2017.

Both the petitioners have filed above captioned petitions under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (for short-Cr.P.C.) challenging the orders passed by learned Magistrate and learned Sessions Judge, Chandigarh.

The first point raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that FIR against the respondent was registered in the year 1987 and the complaint was filed on 22.04.2015 i.e. after a period of 28 years and is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 403.

Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the offence of defamation is a continuing offence giving recurring cause of action to the complainant-respondent. He was defamed from the year the FIR was registered against him till he was acquitted. From the date of acquittal, complaint is within limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in cases of Ajay Agarwal Vs. Union of India 1993(3) SCC 609; State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and another 1972(2) SCC 890; and Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P. 1984 (4) SCC 222.

To find answer to the query as to whether the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent is within limitation, reference can be made to the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (supra), wherein a similar question was directly answered. Order of Magistrate was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC as the limitation prescribed under Section 4 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -5-

468 Cr.P.C. had expired. The appellant before the Hon’ble Apex Court, who was working as General Secretary, had filed a complaint against respondent Ascharaj Lal Chopra, who was working as Special Assistant in the bank and Amrik Singh, working as Clerk, for the offence punishable under Section 406, 420 IPC on 15.03.1972, alleging some misappropriation by them. They were convicted by the trial Court but acquitted by the Appellate Court vide judgment dated 01.04.1975 and the judgment of acquittal was upheld by this Court. Ashcharaj Lal Chopra (respondent) filed a complaint against Surinder Mohan Vikal (complainant in complaint case) on 11.02.1976 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Learned Magistrate summoned him and the petition filed by him under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed by this Court. Taking note of all the above facts, Hon’ble Apex Court observed in para 5 and 6 as follows:-

“It will be recalled that the complaint for the commission of the offence under section 406/420 I.P.C. was. filed on March 15. It has specially been stated in the respondents complaint under section 500 I.P.C. that the defamatory matter was contained in that complaint. So, according to the complaint, the offence under section 500 I.P.C. was committed on March 15, 1972, which was the date of the within the meaning of section 469 (1) (a) of the Code, and the period of three years’ limitation would be calculated with reference to that date for purposes of the bar provided by section 468. But, as has been stated, the complaint under section 500 I.P.C. was filed on February 11, 1976, much after the expiry of that period. It was therefore not permissible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.

                                   5 of 7

 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                               -6-



The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground the “cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not before he (respondent) was acquitted by the Court of Session.” the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appears that High Court took the view that the “protection of section 468(c) was not available to the appellant. We are constrained to say the question of “cause of action could not really arise in this as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. It been stated, sub-section (1) of section 469 of the Code specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in section 468, in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore follow that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for purpose of calculating the three years’ period of limitation. High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.”

The citations referred by learned counsel for respondent that it is a continuing offence, as such, are not applicable to the facts of the present case as defamation is by a particular act and is not a continuing offence. The complaint filed by respondent is clearly barred by limitation and learned trial Court and the Court of revision have committed error while overlooking this fact. As such, both these petitions deserve to be allowed on this short ground.

In view of the above settled proposition of law, it is not required to examine the other plea raised by petitioners. Both these petitions have merits and are allowed. Criminal Complaint No.76 of 2015 (Annexure P-4) and summoning order dated 25.09.2015 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, 6 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -7-

Chandigarh along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

                                                    (SURINDER GUPTA)
December 20, 2019                                       JUDGE
Sachin M.

            Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

            Whether Reportable:              Yes/No




                                   7 of 7

Bikramjit ahluwalia vs simran ahluwalia

Excerpt:It is also an established principle of law that the burden to prove that a case falls within the exceptions to section 499 IPC is on the party who contends it to exist.

To constitute „defamation‟ under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with intention of harming or with a knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made.

In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged.

From the perusal of the records and the complaint of respondent No. 1 it is observed that the averments made by the petitioner do prima facie appear to be defamatory and injurious to the image of  Page 12 of 14 respondent No. 1. The said imputations are directed towards the character of the said respondent. Thus, at this stage this Court is not convinced with the arguments of the petitioner that not even a prima facie case is established against the petitioners for the offence alleged.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alleged defamatory statements made by the accused persons in the pleadings of previous civil proceedings and statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant case. This contention does not find favour with this court. The pleadings form a part of the judicial records and form a part of public documents. Anything stated in such pleadings, therefore, amount to the publication of the defamatory statements. Further the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections 499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only “qualified privilege” and not “absolute privilege”.

 

 

 

 

 

Delhi High Court

Bikramjit Ahluwalia & Ors. vs Simran Ahluwalia & Anr.

on 1 May, 2015

Author: V.P.Vaish

*         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                Reserved on: 13th March, 2015
%                                              Date of Decision: 01st May, 2015

+         CRL.M.C. 447/2013

BIKRAMJIT AHLUWALIA & ORS.            ..... Petitioners
                Through: Mr. Y.P. Narula, Sr. Adv. with
                           Mr. Aniruddha Choudhury,
                           Mr.Abhay Narula & Mr.Ujas
                           Kumar, Advs.

                                           versus

SIMRAN AHLUWALIA & ANR.                                   ..... Respondents
                Through:                        Ms.Anu Narula, Adv.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.P.VAISH

                                      JUDGMENT

1. By way of the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as „Cr.P.C.‟) the petitioners seek quashing of the criminal complaint case No. 49 of 2012 filed by respondent No.1 in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate-06 (East), Karkardooma Court, Shahdara, Delhi alleging offences under Section 499 read with Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟) alongwith quashing of the summons issued pursuant thereto.

2. Succinctly stating the facts of the present case as emerging from the petition are that marriage between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 was solemnized on 26.11.2001 as per Hindu rites, customs and Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 1 of 14 ceremonies. Out of the said wedlock a female child was born on 04.09.2002. Thereafter, certain differences arose between the said parties and respondent No.1 left petitioner No.3 in April, 2008. At that time, she took along with her their minor daughter who was only five years old. Since then, there have been continuous inter se disputes between petitioner No.3 and respondent No.1 which are pending adjudication before various courts. During the course of the said proceedings, pleadings were filed by the petitioners which were taken to be defamatory by respondent No.1 and accordingly a criminal complaint was filed.

3. On the basis of the said complaint case No. 49/2012, the petitioners received summons on 01.02.2013 from the court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi under Sections 500/34 IPC.

4. It is against the said complaint case and the summons received by the petitioners that the petitioners have filed the present petition.

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the complaint is not maintainable as the respondent No.1 has not specified the averments in the pleadings on the basis of which she is resting her claim for defamation. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate committed an error in law in taking cognizance of the complaint for defamation on the basis of records of pending civil proceedings and on the basis of statements recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., during the course of investigation of criminal complaints filed by the respondent No.1. Pleadings filed by the petitioner in the civil proceedings as well as the statement made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be made the basis of the complaint for defamation. Respondent Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 2 of 14 No.1 has not identified any specific allegations/imputations made by the petitioners against her constituting an offence of defamation of respondent No.1 in public.

6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the inferences drawn by respondent No.1 on the basis of circumstances and statements made during litigation between the parties cannot be considered defamatory under Sections 499/500 IPC. The police officer, who investigated the complaint of respondent No.1 and witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the police, cannot be made co-accused in a defamation complaint. Admittedly, respondent No.1 is litigating with the petitioners and the averments made by the petitioners in civil proceedings, which are under adjudication, cannot be made the subject matter of a complaint for defamation. Even if it is presumed that the statements made by the petitioners are defamatory in nature, they would be covered by the fifth exception to Section 499 IPC.

7. It was lastly contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that from the allegations made in complaint and keeping in view the conduct of respondent No.1, it is apparent that respondent No.1 is only interested in implicating the petitioners in false criminal cases by filing false complaints and the said conduct of respondent No.1 amounts to an abuse of the process of Court.

8. In supports of his submissions, learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon a catena of judgments which include, ‘Raminder Kaur Bedi v. Jatinder Singh Bedi’, 1989 (16) DRJ 154; ‘S.P. Satsangi v. Krishna Kumar Satsangi’, II (2007) DMC 425; ‘Alli Rani Joseph Mathew v. P. Arun Kumar’, 2013 (1) CTC 661;

Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 3 of 14 ‘Gopi R. Mallya v. Smt. Pushpa’, 1997 Kar LJ 216 ; ‘Geetha v. A.K. Dhamodharan’, CDJ 2011 MHC 3809; ‘Re: P. Ramaswami Mudaliar’, (1938) 1 MLJ 810; ‘M.P. Singh Sahni v. State’, Crl.M.C. No. 3779 of 2003 decided on 30.05.2013; ‘Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd & Ors.’, AIR 2006 SC 2780 and ‘Shatrughan Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi & Ors.’, (1996) 6 SCC 263.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that the present petition is not maintainable on the face of it as the trial court is seized with the matter and has taken cognizance on the basis of pre-summoning evidence led by respondent No.1. The trial court summoned the petitioners only after being prima facie convinced by the act of defamation by the petitioners. The sole purpose of the petitioners is to malign and defame the image of respondent No.1 before the courts by averting that she has demanded huge sum of money for settlement. The petitioners have always made highly defamatory false statements. In the present petition also the petitioners tried to do the same thing by showing that respondent No.1 has demanded huge sum for settlement of dispute. The petitioners have kept this court in dark by not filing the entire documents on record with the present petition which are relied upon by respondent No.1 before the trial court on the basis of which trial court established a prima facie case against the accused persons. The chain of circumstances established by the respondent No.1 in her complaint clearly show the common intention shared by the petitioners and other accused persons in connivance with each other to defame and malign respondent No.1‟s character.

 Page 4 of 14

10. It was further contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that pleadings filed by the petitioners in civil proceedings, can be quoted out of context and used for filing a complaint for defamation. Any averment made in judicial records containing defamatory statements, amounts to publication as the judicial records are public documents. Fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is not applicable to the present proceedings as it is solely based upon the proposition of good faith, which cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined after completion of trial. This Court while exercising its inherent powers cannot quash the complaint only on the basis that the trial will not result in conviction of the accused persons. The opinion given by the IO in the closure reports without any substantive proof on record are not the acts done in official capacity and may have an effect of tarnishing the image of respondent No.1 before the public.

11. It was also contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 that despite the defamatory allegations made by the petitioners and other accused persons against respondent No.1, the trial court has ordered to file supplementary chargesheet against the petitioners after finding the truth in the protest petition of the respondent No.1 in FIR No. 273/2010 under sections 498A/406/34 IPC.

12. It was lastly submitted by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. has already been served on the petitioners and the trial in the complaint case has already commenced. The petitioners did not challenge the notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C.

13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. I have also perused the material on record.

Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 5 of 14

14. At the outset it may be mentioned that the petitioners have not filed copy of the summoning order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi.

15. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to reproduce relevant provisions of Section 499 IPC which read as under:

“499. Defamation.–Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1-3 Explanation 4.–No imputation is said to harm a person‟s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

xxx xxx xxx Fifth Exception. – Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and other concerned – It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.

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16. To constitute „defamation‟ under Section 499 IPC, there must be an imputation and such imputation must have been made with intention of harming or with a knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made.

In essence, the offence of defamation is the harm caused to the reputation of a person. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant actually suffered directly or indirectly from the imputation alleged.

17. Ingredients of Section 499 IPC were discussed by this Court in „Standard Chartered Bank v. Vinay Kumar Sood‟, 2010 CrlLJ 1277 wherein it was observed as under:-

“7. For an offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 IPC, three essential ingredients are required to be fulfilled:-

(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;

(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations.

(iii) The said imputation must have been made with the intention to harm or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerned.”

18. Further, as per Explanation 4 to the aforementioned Section, no imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, in the estimation of others or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

19. The fifth exception to the said Section provides immunity to an imputation expressed in good faith regarding the merits of any case decided by a Court of justice or to the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent in any such case. So far as the protection under fifth exception to Section 499 IPC is concerned it states that accusations preferred in good faith against a person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusations will not amount to defamation. Good faith of the person making accusations is therefore an essential condition of exemption from liability for defamation under this Exception.

20. It is a settled law that to decide whether the imputations amount to defamation, a court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence under Section 499 IPC triable by the Magistrate. In ‘Shatrughna Prasad Sinha vs. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi and Ors.’ (1996) 6 SCC 263 the Apex Court was of the view that:

“13….. It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read the complaint as a whole and find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence underSection 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima facie came to the conclusion that the allegations Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 8 of 14 might come within the definition of ‘defamation’ under Section 499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to law. Prima facie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500, IPC.”

It is also an established principle of law that the burden to prove that a case falls within the exceptions to section 499 IPC is on the party who contends it to exist.

21. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the allegations of defamation raised by respondent No.1 against the petitioners were made on the basis of the imputations made by the petitioners in the civil proceedings and the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 273/2010 under Sections 498A/406 IPC registered at P.S. Preet Vihar, Delhi. Respondent No.1 has filed the complaint before the trial court in view of the following defamatory statements made by the petitioners and other co-accused:

a) Illicit relation of respondent No.1 with Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma for which reason the complainant left the company of her husband;

b) Respondent No.1 is a money digger who is instituting false and frivolous complaints in order to extort some good amount of money from her in laws as well as using her daughter as a pawn for this purpose;

c) Respondent No.1 ran away with all her belongings including items not belonging to her;

                                       Page 9 of 14
        d)     Respondent No.1 marries for money and troubles

her in-laws at the time of Divorce/break-up for marriage;

e) Respondent No.1 is a characterless person who has/had many relationships;

f) Respondent No.1 blackmailed and pressurized the accused No.2 to marry her; and

g) Respondent No.1 is introducing Mr. Aldaan Rajan Sharma as the father of the child.

22. The law is also well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, F.I.R. or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, the law is equally settled that where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the F.I.R. or complaint may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the leading case of „State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.’, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 certain guidelines were issued for the exercise of these powers by the Courts. In guideline number 3 it was laid down that where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused, the Court may quash the F.I.R. as well as the investigations. A note of caution was added by observing that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It was held that the Court would not be justified in embarking Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 10 of 14 upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint. Similarly, in „Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill’, (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059 and „Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi‟, (1999) 3 SCC 259, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. A note of caution was added that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful.

23. Even at the time of summoning, the Magistrate is not required to conduct a minute analysis of the evidence produced by the complainant. All that is required to be seen is whether the Magistrate has applied his mind and found sufficient reason to proceed against the accused persons. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in „Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta and Ors.‟, (2015) 3 SCC 424, held as under: –

“8. …..At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence, or, in other words, to find out whether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the defence version or materials or arguments nor he is required to evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stage whether the materials will lead to conviction or not.”

24. Further, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine. The Crl.M.C. No. 447/2013 P age 11 of 14 inherent powers of the High Court under the said Section are meant to act in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of court. The scope of the inherent powers of the High Court vested with it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been settled by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. In ‘Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors.’, 2007 12 SCC 1 the Supreme Court reiterated the scope and powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. while stating that:

“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

24. Inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”

25. From the perusal of the records and the complaint of respondent No. 1 it is observed that the averments made by the petitioner do prima facie appear to be defamatory and injurious to the image of  Page 12 of 14 respondent No. 1. The said imputations are directed towards the character of the said respondent. Thus, at this stage this Court is not convinced with the arguments of the petitioner that not even a prima facie case is established against the petitioners for the offence alleged.

26. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the alleged defamatory statements made by the accused persons in the pleadings of previous civil proceedings and statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. cannot furnish a foundation for their prosecution for defamation in the instant case. This contention does not find favour with this court. The pleadings form a part of the judicial records and form a part of public documents. Anything stated in such pleadings, therefore, amount to the publication of the defamatory statements. Further the statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are only exempted for usage at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when statement was made. So far as the use of such statement made in a separate proceeding for prosecution of an offence under Sections 499/500 IPC is concerned, the bar of Section 162Cr.P.C. would not be attracted. Statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. can claim only “qualified privilege” and not “absolute privilege”.

27. The other point for consideration in the present case is whether such statements are covered by the exceptions provided under Section 499 IPC. In the opinion of this court the question whether or not such statements are covered under the said exceptions or whether such statements have been made in good faith or not cannot be decided at a preliminary stage and could only be determined at the time of hearing and not under a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In ‘BalrajKhanna and Ors v. Moti Ram’, AIR 1971 SC 1389 the Apex Court in this regard was of the view that:

“30. …It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499, I.P.C, as well as all other defences that may be available to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial of the complaint.”

28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is devoid of any merit, same deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed.

Crl. M.A. No.1432/2013 and 8899/2013 The applications are dismissed as infructuous.

                                        (VED PRAKASH VAISH)
                                               JUDGE
MAY 01st, 2015
hs