Shybimon vs Haridas

 

Kerala High Court
Shybimon vs Haridas on 22 March, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 2918 of 2009()


1. SHYBIMON, S/O.DIVAKARAN, PUTHEN
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. HARIDAS, S/O.CHELLAPPAN, PUTHAN
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.B.PRAMOD

                For Respondent  :SRI.R.AZAD BABU

The Hon'ble MR. Justice V.RAMKUMAR

 Dated :22/03/2010

 O R D E R
                         V. RAMKUMAR, J
               .................................................
                 CRL.R.P. NO. 2918 OF 2009
            ........................................................
              DATED: 22nd day of March, 2010

                                    ORDER

The revision petitioner who was the complainant in a private complaint filed as C.M.P. No. 2480 of 2009 before the J.F.C.M. I, Cherthala, alleging offences punishable under Sections 500 and 501 I.P.C. against the Ist respondent herein, challenges the order dated 20-8-2009 passed by the Magistrate dismissing the complaint presumably under Section 203 Cr.P.C. after recording the sworn statement of the complainant.

2. Eventhough the accused to whom no process was issued by the Magistrate, has no right to be heard in this revision, since the revision petitioner had made the accused a party respondent and also since this Court ordered notice to him, I also heard Advocate Sri.Azad Babu on behalf of the Ist respondent/accused.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

3. The facts leading to the filing of the aforesaid  complaint can be summarised as follows:

A) O.S. No. 555 of 2008 before the Munsiff’s Court, Cherthala was a suit filed by the complainant’s mother Kaumari and the complainant against the Ist respondent herein (accused) and his wife seeking a declaration of the right of easement over a way and also for consequential injunction. There was an interim prohibitory injunction granted by the Civil Court in favour of the complainant and his mother.

B) Alleging that the interim injunction was violated by the defendants by causing obstructions to the way in dispute the plaintiffs filed a petition for an interim mandatory injunction. Eventhough the said application as opposed, the Civil Court allowed the application.

Accordingly, an interim mandatory injunction was granted and the same was implemented and the status quo ante was restored.

C) The defendants filed an application before the Civil Court to vacate the orders of interim prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction. That application was supported by an affidavit filed by the Ist defendant (Ist respondent) herein. According to the complainant,  paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 of the said affidavit contained defamatory allegations against the complainant. I am only quoting the opening portion of paragraph 9 of the said affidavit which reads as follows:-

Transalation “The second plaintiff (revision petitioner herein) is a thief and a lecher who cannot be permitted to set his foot on the courtyards of houses where ladies of honour and self esteem reside. He is an immoral and anti-social person who has amassed wealth undeservingly through illicit distillation, bootlegging etc. and carries on in the company of such elements. He is a criminal who is prepared to commit any heinous act”.

D) Eventhough the complainant sent a lawyer notice to the accused requesting him to withdraw the false imputations made against the complainant, he has not only acceded to the said request but has also caused a reply notice to be sent through his lawyer reiterating his stand and raising untenable contentions. Thereupon the  complainant filed the aforesaid private complaint before the Criminal Court alleging that the Ist defendant/Ist respondent has committed the offence of defamation as defined under Section 499 I.P.C. and punishable under Sections 500 and 501 I.P.C.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE ACCUSED

4. Advocate Sri.Azad Babu, the learned counsel appearing for the Ist respondent/accused made the following submissions before me in support of the impugned order dismissing the complaint:-

The mere filing of an affidavit before the Civil Court after giving a copy of the same to the complainants’ counsel will not amount to “publication” for the purpose of Section 499 I.P.C. Even assuming that the statements in the affidavit are defamatory, as rightly observed by the Court below, those statements enjoy absolute privilege since they were made in the course of judicial proceedings. (Vide Gopalankutty Nair v. Sankunni Ezhuthassan – 1971 KLT 393 F.B.). There is no evidence available at present to show that the imputation in question has lowered the reputation of the complainant in the  estimation of others as required under Explanation 4 to Section 499 I.P.C. In any view of the matter, the statement in question may fall under the Fourth, Fifth or Nineth Exception to Section 499 I.P.C. so as to take it out of the offence of defamation. Moreover, as was held by the Madras High Court in Gurubasayya v. Siddalingappa – AIR 1940 Madras 677, the complaint ought to have been filed by the Civil Court.

JUDICIAL EVALUATION

5. I am afraid that I find myself unable to agree with the above submissions made on behalf of the accused. The learned Magistrate has also substantially based his order on the aforementioned grounds.

6. “To publish” means to make known to others or to communicate to a third person. (See Webster’s Comprehensive dictionary – International Edition). Publication will be complete if after making or printing the defamatory statement, it is made available to the public. (Vide Collector of Central Excise v. New Tobacco Company and Others – (1998) 8 SCC 250). Publication includes pleadings, affidavits etc. which are filed in  Courts. (In Re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate (1998) 7 Supreme 473). The filing of an affidavit is publication. An affidavit is not a secret document. It forms part of the Court records and is available to and accessible by the Public. (See J.R. Parashar, Advocate and Others v. Prasant Bhushan, Advocate and Others (2001) 6 SCC 735). Once a statement is filed in a Court of law such statement can be taken as published (See Prabhakaran v. Gangadharan – 2006 (2) KLT 122).

7. If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for the criminal offence of defamation in respect of a statement made in such judicial proceeding either on oath or otherwise, his criminal liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 I.P.C. alone. The English common law doctrine of absolute privilege can be set up as a defence only in a suit for damages under the Law of Torts. No such privilege is recognized by the Indian Penal Code beyond the limits of the Exceptions embodied in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The said provision together with its Exceptions forms a  complete Code in itself with regard to the criminal liability of a person accused of the offence of defamation. Every defamatory statement not coming within any of the 10 Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C. is punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. The Court cannot engraft thereupon any further exceptions derived from the common law of England or based on grounds of public policy. (See also Haji Ahmad Hussain v. State – AIR 1960 Allahabad 623 = 1960 Crl.L.J. 1296). Ordinarily, the question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C. will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those Exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused. The accused may discharge the said burden by means of preponderance of probabilities. (See Chinnakuttan Nair v. Kumaran Nair – 1963 KLT 845; Jose v. Thankappan – 1963 KLT 1071; Chandrasekhara Pillai v. Karthikeyan – ILR 1964 Kerala 31; Dasgupta v. State of West Bengal -1968 KLT (SN) 21 (SC) and Narayanan v. Gangadharan – 1982  KLT 378).

8. As mentioned earlier the English Common law doctrine of privilege is a defence available in a suit for compensation for defamation under the Law of Torts. Privilege is of two kinds – absolute and qualified. In cases of qualified privilege it is the occasion which protects the man who speaks out his mind fully and frankly without any fear of consequences. No action under the civil law will lie in respect of a false and defamatory statement even if made with express malice if such statement is absolutely privileged. Instances when such statements enjoy the immunity of absolute privilege are when made in the course of –

i) Parliamentary proceedings.

ii) Judicial proceedings

iii)Military and Naval Proceedings

iv)State Proceedings (Eg. communications relating to State matters made by one Minister to another or to the Crown, a report made by a Police Officer to a Magistrate under Section 202 Cr.P.C.

etc.) [Vide pages 294 and 295 of the Law of Torts _ Ratanlal and Dhirajlal – 25th Edition.] Gopalakrishnan Nair v. Sankunni Ezhuthassan (Supra) and Daniel v. Hymavathy Amma

-1985 KLT 574) are authorities which elucidate the nature and extent of absolute privilege. It is pertinent to note that going by the ratio in Daniel’s Case (Supra) even under the civil law of defamation, if the offending statement was absolutely irrelevant or was made de hors the matter in hand or had no reference to the matter under inquiry, such statement cannot enjoy the status of absolute privilege.

9. In cases of qualified privilege, it is not enough if the plaintiff shows that the offending statement was false and defamatory, but the plaintiff will have to further prove that the statement was made with express malice.

(1) Communications made –

i) in the course of legal, social or moral duty

ii) for self protection

iii)for protection of common interest

iv)for public good and (2) reports of Parliamentary and judicial proceedings and proceedings at public meetings etc. are instances of qualified privilege if the communications or reports are made without malice (Vide Law of Torts (supra) – pages 294 to 304).

10. Pargraphs 8 in Narayanan’s case (supra) – 1982 KLT 378 will indicate that actual loss of reputation need not be proved. An accused person, as in this case, who takes shelter under Exception 9 to Section 499 I.P.C. will have to show that the imputation was made in good faith. In order to claim good faith the accused must show that before making the imputation he had made inquiries with due care and attention and that he was satisfied about the truth of the imputation made by him. (Vide Sukra Mahto v. Basudeo Kumar – AIR 1971 SC 1567).

11. AIR 1940 Madras 677 relied on by the learned counsel for the Ist respondent cannot obviously apply to the facts of the present case. In the Madras case the private complaint though styled as one alleging defamation was really one involving the commission of an offence punishable under Section 193 I.P.C. If so, by virtue of Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) Cr.P.C. the Court alone could have figured as the complainant.

12. The result of the foregoing discussion is that none of the reasons mentioned by the Cou rt below constitutes a valid  ground for dismissal of the complaint. The learned Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the offence should have issued process to the accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C. The impugned order dismissing the complaint is set aside. C.M.P. 2480/2009 will stand restored to file and shall be assigned an appropriate number and shall be dealt with in accordance with law. This Court shall not be taken as having made any observation on the merits of the case.

In the result, this Crl.R.P. is allowed as above. Dated, this the 22nd day of March, 2010.

                                     V.RAMKUMAR, JUDGE



ani/

M.K.Varghese Cor Episcopa vs State Of Kerala

Excerpt:

PARAGRAPH NO 19.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of any of the exceptions provided to Section 499 I.P.C, whether he had made the statements in the writ petition in good faith for protection of his interest etc. are matters which cannot be decided by this Court in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Ordinarily, the question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused.

PARAGRAPH NO 20.

As noticed earlier, the question whether the petitioner had made the imputations against the complainant in the writ petition in good faith for the protection of his interest is a matter which cannot be decided in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C (See Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi :(1996) 6 SCC 263). It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C as well as all other defences that may be available to the accused will have to be gone into during the trial of the case (See Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram : AIR 1971 SC 1389 and Jeffrey J. Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 Diermeier v. State of West Bengal : (2010) 6 SCC 243).

 

Kerala High Court
M.K.Varghese Cor Episcopa vs State Of Kerala on 8 January, 2020
               IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                    PRESENT

          THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

  WEDNESDAY, THE 08TH DAY OF JANUARY 2020 / 18TH POUSHA, 1941

                       Crl.MC.No.6794 OF 2019(H)

  IN CONNECTION WITH CC 119/2019 OF CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
                       COURT, ERNAKULAM


PETITIONER/ACCUSED:

               M.K.VARGHESE COR EPISCOPA
               AGED 58 YEARS
               S/O. M.J. KOSHI, NOW WORKING AS VICAR, ST. MARYS
               ORTHODOX CHURCH, KOIPALLY, KAYAMKULAM, RESIDING AT
               MUTHALAVANAPARAMBIL, KOLLAKADAVU P.O, MAVELIKKARA.

               BY ADVS.
               SRI.K.R.VINOD
               SMT.M.S.LETHA
               KUM.K.S.SREEREKHA
               SRI.NABIL KHADER

RESPONDENTS:

      1        STATE OF KERALA
               REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
               KERALA, KOCHI-682 031

      2        PAPPACHAN PHILIPPOSE,
               AGED 64 YEARS
               S/O. T. PAPPACHAN, C/O. HOTEL GRAND SEASON,
               CHITTOOR ROAD, ERNAKULAM, PIN-682 016

                 SMT.V.SREEJA.P.P


     THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD         ON
07.11.2019, THE COURT ON 08.01.2020 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
 Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019
                                      2



                                                                    "CR"

                    R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, J
                    ************************
                      Crl.M.C.No.6794 of 2019
             ---------------------------------------------
              Dated this the 8th day of January, 2020


                                 ORDER

The petitioner is the sole accused in the case C.C.No.119/2019 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam.

2. The aforesaid case is one instituted upon the complaint filed against the petitioner by the second respondent.

3. According to the petitioner, he is accused of committing an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. However, the petitioner has not produced copy of the order passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences on the complaint filed against him by the second respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the complainant’).

4. Annexure-A1 is the copy of the complaint filed against the petitioner. The material averments in Annexure-A1 complaint Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 are as follows: The accused filed W.P.(C) No.12448/2018 before this Court seeking police protection against certain persons who were accused in the case which was registered as Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station. In the aforesaid writ petition, the complainant was arrayed as the seventh respondent. There were various allegations and imputations made against the complainant in the aforesaid writ petition which are extracted in the complaint. Such statements made about the complainant in the writ petition filed by the accused are defamatory and the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. On 09.04.2018, the accused made a visit to the hotel in which the complainant was residing. The accused met the Manager of the hotel and made statements defamatory to the complainant to him in front of the staff and the customers of the hotel. The accused told the Manager of the hotel that the complainant is the kingpin who is arranging contract killers. Such imputation was made by the accused intentionally with the knowledge that the goodwill and reputation of the complainant would be put to danger. The accused has caused irreparable  injury to the prestige and reputation of the complainant by making the defamatory statements.

5. This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C for quashing Annexure-A1 complaint and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to that complaint.

6. Notice was served on the second respondent but he has not chosen to make appearance in this petition. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the averments in Annexure-A1 complaint do not attract the offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the averments and the statements in the writ petition filed by the petitioner against the complainant enjoy absolute privilege and on the basis of those statements, no complaint for an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C is maintainable.

8. Section 499 I.P.C states that, whoever, by words, either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. Four explanations and ten exceptions are also provided to this provision.

9. Under Section 499 I.P.C, in order that an offence of defamation may be committed, there must be making or publication of any imputation concerning any person by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. To constitute the offence of defamation there must therefore be making or publication of an imputation concerning any person and the making or publication must be with intent to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. Unless there is publication there can be no commission of an offence of defamation.

10. The writ petition filed by the petitioner against the complainant contained a statement that, the persons who were Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 accused in the case registered as Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station, are the hired goons of the complainant. The writ petition also contained a statement that the crime committed which led to the registration of Crime No.472/2018 of Nooranad police station is the handwork of the complainant and that respondents 8 to 10 in the writ petition are the contract killers hired by the complainant. Prima facie, these statements in the writ petition filed by the petitioner, are defamatory to the complainant.

11. If the pleadings filed in the court contain defamatory statements, it amounts to publication (See Thangavelu Chettiar v. Ponnammal : AIR 1966 Mad 363). Once a statement is filed in a court of law, it can be considered as published (See Prabhakaran v. Gangadharan : 2006 (2) KLT

122).

12. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statements made by the petitioner in the writ petition filed before this Court enjoy absolute privilege. In Shybimon v. Haridas : 2010 (2) KHC Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 607: 2010 (2) KLT 158, it has been held as follows:

“If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for the criminal offence of defamation in respect of a statement made in such judicial proceeding either on oath or otherwise, his criminal liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 IPC alone. The English common law doctrine of absolute privilege can be set up as a defence only in a suit for damages under the Law of Torts. No such privilege is recognized by the Indian Penal Code beyond the limits of the exceptions embodied in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The said provision together with its exceptions forms a complete code in itself with regard to the criminal liability of a person accused of the offence of defamation. Every defamatory statement not coming within any of the 10 Exceptions to Section 499 IPC is punishable under Section 500 IPC. The Court cannot engraft thereupon any further exceptions derived from the common law of England or based on grounds of public policy”.

13. The privilege defined by the exceptions to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code must be regarded as exhaustive as to the cases which they purport to cover and recourse cannot be Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 had to the English Common Law to add new grounds of exception to those contained in the statute (See Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal: AIR 1926 Mad 906). If a party to a judicial proceeding is prosecuted for defamation in respect of a statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability must be determined by reference to the provisions of Section 499 I.P.C and the court cannot engraft thereupon exceptions derived from the Common Law of England or based on grounds of public policy. Consequently, a person in such a position is entitled only to the benefit of the qualified privilege (See Satis Chandra Ckakrabarti v Ram Dayal : AIR 1921 Cal 1).

14. The decision in Tiruvengada Mudali (supra) has been referred to by the Supreme Court in M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan : AIR 1970 SC 1876 and it has been held as follows:

“In Thiruvengadda Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal, ILR 49 Madras 728 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed that the exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C must be regarded as exhaustive as to the cases which they purport to cover and recourse cannot be had to the English common law to add new grounds of exception to those Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 contained in the statute. A person making libellous statements in his complaint filed in court is not absolutely protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation, for under the Eighth Exception and the illustration to Section 499 the statements are privileged only when they are made in good faith. There is therefore authority for the proposition that in determining the criminality of an act under the Indian Penal Code the courts will not extend the scope of special exceptions by resorting to the rule peculiar to English common law”.

15. Reliance on the decision in Gopalankutty Nair v.

Sankunny Ezhuthassan : 1971 KLT 393 made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to claim absolute immunity from prosecution for defamation in respect of the statements made by the petitioner in the writ petition, on the ground that they are statements made in a judicial proceedings, is misplaced. The aforesaid decision was rendered in considering the maintainability of a suit filed for realisation of damages for defamation.

16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman v. Aneesh-ul-HaK : (2011) 10 SCC 696 also does not help the petitioner to show that the complaint filed against him is not Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 maintainable. It was a case in which the offences punishable under Sections 211 and 500 I.P.C were alleged against the accused. In that case, the Apex Court considered the applicability of the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C in respect of the offence punishable under Section 211 I.P.C. The Apex Court held that the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C would apply to taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 211 I.P.C committed in relation to a judicial proceedings and the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of that offence on the basis of a private complaint. It is pertinent to note that the Apex Court gave liberty to the complainant in that case to proceed with the complaint so far as the same related to commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C.

17. There is yet another aspect which requires consideration. Annexure-A1 complaint also contains averments regarding the defamatory statement allegedly made by the petitioner about the complainant when the petitioner visited the hotel in which the complainant was residing. There is a specific allegation in the complaint that the petitioner told the Manager of  the hotel that the complainant is the kingpin who is arranging contract killers and that such statement was made by him in front of the staff and the customers of the hotel. The Manager of the hotel is a witness cited in the complaint. The aforesaid words, allegedly spoken to by the petitioner to the Manager of the hotel, are, prima facie, defamatory to the complainant.

18. Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of any of the exceptions provided to Section 499 I.P.C, whether he had made the statements in the writ petition in good faith for protection of his interest etc. are matters which cannot be decided by this Court in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Ordinarily, the question as to whether the statement in a given case falls under any of the ten exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C will have to be decided only after trial and the burden to bring the libel or slander under any of those exceptions is, by virtue of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the accused.

19. The Ninth Exception to Section 499 I.P.C provides that it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for  the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person or for the public good. The Ninth Exception deals with statement made for the protection of the interest of the person making it. The ingredients of the Ninth Exception are, first that the imputation must be made in good faith; secondly, the imputation must be for protection of the interest of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good. Good faith is a question of fact. So is protection of the interest of the person making it.

20. As noticed earlier, the question whether the petitioner had made the imputations against the complainant in the writ petition in good faith for the protection of his interest is a matter which cannot be decided in a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C (See Shatrughna Prasad Sinha v. Rajbhau Surajmal Rathi :(1996) 6 SCC 263). It is needless to state that the question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499 I.P.C as well as all other defences that may be available to the accused will have to be gone into during the trial of the case (See Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram : AIR 1971 SC 1389 and Jeffrey J. Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 Diermeier v. State of West Bengal : (2010) 6 SCC 243).

21. The result of the discussion above is that the prayer made by the petitioner for quashing Annexure-A1 complaint and the criminal proceedings initiated against him by the complainant cannot be allowed.

Consequently, the petition is dismissed.

(sd/-) R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JUDGE jsr/04/01/2010 Crl.M.C.No.6794/2019 APPENDIX PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS:

ANNEXURE A1 THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEFORE THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE COURT, ERNAKULAM THAT WAS TAKEN IN FILES AS CC NO. 119/2019 ANNEXURE A2 THE COPY OF THE WPC NO. 12448/2018 ANNEXURE A3 THE COPY OF THE REPLY NOTICE SENT BY THE PETITIONER.

RESPONDENTS’ EXHIBITS: NIL TRUE COPY PS TO JUDGE

Cause of action is date of offence not date of acquittal

Excerpt:

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Yashvant Malhotra vs A.K.Sinha on 20 December, 2019
CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                                   -1-



           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
                          CHANDIGARH
(1)
                                             Crl. Misc. No. M-11992-2017 (O&M)
                                             Date of decision: December 20, 2019

Yashvant Malhotra
                                                               ..... PETITIONER(s)

                          Versus

A.K. Sinha
                                                            ....RESPONDENT(s)

Crl. Misc. No.M-13649 of 2017 (O&M) J.N. Parsad ….. PETITIONER(s) Versus A.K. Sinha and another ….RESPONDENT(s) CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURINDER GUPTA Present: Mr. R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate with Mr. Arshdeep Singh Cheema, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-11992-2017.

Mr. Sumeet Goel, Advocate for the petitioner in CRM-M-13649-2017.

Mr. Mohan Singla, Advocate for respondent No.1.

Mr. Sukant Gupta, AP.P. for U.T. Chandigarh. SURINDER GUPTA, J(Oral) The complaint describes the brief facts of the case in para 3, which are reproduced as follows:-

“That the brief facts leading to the present complaint are 1 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -2-

as under:

(a) when the complainant was working as Commissioner and Secretary to Govt., Haryana Govt., at Chandigarh the accused no. 1, suo moto, registered a preliminary enquiry (hereinafter referred to as ‘PE’) in a transaction conducted during the period 1979-80, alleged to have been connected with some purchase order for WEEDICIDE issued by the complainant as the Director of Agriculture Haryana in 1980.

(b) the accused no. 1, thereafter, marked the same enquiry to accused no. 2 and ordered him to submit a P.E. report. The accused no. 2 conducted the whole P.E. within a span of 4-5 weeks and submitted a P.E. report to the accused no. 1.

(c) the accused no. 1, thereafter, suo moto registered an FIR bearing No. RC 5 of 1987 u/s 120-B Indian Penal Code read with Section 5(2) r/w 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 (& Sec. 5(2) r/w 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947) on dated 23.12.1987 against the complainant and two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of FIR dated 23.12.1987 is annexed as Annexure C-1.

(d) The accused No. 3 who was the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana signed the sanction order for the prosecution of the complainant on the behalf of His Excellency Governor of Haryana without having shown the concerned sanction order to the then Excellency Governor.

(e) the accused no. 1, thereafter, handed over the investigation in the above-mentioned FIR to accused no. 4 who was then DSP, CBI. The accused no. 4 had completed the investigation in 28 months and after a long period of 2 years and 4 months i.e. 28 months, he filed a charge sheet on 22.08.1990 against the complainant and 2 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -3-

two others namely Kamal Oswal and Vimal Oswal. The copy of charge sheet is annexed as Annexure C-2.

(f) the complainant was never examined by the accused No. 4 during the period of so-called above mentioned investigation on any aspect.

(g) the trial, thereafter, was conducted and during the trial prosecution examined 28 witnesses numbered as PW1 to PW29 except numbered as PW10 and produced so many documents on record.

(h) the trial Court after going through, thoroughly, all the statement of witnesses and the documents on record and arguments of the counsels of the parties pronounced its final judgment on dated 11.09.2014 and acquitted the complainant and two others from all charges. The copy of judgment of the trial Court is annexed as Annexure C-3.”

Learned trial Court on the basis of statement of complainant in preliminary evidence, observed that the accused named in the complaint have not followed the ordinary practice of registration of case, investigation, grant of sanction and putting the complainant to trial in the case registered against him.

Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that respondent has been victimised and the commission of offence under Section 166 and 499 of Indian Penal Code (for short-IPC) was disclosed against petitioners Yashvant Malhotra, J.N. Parsad along with co-accused Kulwant Singh, Purshotam Lal, and Bhaskar Raj Saxena and ordered their summoning vide order dated 25.09.2015.

Petitioners filed separate revisions against the summoning order, which were dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh 3 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -4-

vide separate orders dated 23.01.2017.

Both the petitioners have filed above captioned petitions under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure (for short-Cr.P.C.) challenging the orders passed by learned Magistrate and learned Sessions Judge, Chandigarh.

The first point raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is that FIR against the respondent was registered in the year 1987 and the complaint was filed on 22.04.2015 i.e. after a period of 28 years and is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 403.

Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the offence of defamation is a continuing offence giving recurring cause of action to the complainant-respondent. He was defamed from the year the FIR was registered against him till he was acquitted. From the date of acquittal, complaint is within limitation. In support of his contention, he has relied on the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in cases of Ajay Agarwal Vs. Union of India 1993(3) SCC 609; State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and another 1972(2) SCC 890; and Bhagirath Kanoria Vs. State of M.P. 1984 (4) SCC 222.

To find answer to the query as to whether the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent is within limitation, reference can be made to the observations of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs. Ascharaj Lala Chopra (supra), wherein a similar question was directly answered. Order of Magistrate was challenged before the Hon’ble Apex Court on the ground that Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC as the limitation prescribed under Section 4 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -5-

468 Cr.P.C. had expired. The appellant before the Hon’ble Apex Court, who was working as General Secretary, had filed a complaint against respondent Ascharaj Lal Chopra, who was working as Special Assistant in the bank and Amrik Singh, working as Clerk, for the offence punishable under Section 406, 420 IPC on 15.03.1972, alleging some misappropriation by them. They were convicted by the trial Court but acquitted by the Appellate Court vide judgment dated 01.04.1975 and the judgment of acquittal was upheld by this Court. Ashcharaj Lal Chopra (respondent) filed a complaint against Surinder Mohan Vikal (complainant in complaint case) on 11.02.1976 for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Learned Magistrate summoned him and the petition filed by him under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed by this Court. Taking note of all the above facts, Hon’ble Apex Court observed in para 5 and 6 as follows:-

“It will be recalled that the complaint for the commission of the offence under section 406/420 I.P.C. was. filed on March 15. It has specially been stated in the respondents complaint under section 500 I.P.C. that the defamatory matter was contained in that complaint. So, according to the complaint, the offence under section 500 I.P.C. was committed on March 15, 1972, which was the date of the within the meaning of section 469 (1) (a) of the Code, and the period of three years’ limitation would be calculated with reference to that date for purposes of the bar provided by section 468. But, as has been stated, the complaint under section 500 I.P.C. was filed on February 11, 1976, much after the expiry of that period. It was therefore not permissible for the Court of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.

                                   5 of 7

 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions)                                               -6-



The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground the “cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not before he (respondent) was acquitted by the Court of Session.” the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appears that High Court took the view that the “protection of section 468(c) was not available to the appellant. We are constrained to say the question of “cause of action could not really arise in this as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. It been stated, sub-section (1) of section 469 of the Code specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in section 468, in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore follow that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for purpose of calculating the three years’ period of limitation. High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.”

The citations referred by learned counsel for respondent that it is a continuing offence, as such, are not applicable to the facts of the present case as defamation is by a particular act and is not a continuing offence. The complaint filed by respondent is clearly barred by limitation and learned trial Court and the Court of revision have committed error while overlooking this fact. As such, both these petitions deserve to be allowed on this short ground.

In view of the above settled proposition of law, it is not required to examine the other plea raised by petitioners. Both these petitions have merits and are allowed. Criminal Complaint No.76 of 2015 (Annexure P-4) and summoning order dated 25.09.2015 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, 6 of 7 CRM-M-1992-2017(2 petitions) -7-

Chandigarh along with all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

                                                    (SURINDER GUPTA)
December 20, 2019                                       JUDGE
Sachin M.

            Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

            Whether Reportable:              Yes/No




                                   7 of 7

Exceptions to defamation are a matter of trial

Excerpt:

“First Exception – Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.- It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.

Tenth Exception – Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.- It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.”

12. As can be seen from the First exception, whether or not the statement or imputation is for the public good is a question of fact. Both these exceptions save the imputations which are made in public good. It being a pure question of fact, as has been observed in the case of Dilip Babasaheb Londhe (supra), it would be appropriate to leave it for the decision at the trial to ascertain if the news item was published in good faith, by extending ( 10 ) cri appln 2032.09 suitable opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence.

Bombay High Court
Vijay Jawarlalji Darda And Ors vs State Of Mah And Anr on 4 October, 2019
Bench: Mangesh S. Patil
                                        (1)                      cri appln 2032.09

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                          BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                    CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2032 OF 2009

1.    Vijay Jawaharlalji Darda,
      Age- 58 years, Occu- Business,
      R/o Lokmat Bhavan,
      Nagpur.

2.    Rajendra Jawaharlalji Darda,
      Age- 56 years, Occu- Business,
      R/o Lokmat Bhavan,
      Nagpur.

3.    Sudhir Prabhakar Mahajan,
      Age- 50 years, Occu- Service,
      R/o 11, Akshada Apartments,
      Aadarsha Nagar, Jalgaon.

4.    Pramod Bhimsing Patil,
      Age- 49 years, Occu- Service,
      R/o Kasoda, Tq.. Erandol,
      Dist. Jalgaon.                                          ...        APPLICANTS

               Versus

1.    State of Maharashtra

2.    Vijay Bapu Patil,
      Age 40 years, Occ. Nil,
      R/o Shop No.49, Ambedkar Market,
      Jalgaon.                                                ...        RESPONDENT

                                         ...
                   Advocate for Applicants : Mr. Satyajit S. Bora.
                    A.P.P. for Respondent/State : Mr. B.V. Virdhe.
                  Advocate for Respondent no.2: Mr. Vijay B. Patil.
                                         ...




     ::: Uploaded on - 04/10/2019                    ::: Downloaded on - 05/10/2019 05:22:52 :::
                                         (2)                    cri appln 2032.09

                                    CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, J.

RESERVED ON: 04.09.2019 PRONOUNCED ON: 04.10.2019 JUDGMENT :-

The applicants are invoking the powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the proceeding bearing S.C.C. No.2223 of 2008 lodged by the respondent no.2 for the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of a news item published by them on 11.07.2008 in their news paper ‘Lokmat’. The applicant no.1 is the Chairman, applicant no.2 is the Chief Editor, applicant no.3 is the Editor and the applicant no.4 is the reporter from village Kasoda Taluka Erandol, District Jalgaon.

2. The respondent no.2 filed a private complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalgaon alleging that in ‘Lokmat’ dated 11.07.2008 a news item was published on the front page under the caption ‘Narbali cha pryatna’ (Attempt at Human Sacrifice) with a sub heading ‘Jalu Gramsthanche Madtine Vachale Balkache Pran’ (A Child survives death scare because of alertness of Jalu villagers). The respondent no.2 claimed to be a social worker and a Founder President of Akhil Bhartiya Rajarshree Shahu Brigade, Jalgaon, which has been registered as a union at Nashik. There are number of (3) cri appln 2032.09 branches of the organization through out the State of Maharashtra. He alleged that under above caption a news was published mentioning that the respondent no.2 and ten members of his organization were taken to the police station on 10.07.2008. They were in police station till 11.07.2008 still the police could not collect any evidence and did not register any crime. In spite of that the news item was published. This was done by the applicants with intent to harm his reputation and the reputation of his organization. As a result of such a news item many persons started spreading rumours and started questioning him about the contents of the news item. He is defamed. He has been put to disrepute. He thereafter alleged that on 17.07.2008 he sent a notice to the applicants through his advocate and demanded the particulars on the basis of which the news item was published. However they did not respond and therefore they were liable to be punished. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement under verification and by the order dated 28.08.2008 directed the process to be issued.

3. The learned advocate for the applicants submits that it is a fact that a news item was published as was alleged on 11.07.2008 in the news paper ‘Lokmat’ (Exhibit-C). There is no question about disputing this fact and the news item is very well there to be read and must have been read by many persons. However, according to the learned advocate, what was published (4) cri appln 2032.09 was merely a report about the incident and no opinion was expressed. It was a truthful reporting of an incident wherein the respondent no.2 and his associates were indeed found moving in the village as a group with a boy named in the news item. The villagers suspected that the child was being carried by these people for sacrifice and one human skull was found. The persons were accosted by the villagers. The villagers assaulted them and took them to police station and the process of registering crime was going on till late in the night and Sub Inspector Khan of Bhadgaon was inquiring into it. He would further submit that it was a candid reporting in as much as even the version of the respondent and his associates to police that they had come there for a party was also mentioned in the news item.

4. The learned advocate would submit that further inquiry by the applicant no.4 with the police concerned revealed that indeed the incident was true. The respondent no.2 and his associates were assaulted by the villagers and were produced before the police. The boy was with them aged between 8-10 years and the villagers perceived that the boy was being taken for sacrifice. The matter was inquired into by Sub-Inspector Farooq Khan and on verification it was transpired that it was a matter of misunderstanding. They all had gathered there for a party. The boy was in fact was a nephew of one of them Sambhaji. They all were proceeding for a party but since it was (5) cri appln 2032.09 being held in a field the villagers perceived that it was some attempt at human sacrifice. The police also informed him about having inquired with the respondent by invoking the provisions of Section 68 of the Mumbai Police Act and having allowed them to let go under Section 69. Such a news explaining everything was also published on the very next day i.e. 12.07.2008 in the same daily. It is thus quite clear that it was a sheer misunderstanding and the news item was in fact a truthful disclosure of the happenings.

5. The learned advocate would submit that the complaint is devoid of any allegations that the applicants were harbouring some grudge against him and his associates and had published the news item to settle some score much less intending to harm his reputation. Since it turned out to be a factually correct reporting, no further inquiry is necessary and would fall under First exception to Section 499 which saves such true publication of a news item made in public good and was done in good faith and would also fall under Ninth exception, since the news was published in good faith for the protection of public at large and since it was seriously thought to be a case of human sacrifice.

6. The learned advocate for the applicants then placed reliance on the decision in the case of Jawaharlal Darda and Ors. Vs. Manoharrao Ganpatrao Kapsikar and Anr.; AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2117, Dilip (6) cri appln 2032.09 Babasaheb Londhe and Ors. Vs. State and Ors; 2013 ALL M.R. (Cri.) 4302 and the decision of a coordinate bench of this Court in Criminal Application No.607 of 2006 dated 09.11.2017 Dinkar Keshvrao Raikar and Anr. Vs. Mirza Afzal Baig s/o. Mirza Anvar Baig (Aurangabad Bench).

7. The learned advocate for the respondent no.2 submitted that once publication of the news item is brought on record. The contents of the news item clearly show that the respondent no.2 and his associates were clearly named therein to be the persons conveying to the public at large that they were nabbed by the villagers by suspecting that they were indulging in some inhuman act like human sacrifice. At this juncture this is sufficient to infer that it has the tendency of putting the respondent no.2 and his associates to disrepute and had a tendency to lower their reputation in the esteems of others as defined under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.

8. Whether the applicants had published such news item intentionally is a pure question of fact which can only be gone into and decided after extending sufficient opportunity to the respondent no.2 to prove his allegations. Similarly, whether or not they had published it for public good is again a question of fact as laid down in the first exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and being a question of fact, it could be decided only at a full-fledged trial. Consequently, when only the cognizance has been taken (7) cri appln 2032.09 by the Magistrate and a process has been issued, it cannot be concluded that the applicants had acted bona fide and had published the news item in good faith.

9. The learned advocate would submit that the applicants could have merely reported the incident without mentioning the names of the persons i.e. the respondent no.2 and his associates even if it was a fact that they were accosted by the villagers and were taken to the police station. If really the applicants were having some bona fides they should have waited for things to be clarified by police which according to them was done on the next day. The fact that the news was published hurriedly without such verification is demonstrative of the fact that they had not acted in good faith and the knowledge of the consequences of such serious imputations in a news item on the front page of the newspaper is sufficient to attribute knowledge on the part of the applicants that the contents of the news item had the potential to lower the reputation of the respondents in the esteems of others. Therefore the respondent no.2 deserves to be allowed to proceed with the trial and to lead evidence to substantiate the allegations. The facts prima facie make out a case of defamation and cannot be said to be an abuse of the process of law so as to quash and set aside the complaint itself.

10. I have carefully gone through the papers and particularly the news item. To repeat in brief, the news item clearly mentions that the respondent no.2 and his associates were accompanied by a child and were present in a field nearby the village, the villagers perceived that they were about to give a human sacrifice and had assaulted them and had taken them to the police station. One can easily attribute knowledge of the consequences of publication of such a news item containing grave imputations. At this juncture, one need not delve much in this aspect and the contents of the news item indeed can easily be said to have lower the reputation of the respondent no.1 in the esteems of others and the knowledge of such consequence can easily be imputable to the persons who have published the news.

11. True it is that the applicant no.4 thereafter seems to have inquired with the police on the next day i.e. 12.07.2008 and received a reply mentioning that indeed such an incident had taken place but it was a case of misunderstanding and the respondent no.2 and his associates were allowed to go after some inquiry. It was also informed by the Assistant Police Inspector of Kasoda Police Station by his reply dated 26.11.2008 under his signature and seal of the office that the respondent no.2 and his associates were brought to the police station at 4.00 a.m. of 11.07.2008 and were let go at 13.05 hours after inquiry. It is also true that a detail news was again published in the same daily on 12.07.2008 giving all these details mentioning as to how the incident (9) cri appln 2032.09 had put the respondent no.2 and his associates to the assault and lots of embarrassment. But then though prima facie it can be said that news item merely reported the true state of affairs, still, the question here would be as to if the case of the applicants can be said to fall under the relevant exceptions i.e. the First exception and the Tenth exception. The exceptions read as under:

“First Exception – Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.- It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.

Tenth Exception – Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.- It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.”

12. As can be seen from the First exception, whether or not the statement or imputation is for the public good is a question of fact. Both these exceptions save the imputations which are made in public good. It being a pure question of fact, as has been observed in the case of Dilip Babasaheb Londhe (supra), it would be appropriate to leave it for the decision at the trial to ascertain if the news item was published in good faith, by extending ( 10 ) cri appln 2032.09 suitable opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence.

13. As has been held in the case of Sewakram Vs. R.K. Karanjia; (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 208, journalist do not enjoy some kind of special privilege or have a greater freedom than others to make imputations or allegations, sufficient to ruin the reputation of a citizen. They are in no better position than any other person. Truth of an allegation does not permit a justification under First exception unless it is proved to be in public good. The question whether or not it was for public good is a question of fact which needs to be proved like any other relevant fact. Bearing in mind these principles, without intending to traverse the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to inquire into and decide the issue, publishing names of the respondent no.2 and his associates in a news item which could have been published by deleting the names is indeed a material circumstance which will have to be borne in mind by the Magistrate during the trial. At this juncture, in my considered view, publication of such item which has the potential of putting the respondent no.2 to disrepute and to lower him in the esteems of the others is prima facie sufficient to constitute defamation as defined under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and the doors cannot be shut at the threshold.

14. However, toeing the line of decision of a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Dilip Babasaheb Londhe (supra) it can certainly be said ( 11 ) cri appln 2032.09 that the applicant no.1 being Chairman, applicant no.2 being the Chief Editor could not have any direct role and responsibility in publishing the news item. It must have been the responsibility of the applicant no.3 who was the Editor and the applicant no.4 who was the news reporter of publishing such a news. Therefore, no fault can be found in the impugned order directing the process to be issued to the extent of applicant nos. 3 and 4 but the complaint deserves to be quashed qua the applicant nos. 1 and 2. To the extent of applicant nos. 3 and 4 the complaint cannot be quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case.

15. The decision in the case of Jawaharlal Darda (supra) was rendered in respect of a news item published in the same daily, which was in the form of a reporting of the answers/replies given by the Minister on the floor of the house in respect of misappropriation of Government funds meant for some irrigation projects. In those peculiar facts and circumstances it was found that it was published in public good and the complaint was quashed.

16. In the case of Dinkar Keshvrao Raikar (supra), a news item was published in the same daily mentioning that the complainant therein was a practising advocate and he and another advocate were detained by police and were in lock-up till next morning in respect of assault on some advocates and closure of functioning of the Court at the instance of the advocates. In the ( 12 ) cri appln 2032.09 peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein the brother Judge had found that a bare reading of the news item did not reveal necessary ingredients for constituting the offence of defamation and therefore the complaint was quashed.

17. On an independent scrutiny of the matter in hand, I have demonstrated herein above as to how prima facie there is material to show the offence of defamation having been committed. Therefore the applicant nos. 3 and 4 are not entitled to derive any benefit from these decisions.

18. The Criminal Application is partly allowed. The complaint filed by the respondent no.2 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate under Section 500 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is quashed and set aside to the extent of the applicant nos. 1 and 2.

19. The Criminal Application seeking quashment of the complaint even in respect of applicant nos. 3 and 4 is dismissed. The Rule is accordingly made absolute.

[MANGESH S. PATIL, J.] KAKADE

Mohammed Abdulla Khan vs Prakash K

Excerpt:

Where defamatory matter is printed (in a newspaper or a book etc.) and sold or offered for sale, whether the owner thereof can be heard to say that he cannot be made vicariously liable for the defamatory material carried by his newspaper etc. requires a critical examination.

27. Each case requires a careful scrutiny of the various questions indicated above. Neither prosecutions nor the power under Section 482 CrPC can be either conducted or exercised casually as was done in the case on hand.

 

 

Supreme Court of India
Mohammed Abdulla Khan vs Prakash K. on 4 December, 2017
Author: Chelameswar
Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2059 OF 2017
(Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.1741 of 2017)
Mohammed Abdulla Khan … Appellant

Versus

Prakash K. … Respondent
JUDGMENT
Chelameswar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The sole respondent is admittedly the owner of a Kannada Daily Newspaper by name “Jaya Kirana” published from Mangalore, Karnataka. On 16.12.2013, the said newspaper carried a news item containing certain allegations against the  appellant herein. According to the appellant, the allegations are highly defamatory in nature.

3. The appellant lodged a report with the Panambur Police, Mangalore, Dakshina Kannada District on 17.12.2013 against the respondent and another person who was editor of the above mentioned newspaper. Police did not take any action. Thereafter, the appellant filed a private complaint against the respondent and the editor of the above mentioned newspaper before the J.M.F.C.-II, Mangalore in PCR No.24/2014 which eventually came to be numbered as CC No.1252 of 2014. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the matter on 15.04.2014 for the offences punishable under Section 500, 501 and 502 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.04.2014, the respondent carried the matter in Revision Petition No.219 of 2014 before the Sessions Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore. By the order dated 06.11.2015, the respondent’s revision was dismissed. Respondent further carried the matter in Criminal Petition No.8679 of 2015 to the Karnataka High Court invoking Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. By an order dated 23.11.2016, the said petition was allowed and the proceedings in CC No.1252 of 2014, insofar as they pertained to the respondent, were quashed.

5. Both in his revision as well as the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the respondent urged various grounds which according to him render the order dated 15.04.2014 illegal. The details of those various grounds are not necessary for our purpose.

6. The judgment under appeal is very cryptic. The first three paragraphs of the judgment under appeal (running into a short one and a half page) purport to take note of only one submission of the respondent.

“Para 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would point out that there can be no vicarious liability insofar as the criminal law is concerned. The complainant’s allegation of the defamatory material published in the newspaper against him, even if it is established, can only be sustained against the editor of the newspaper and not the owner of the newspaper. The petitioner admittedly was the owner. The newspaper carries a legend that the newspaper is edited and published on behalf of the petitioner and there is no dispute in this regard.”

7. It appears from the judgment under appeal that the appellant herein argued that in view of the law laid down in K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham, (2002) 6 SCC 670 the respondent’s objection could not be sustained. High Court rejected the submission of the appellant.

“Para 3. Though the learned Counsel for the respondent would seek to contend that the question is no longer res integra and is covered by a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Mathew vs. K.A. Abraham, AIR 2002 SC 2989, it is however noticed that the said decision was in respect of a managing editor, resident editor or a chief editor of respective newspaper publications, who were parties therein.” The learned Judge recorded that the judgment in K M Mathew’s case could be distinguished and, therefore, opined that the respondent’s petition is required to be allowed.

“Para 3. … Therefore, at the outset, it can be said that the said case could be distinguished from the case on hand, as, the petitioner is not claiming as an editor, who had any role in the publication of the newspaper. Therefore, it is a fit case where the petition should be allowed.” It is unfortunate that the High Court did not choose to give any reason whatsoever for quashing the complaint except a grand declaration that “it would lead to a miscarriage of justice”.

“Accordingly, though the criminal proceedings can go on against the editor of the newspaper, the petitioner cannot be proceeded with, as it would lead to a miscarriage of justice.” Hence, the appeal.

8. Before us, the appellant appeared in person. In spite of the service of notice, the respondent neither chose to appear in person nor through a counsel. In view of the fact that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter, we thought it appropriate to request Shri M.N. Rao, learned Senior Advocate to assist the Court in this matter.

9. Heard Shri M.N. Rao, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant.

10. Section 499 IPC defines the offence of defamation. It contains 10 exceptions and 4 explanations. The relevant portion reads;

“Section 499. Defamation.— Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.”
11. An analysis of the above reveals that to constitute an offence of defamation it requires a person to make some imputation concerning any other person;

(i) Such imputation must be made either

(a) With intention, or

(b) Knowledge, or

(c) Having a reason to believe

that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person against whom the imputation is made.

(ii) Imputation could be, by

(a) Words, either spoken or written, or

(b) By making signs, or

(c) Visible representations

(iii) Imputation could be either made or published. The difference between making of an imputation and publishing the same is:

If ‘X’ tells ‘Y’ that ‘Y’ is a criminal – ‘X’ makes an imputation. If ‘X’ tells ‘Z’ that ‘Y’ is a criminal – ‘X’ publishes the imputation.

The essence of publication in the context of Section 499 is the communication of defamatory imputation to persons other than the persons against whom the imputation is made.1

12. Committing any act which constitutes defamation under Section 499 IPC is punishable offence under Section 500 IPC. Printing or engraving any defamatory material is altogether a different offence under Section 501 IPC. Offering for sale or selling any such printed or engraved defamatory material is yet another distinct offence under Section 502 IPC. Khima Nand v. Emperor , (1937) 38 Cri LJ 806 (All); Amar Singh v. K.S. Badalia, (1965) 2 Cri LJ 693 (Pat)
13. If the content of any news item carried in a newspaper is defamatory as defined under Section 499 IPC, the mere printing of such material “knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory” itself constitutes a distinct offence under Section 501 IPC. The sale or offering for sale of such printed “substance containing defamatory matter” “knowing that it contains such matter” is a distinct offence under Section 502 IPC.

14. Whether an accused (such as the respondent) against whom a complaint is registered under various Sections of the IPC (Sections 500, 501 & 502 IPC) could be convicted for any of those offences depends upon the evidence regarding the existence of the facts relevant to constitute those offences.

15. In the context of the facts of the present case, first of all, it must be established that the matter printed and offered for sale is defamatory within the meaning of the expression under Section 499 IPC. If so proved, the next step would be to examine the question whether the accused committed the acts which constitute the offence of which he is charged with the requisite intention or knowledge etc. to make his acts culpable.
16. Answer to the question depends upon the facts. If the respondent is the person who either made or published the defamatory imputation, he would be liable for punishment under Section 500 IPC. If he is the person who “printed” the matter within the meaning of the expression under Section 501 IPC. Similarly to constitute an offence under Section 502 IPC, it must be established that the respondent is not only the owner of the newspaper but also sold or offered the newspaper for sale.

17. We must make it clear that for the acts of printing or selling or offering to sell need not only be the physical acts but include the legal right to sell i.e. to transfer the title in the goods – the newspaper. Those activities if carried on by people, who are employed either directly or indirectly by the owner of the newspaper, perhaps render all of them i.e., the owner, the printer, or the person selling or offering for sale liable for the offences under Sections 501 or 502 IPC, (as the case may be) if the other elements indicated in those Sections are satisfied.

18. Whether the content of the appellant’s complaint constitutes an offence punishable under any one or all or some of the above mentioned sections was not examined by the High Court for quashing the complaint against the respondent. So we need not trouble ourselves to deal with that question. We presume for the purpose of this appeal that the content of the appellant’s complaint does disclose the facts necessary to establish the commission of one or all of the offences mentioned above. Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent for any one of the above mentioned three offences is a matter that can be examined only after recording evidence at the time of trial. That can never be a subject matter of a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

19. From the judgment under appeal, it appears that before the High Court it was argued on behalf of the respondent that there is no vicarious liability in criminal law and therefore the owner of a newspaper cannot be prosecuted for the offences of defamation.

“2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that there can be no vicarious liability insofar as the criminal law is concerned. The complainant’s allegation of the defamatory material published in the newspaper against him, even if it is established, can only be sustained against the editor of the newspaper and not the owner of the newspaper. The petitioner admittedly was the owner. The newspaper carries a legend that the newspaper is edited and published on behalf of the petitioner and there is no dispute in this regard.”

20. It appears from para 3 of the judgment that the appellant herein submitted in response to the above extracted contention of the respondent that the question is no longer res integra and is covered by a judgment of this Court in K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham & Others.2 The High Court rejected the submission holding: “…….it is however noticed that the said decision was in respect of a managing editor, resident editor or a chief editor of respective newspaper publications, who were parties therein. Therefore, at the outset, it can be said that the said case could be distinguished from the case on hand, as, the petitioner is not claiming as an editor, who had any role in the publication of the newspaper. Therefore, it is a fit case where the petition should be allowed.” The High Court concluded that prosecution of the respondent would lead to miscarriage of justice. A conclusion without any discussion and without disclosing any principle which forms the basis of the conclusion.

FACTS, ISSUE & RATIO DECIDENDI OF K.M. MATHEW’S CASE:

21. K.M. Mathew was the “Chief Editor” of a daily called Malayalam Manorama. When he was sought to be prosecuted for the offence of defamation, he approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying that the prosecution be quashed on the ground that Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 only permits the prosecution of the Editor but not the Chief Editor. The High Court rejected the submission. (2002) 6 SCC 670
22. Even before this Court, the same submission was made.3 This Court rejected the submission holding:

“16. The contention of these appellants is not tenable. There is no statutory immunity for the Chief Editor against any prosecution for the alleged publication of any matter in the newspaper over which these persons exercise control.” It was further held that though the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 is not applicable to somebody whose name is printed in the newspaper as the Chief Editor, the complainant can still allege and prove that persons other than the Editor, if they are responsible for the publication of the defamatory material.
“20. The provisions contained in the Act clearly go to show that there could be a presumption against the Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the Editor of such publication and that he is responsible for selecting the matter for publication. Though, a similar presumption cannot be drawn against the Chief Editor, Resident Editor or Managing Editor, nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory news item. Even the presumption under Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption and the same could be proved otherwise. That by itself indicates that somebody other than editor can also be held responsible for selecting the matter for publication in a newspaper.”
23. K.M. Mathew’s case has nothing to do with the question of vicarious liability. The argument in K.M. Mathew’s case was that in view of Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books The contention of the appellants in these cases is that they had not been shown as Editors in these publications and that their names were printed either as Chief Editor, Managing Editor or Resident Editor and not as “Editor” and there cannot be any criminal prosecution against them for the alleged libellous publication of any matter in that newspaper. [Para 15 of K.M. Mathew’s case] Act, 1867 only the Editor of a newspaper could be prosecuted for defamation. Such a submission was rejected holding that Section 7 does not create any immunity in favour of persons other than the Editor of a newspaper. It only creates a rebuttable presumption that the person whose name is shown as the editor of the newspaper is responsible for the choice and publication of the material in the newspaper. K.M. Mathew’s case made it clear that if a complaint contains allegations (which if proved would constitute defamation), person other than the one who is declared to be the editor of the newspapers can be prosecuted if they are alleged to be responsible for the publication of such defamatory material.

The High Court, in our opinion, without examining the ratio of K.M. Mathew’s case chose to conclude that the decision is distinguishable. The judgment of the High Court is absolutely unstructured leaving much to be desired.

24. Vicarious liability for a crime is altogether a different matter. In England, at one point of time, the owner of a newspaper was held to be vicariously liable for an offence of defamation (libel). The history of law in this regard is succinctly stated by Lord Cockburn in The Queen v. Holbrook.4 Though there appears to be some modification of the law subsequent to the enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act i.e. the Libel Act 1843 (6&7 Vict C 96).

Lord Campbell’s Act did not apply to India. The Press and Registration of Books Act (Act XXV of 1867) is made applicable to British India and continues to be in force by virtue of the declaration under Article 372 of the Constitution of India. There are material differences between the scheme and tenor of both the enactments. In Ramasami v. Lokanada, (1886) ILR 9 Mad 692, it was held:

“… But we cannot hold that the provisions of that Statute (Ed.
Lord Campbell’s Act) are applicable to this country, and we must determine whether the accused is or is not guilty of defamation with reference to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. We consider that it would be a sufficient answer to the charge in this country if the accused showed that he entrusted in good faith the temporary management of the newspaper to a competent person during his absence, and that the libel was published without his authority, knowledge or consent. As the Judge has, however, misapprehended the effect of Act XXV of 1867, we shall set aside the order of acquittal made by him and direct him to restore the appeal to his file, to consider the evidence produced by the accused and then to dispose of the appeal with reference to the foregoing observations.” and reiterated in Emperor v. Bodi Narayana Rao and G. Harisarvothama Rao, (1909) ILR 32 Mad 338:

“Lord Campbell’s Act, of course, is not in force in India, and the Criminal Law of England is not necessarily the same as the Criminal Law of India as contained in the Indian Penal Code …” L.R. 3 QBD 60
25. The extent of the applicability of the principle of vicarious liability in criminal law particularly in the context of the offences relating to defamation are neither discussed by the High Court in the judgment under appeal nor argued before us because the respondent neither appeared in person nor through any advocate. Therefore, we desist from examining the question in detail. But we are of the opinion that the question requires a serious examination in an appropriate case because the owner of a newspaper employs people to print, publish and sell the newspaper to make a financial gain out of the said activity. Each of the above mentioned activities is carried on by persons employed by the owner.

26. Where defamatory matter is printed (in a newspaper or a book etc.) and sold or offered for sale, whether the owner thereof can be heard to say that he cannot be made vicariously liable for the defamatory material carried by his newspaper etc. requires a critical examination.

27. Each case requires a careful scrutiny of the various questions indicated above. Neither prosecutions nor the power under Section 482 CrPC can be either conducted or exercised casually as was done in the case on hand.

28. The judgment under appeal cannot be sustained for the reasons indicated above. The same is, therefore, set-aside and the appeal is allowed. The trial court will now proceed with the case in accordance with law.

………………………………….J. (J. CHELAMESWAR) ………………………………….J. (S. ABDUL NAZEER) New Delhi December 4, 2017

Vishveshwar Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Another

Excerpt:, I am of the view that in the present case as well, it would be appropriate to have a full-fledged trial so as to gather the intention of the accused, whether it was there to defame the opposite party no. 2 in order to lower his image in the estimation of the public and with that motive the news item was printed or whether it was simply a statement of fact. This Court cannot prejudge this issue without the full trial.
Allahabad High Court
Vishveshwar Kumar vs State Of U.P. And Another on 2 September, 2019
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Singh-I
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Judgment Reserved on : 08.08.2019
 
Judgment Delivered on :  02.09.2019
 

 
Court No. - 65
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 38158 of 2012
 

 
Applicant :- Vishveshwar Kumar
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Imran Ullah
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt.Advocate,N.L.Pandey,Pankaj Srivastava
 

 
Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J.

Heard learned counsel for the applicant Shri Imran Ullah and in opposition, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 Shri N.L. Pandey, learned A.G.A. for the State Shri G.P. Singh and perused the record.

2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Code’) has been moved on behalf of the applicant with a prayer to quash the entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 583 of 2012 (Natthu Lal Yadav v. Pradhan Sampadak and others), under Sections 500, 501 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’), Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi, pending in the court of A.C.J.M.-II, Varanasi.

3. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the applicant and the contentions made in the affidavit filed on his behalf, it would be pertinent to refer here in brief, the complainant’s case as narrated in the complaint and the evidence which has been adduced in support thereof. According to the complaint, one Sessions Trial No. 642 of 1999 was initiated against the opposite party no. 2/complainant under Sections 302, 120B of I.P.C., Police Station – Chowk, District – Varanasi pertaining to Crime No. 10 of 1999, in which he was acquitted vide judgment and order dated 05.08.2002 by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. 5. The Advisory Committee of the National Security Agency (N.S.A.) had communicated by FAX to the opposite party no. 2 that his detention was found to be against law and a direction was issued for his immediate release. Earlier, the District Magistrate had cancelled the license of S.B.B.L. gun of the opposite party no. 2, but subsequently, a report was sent by Inspector, Kotwali pertaining to Crime No. 10 of 1999 in respect to the cancellation of gun license of the opposite party no. 2 and after consideration of the same, the District Magistrate vide order dated 25.08.1999, had cancelled his gun license, against which an appeal was preferred by him before the Commissioner, Varanasi under Section 19 of the Arms Act, 1959 and vide order dated 26.02.2001, the order of District Magistrate was confirmed, against which the opposite party no. 2 had preferred a writ petition No. 20298 of 2010 before the High Court, in which the orders of the District Magistrate and the Commissioner were set aside and the said gun was released in favour of opposite party no. 2 and his armed license gun was renewed up to 2009 and was valid till then. The accused-applicant along with two other co-accused were fully aware of these facts, but in order to assail his dignity, at the instance of co-accused (Sanjay Singh, Inspector, Police Station – Kotwali, District – Varanasi), on 13.06.2007, untrue facts were published in the newspapers, which were derogatory to the opposite party no. 2 and considerably dented his esteem in the eyes of public and people started looking upon him in adverse light and this also led to the breakage of betrothal (‘sagaai’) of the complainant’s son and people started avoiding to meet him so much so that it became very difficult for him to move around and live peacefully a dignified life. This caused immense physical, mental and financial loss to him.

4. The said complaint was registered as Complaint Case No. 2025 of 2007 against the applicant and two other co-accused and on 25.06.2007, the statement of the opposite party no. 2 was recorded under Section 200 of the Code, in which he narrated the same version which has been stated above in the complaint, further clarifying that all the three accused, which included the applicant, in conspiracy with each other, published news item in ‘Hindustan’ and ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspapers on 13.06.2007. The local editors of the said two daily newspapers were made accused along with the S.I. Sanjay Singh who were stated to have deliberately published the said news item, which led to the defamation of the opposite party no. 2 and therefore, it was mentioned that a sum of Rs. 10 lacs should be directed to be paid by the accused to compensate the opposite party no. 2.

5. In support of the complaint, one Manoj Kumar Srivastava was examined by the opposite party no. 2 as P.W.1 under Section 202 of the Code, who has stated that he knew the opposite party no. 2 and had read news item in ‘Amar Ujala’, Varanasi edition dated 13.06.2007, carrying news item pertaining to the opposite party no. 2, after reading which, he received a big jolt that the opposite party no. 2 was a man with criminal antecedents, having case under Section 302 of I.P.C. and he was a history-sheeter. His other friends were having the same kind feeling towards him after having read the news and started avoiding to meet him. The other witness, namely, Kashi Seth was also examined by the opposite party no. 2 as P.W.2. He also has stated that he read the Varanasi Edition of the ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspaper dated 13.06.2007 and came to know about the opposite party no. 2 being a history-sheeter and this led him not to have confidence in the opposite party no. 2 as his reputation had gone down badly. The marriage of opposite party no. 2’s son which was likely to take place also had broken because of the said news item having been widely read by the general public.

6. Based on the said evidence, the trial court passed the order dated 10.01.2008, wherein it was recorded that the news item which was published by the accused-applicant was nothing but publishing correct news and therefore, the same would not fall in the category of any offence. The accused being an editor of the ‘Amar Ujala’ daily newspaper, had published the said item only thinking that the said news item was correct and it would not appear to him that if the same was published by him, it would bring down the esteem of the opposite party no. 2 in the eyes of public. As regards the third accused Sanjay Singh, Inspector, Kotwali, the action taken by him fell within the domain of his official duty in respect of cancellation of arm’s license of opposite party no. 2. Merely on account of opposite party no. 2 being acquitted, it could not be said that accused no. 3 had proceeded to take action for cancellation of arms license in order to damage his reputation. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code. Against the said order, a revision (Criminal Revision No. 09 of 2008) was preferred in which the Sessions Judge, Varanasi vide judgment and order dated 29.02.2008, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate mentioned above and remanded the matter back to the trial court to decide the matter afresh after hearing the counsel for the complainant and considering the evidence on record. While passing the said order, the learned revisional court observed that although the complainant had been acquitted in the cases pending against him, getting benefit of doubt, but in the publication dated 13.06.2007, it was written ^^fgLVªh’khVj Hkh ysdj ?kwe jgsa ykblsalh vlygk^^. The name of the opposite party no. 2 was also mentioned therein, therefore, it was not appropriate for the newspaper to publish such news without proper enquiry. The opposite party no. 2 had been acquitted by the Additional District Judge on 05.08.2002 and by the order of High Court in Writ Petition No. 20298 of 2001, the petition of opposite party no. 2 was allowed and his arm’s license was restored in the year 2003. Thus, after 2003 till 2007, there was nothing against the opposite party no. 2 which could be the basis for publishing such news item that he was a history-sheeter detenue of “RASUKA” (Rashtriya Suraksha Kanoon). Further, it is mentioned in the said judgment that the publication of the fact mentioned in the complaint could not be said to be bona fide and the conclusion drawn by the learned trial court that true facts were published could not be said to be in accordance with evidence on record and accordingly, the revision was allowed.

7. Thereafter, the trial court passed the impugned order dated 09.07.2009, in which it has been recorded that the revisional court, while allowing the revision on 29.02.2008, has directed it to pass fresh order on the basis of evidence, after hearing the parties again. The revisional court in its order while drawing the conclusion, has mentioned that the publication made in the newspapers did not appear to have been published bona fidely and hence, according to the conclusion drawn by the revisional court, the accused deserves to be summoned to face trial under Section 500 of I.P.C. and accordingly, summons were issued against the applicant along with other two co-accused.

8. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant was that the impugned order was totally illegal because the same was not passed on the appreciation of the evidence on record by the learned Magistrate, rather it has been passed in accordance with the wishes/opinion formed by the revisional court, which is wrong. The learned Magistrate was directed to consider the evidence afresh and after hearing the parties, he should have passed fresh order, expressing his own opinion as to whether prima facie case under the relevant sections were made out or not and it should not have passed the order merely because the revisional court had expressed opinion that the said offence was found to be made out.

9. Attention of this Court was also drawn to the order of the District Magistrate, Varanasi dated 15.10.2007 at page no. 85 of the paper book, in which as many as four criminal cases are shown to have been recorded against opposite party no. 2 and it was also mentioned therein that on the basis of police report, showing those cases to have been initiated against opposite party no. 2, was held to be the basis for cancelling the arm’s license of the opposite party no. 2. He was issued notice to show cause on 19.07.2007. In response to the said notice, the opposite party no. 2 had filed objection on 17.08.2007, stating therein that the Crime No. 10 of 1999 was registered against him because a widow lady had received a bullet injury and concerning that, proceedings were also initiated against him under N.S.A. His arm’s license was also cancelled vide order dated 25.08.1999, against which he had preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, which too was dismissed and thereafter, a writ petition No. 20298 of 2001 was preferred by the opposite party no. 2 and in the said petition, vide order dated 14.05.2003, the orders of District Magistrate and the Commissioner were set aside and the arm’s license of the opposite party no. 2 was directed to be restored and on that basis, the show cause notice was taken back with immediate effect and the gun was directed to be restored to opposite party no. 2. It was argued after having shown the said order, that the said order was passed on 15.10.2007, while the publication of news item was made on 13.06.2007, which was stated to be derogatory and defamatory against the opposite party no. 2. Therefore, it is apparent that the accused-applicant did not have any knowledge that any such order was passed by the District Magistrate, restoring the arm’s license to the opposite party no. 2 after having found that the criminal case shown pending against him had resulted in acquittal and the High Court had passed a direction in his favour to restore the license and the weapon as well.

10. The sole basis of making publication of the said news item was that there was report of the co-accused Sanjay Singh to the effect that the above-mentioned four cases were pending against him and hence, he had made the said publication simply on the basis of the police report. There was no intention while publishing the said news item to defame the opposite party no. 2, rather it was simply a news item, which was statement of fact, basis of which was police report, which later on came to be set aside by the order of District Magistrate dated 15.10.2007, hence, he cannot be held liable for having caused offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C.

11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the quashing of the proceedings against the applicant because according to him, it was very much in the knowledge of the accused-applicant that those criminal cases, which are cited above, had already been closed and the accused-applicant had been acquitted and the license of the gun was also restored to the opposite party no. 2 and yet, knowing full well, the said news item was published in the said papers with a view to maligning the image of the opposite party no. 2, hence, offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C. were made out on the basis of evidence which has been recorded by the trial court.

12. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K. Sitaram and Another v. CFL Capital Financial Service Limited and Another1. In the above-mentioned case, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that when a person files a complaint and supports it on oath, rendering himself liable to prosecution and embezzlement, if it is false, he is entitled to be believed unless there is some apparent reason for disbelieving him; and he is entitled to have the person, against whom he complains, brought before the court and tried. The only condition requisite for the issue of process is that the complainant’s deposition must show sufficient ground for proceeding.

13. From the side of the applicant, in paragraph no. 32 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that a perusal of the order dated 15.10.2007 passed by the District Magistrate would itself demonstrate that the D.M. was not in the knowledge of earlier proceedings and as such if at all he had given any statement against opposite party no. 2, that was on the basis of criminal proceedings and relying on the police report. However, the reporting of the publishing was done only on the basis of the statement given by the then-District Magistrate and after doing preliminary enquiry by the reporter concerned, whereby he was shown the papers regarding criminal prosecution as well as the reports given by the police station concerned to the District Magistrate and as such, it cannot be said that the said reporting was done with laxity and without proper investigation, with an intention to defame any person. The petitioner/applicant, at the time of the said reporting, was Resident Editor of Hindustan Times Media Ltd. The said reporting was not done by him. There was no intention nor any personal enmity with the complainant to publish false report against him, rather it was a plain and simple reporting of the fact as narrated by the then District Magistrate, Varanasi and there was no ulterior motive against the complainant to defame him or tarnish his image. The trial court has ignored the settled principle of law that in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have intention as well knowledge to have aided in the commission of the offence.

14. In the instant case, the applicant cannot be said to be an abettor as there was no intention or knowledge to commit the offence. There was no prima facie case made out against the applicant. There is not an iota of single specific allegation against the applicant in relation to the publication of the said news item and yet he has been summoned. Further, it was mentioned that under Section 7 of the Press and Regulation of Books Act, 1867, it is only the office of the “editor” as defined under Section 1(1) of the Act who can be held responsible for the publication and no other person. The said Act has been reproduced in the affidavit. It was necessary that the editor should have been directly responsible for publishing any news item.

15. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Alagh v. State of Uttar Pradesh2, in which it is held that there is no concept of vicarious liability under criminal law. The trial court has miserably failed to appreciate the evidence on record and has taken cognizance erroneously, which needs to be set aside.

16. From the side of opposite party no. 2, counter affidavit has been filed, in which all the submissions made in the affidavit have been rebutted and it has been asserted that there was sufficient evidence on record for the trial court to summon the accused under the aforesaid sections.

17. In the rejoinder affidavit filed from the side of the applicant, the same facts have been reiterated, which have been mentioned in the affidavit and nothing new has been stated.

18. The facts in the case are very much clear, as has been mentioned above. It is a fact that the opposite party no. 2 was an accused under Section 302 of I.P.C., but he had been acquitted for the same by the trial court way back in the year 2002 and the gun license was issued in favour of opposite party no. 2, which was cancelled by the District Magistrate and thereafter, the said decision was upheld by the Commissioner. Both the orders were set aside by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 20298 of 2001 vide order dated 14.05.2003 and the said license was restored to the opposite party no. 2, while the news item in question has been published in 2007. It is apparent that the said news item appears to have been printed in newspapers without taking proper care and making proper enquiry and the possibility cannot be ruled out that the same could have been published in order to bring down the image of the opposite party no. 2, as has been stated in the complaint and supported by the two witnesses named above. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant had no intention to defame opposite party no. 2 and that he had simply printed the news item on the basis of his information which he had received from the District Magistrate and also on the basis of police report, is something which needs to be decided by the trial court after having appreciated the evidence on record of both the sides and after having appreciated in the light of cross-examination made as to whether the evidence to be adduced by the parties proves the offence as has been committed by the accused-applicant or not. In case the trial court comes to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence on record to hold the accused guilty of having published the said news item deliberately in order to lower his image in the estimation of public, then the accused may get acquittal from the trial court, but at this stage, prima facie there is evidence against the applicant which discloses commission of offence under Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C.

19. Sections 500 and 501 of I.P.C. are reproduced herein below :-

500. Punishment for defamation.–Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

501. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.–Whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

20. It is apparent from the above definition of offence under Section 501 of I.P.C. that if someone prints or engraves any matter knowing that such matter is defamatory of a person, he shall be punished with two years’ simple imprisonment or with fine or with both.

21. In the present case, there is certainly a news item printed, which is found by the trial court to be defamatory against the opposite party no. 2, as two witnesses have stated that when they read the said piece of evidence, they started viewing the opposite party no. 2 in poor light, considering that he was a criminal and tried to stay away from him and the marriage of his son had also broken on that account. Therefore, the fact as to whether the said news item was printed in the said newspapers knowingly that the same would tarnish the image of the opposite party no. 2 or not, is a matter of evidence and a full-fledged trial is required to be held for the same. Therefore, at the initial stage, the proceedings against the applicant cannot be nibbed in the bud and reliance may be placed by me upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Md. Abdullah Khan v. Prakash K.3, wherein it was held that it must be established that matter printed and offered for sale is defamatory within the meaning of expression under Section of 499 of I.P.C. If so proved, the next step would be to examine the question whether the accused-respondent committed the acts which constitute the offence of which he is charged, with the requisite intention or knowledge, etc. to make his act culpable. The answer to question depends upon facts. If the respondent is the person who either made or published the defamatory imputation, he would be liable for punishment under Section 500 of I.P.C. and if he is the person who “printed” the matter, then within the meaning of expression under Section 501 of I.P.C. Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondent for the said offence, is a matter that can be examined only after recording the evidence at the time of the trial. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the High Court did not choose to give any reason, whatsoever, for quashing the complaint, except concluding that the prosecution of accused would lead to miscarriage of justice, which was held to be wrong and it was considered proper that the trial ought to have been held.

23. Adopting the above principle of law in the present case, I am of the view that in the present case as well, it would be appropriate to have a full-fledged trial so as to gather the intention of the accused, whether it was there to defame the opposite party no. 2 in order to lower his image in the estimation of the public and with that motive the news item was printed or whether it was simply a statement of fact. This Court cannot prejudge this issue without the full trial.

23. In view of the aforesaid, the prayer for quashing the entire proceedings in the aforesaid case is refused and resultantly, the instantly application stands rejected.

Order Date :- September 02, 2019 I.Batabyal [Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J.]

Gambhirsinh R.Dekare vs Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel & Anr

Excerpt:

Supreme Court of India
Gambhirsinh R.Dekare vs Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel & Anr on 11 March, 2013
Author: C K Prasad
Bench: Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, V. Gopala Gowda
                                                                      REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.433 OF 2013
              (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 3475 OF 2008)


GAMBHIRSINH R. DEKARE                   … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS


FALGUNBHAI CHIMANBHAI PATEL
AND ANR.                                          …RESPONDENTS





                               J U D G M E N T

CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.

The petitioner Gambhirsinh R. Dekare, at the relevant point of time was serving as Taluka Mamlatdar and an Executive Magistrate in Vadodara Taluka in the State of Gujarat. A Gujarati daily newspaper “Sandesh” is published from different places i.e., Surat, Valsad, Bharuch, Vadodara and other cities of India. Navinbhai Chauhan is the Resident Editor of Vadodara edition of “Sandesh” whereas Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel is the Editor of “Sandesh”. The newspaper published a news item in its Vadodara issue dated 28.09.1999 that the petitioner “is in love and keeping illicit relations with the wife of a doctor at Ajwa Road with the following headlines:

“Mamlatdar Shri Gambhirsinh Dhakre is caught red handed by the youngsters- Mamlatdar is indulged in illicit relations with the wife of Doctor who is residing at Ajwa Road- attempts to conceal the matter- why the Government is not taking any action against the Mamlatdar?” According to the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”), the allegation published in the newspaper is false and defamatory. Accordingly, he filed complaint in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara. The complainant alleged that the news items are printed in the newspaper “as per the instructions and directions of the accused persons”. In paragraph 3 of the complaint the complainant alleged as under:

“3. The Accused No. 1 and 2 of this case have deliberately published the news in the Page No. 12 of their daily newspaper ‘Sandesh’ dated 28/9/99 which is quite defaming and offending to us. The accused persons were in the knowledge that we the complainant shall be defamed in the Society due to publishing of such news and with a view to vilify us as the person having bad character, the accused persons, in collusion with each other, have published the following news in the newspaper deliberately.” The complainant termed those allegations to be false and stated that the Editor and the Resident Editor have tried to prove him a characterless person in the society and because of that he had faced shameful and disgraceful situation amongst the family members and friends. The news item further brought him in disrepute in the Department and the public. It has been alleged that the accused persons have published the news item without any evidence or proof. The complainant denied to have any illicit relation with the doctor’s wife. The complainant was examined on solemn affirmation in which he reiterated the allegation.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate, taking into account the allegation made in the petition of complaint and the statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation, took cognizance of the offence under Section 500, 501, 502, 506, 507 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and issued process against both the accused.

Accused no. 2, Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel, the Editor of “Sandesh”, aggrieved by the order taking cognizance and issuing process, filed an application before the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vadodara on 08.10.1999. He sought quashing of the complaint on the ground that he is the Editor of the newspaper, stationed at Ahmedabad and the offending news item was published in the Vadodara Edition of the newspaper, of which Navinbhai Chauhan, accused no. 1, is the Resident Editor. It was further contended that he was not aware of the offending news item being published in the newspaper or for that matter he had any role to play in selection of such item for publication. The High Court by the impugned order allowed the application and while doing so observed as follows:

“6. In the complaint itself, the petitioner is described as editor of the newspaper and his address is shown at Ahmedabad. Original accused No. 1 is described as a resident editor of Baroda of the same newspaper. It is not in dispute that the newspaper in question has its registered office at Ahmedabad and Baroda edition of the newspaper is being separately published from Baroda. It is also not in dispute that offending news item was carried in Baroda edition of the newspaper only.” The High Court further went on to observe as under:

“10. In the present case also, I find that there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the petitioner herein was aware about the offending news item being published or that he had any role to play in selection of such item for publication. In absence of any material disclosed in the complaint and in view of the admitted fact that the petitioner is an editor of the newspaper stationed at Ahmedabad and the news item was carried in its Baroda edition alone where the newspaper has a separate resident editor, the petitioner cannot be proceeded against for the offence of defamation of the complaint.” The High Court came to the conclusion that prosecution of accused no.

2 would amount to miscarriage of justice and, accordingly, quashed the complaint and the process issued against him.

It is against this order that the complainant has preferred this special leave petition.

Leave granted.

Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, Senior Advocate appears on behalf of the complainant (appellant herein) whereas accused no. 2 (Respondent no. 1 herein) is represented by Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate.

Mr. Ahmadi, submits that according to the complainant, accused no. 2 was the Editor stationed at Ahmedabad and there is specific allegation against him that the news items are published in the newspaper “as per the instructions and directions of the accused persons”. The complainant has further alleged in the complaint that both the accused i.e. the Editor (accused no. 2) and the Resident Editor (accused no. 1) had deliberately published the news in their Gujarati daily newspaper “Sandesh” which is defamatory. The complainant went on to say that the “accused persons were in the knowledge that the complainant shall be defamed in the society due to publication of such news”. In the face of the aforesaid allegation, Mr. Ahmadi points out that the High Court committed a serious error by observing that “there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that” accused no. 2 “was aware about the offending news item being published or that he had any role to play in selection of such item for publication”. Mr. Dave, however, submits that, according to the complainant’s own showing, accused no. 2 was the Editor of the newspaper stationed at Ahmedabad and the offending news item having been published at Vadodara for which there is admittedly a separate Resident Editor, it has to be assumed that the accused no. 2 was not aware of the same and had no role to play in the selection of such item for publication.

We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submission and we do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Dave. Complainant has specifically averred in the complaint that the news item was printed in the newspaper as per the instructions and directions of the accused persons. The complainant had specifically alleged that accused nos. 1 and 2 have deliberately published the offending news and it was within their knowledge. At this stage, it is impermissible to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegation and one has to proceed on a footing that the allegation made is true. Hence, the conclusion reached by the High Court that “there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the petitioner herein was aware of the offending news item being published or that he had any role to play in the selection of such item for publication” is palpably wrong. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court has quashed the prosecution on an erroneous assumption of fact which renders its order illegal.

Mr. Ahmadi, further submits that the impugned order is vulnerable on another count. He points out that according to the complainant, the present accused was the Editor and his name has been printed as such in the publication and, therefore, he is responsible for the publication of the news item. Mr. Dave, however, submits that there being Resident Editor for the Vadodara Edition of the newspaper, the present accused, who is the Editor and stationed at Ahmedabad, cannot be held responsible for the publication. He emphasizes that it would be the Resident Editor who shall be responsible for the contents of the Vadodara Edition. In support of the submission he has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 217.

A news item has the potentiality of bringing doom’s day for an individual. The Editor controls the selection of the matter that is published. Therefore, he has to keep a careful eye on the selection. Blue- penciling of news articles by any one other than the Editor is not welcome in a democratic polity. Editors have to take responsibility of everything they publish and to maintain the integrity of published record. It is apt to remind ourselves the answer of the Editor of the Scotsman, a Scottish newspaper. When asked what it was like to run a national newspaper, the Editor answered “run a newspaper! I run a country”. It may be an exaggeration but it does reflect the well known fact that it can cause far reaching consequences in an individual and country’s life.

The scheme and scope of Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) also brings forward the same conclusion. Section 1 of the Act is the interpretation clause and the expression “Editor” has been defined as follows:

“1. Interpretation-clause.-(1)In this Act, unless there shall be something repugnant in the subject or context,-

xxx xxx xxx “editor” means the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper;” Section 5 of the Act provides for rules as to publication of newspapers and prohibits its publication in India except in conformity with the rules laid down. Section 5 (1) of the Act which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows:

“5. Rules as to publication of newspapers.-No newspaper shall be published in India, except in conformity with the rules hereinafter laid down:

(1)Without prejudice to the provisions of section 3, every copy of every such newspaper shall contain the names of the owner and editor thereof printed clearly on such copy and also the date of its publication.

xxx xxx xxx” From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that every copy of every newspaper published in India is mandated to contain the names of the owner and Editor thereof. It is in the light of the aforesaid obligation that the name of the accused no. 2 has been printed as Editor.

Section 7 of the Act makes the declaration to be prima facie evidence for fastening the liability in any civil or criminal proceeding on the Editor.

Section 7 of the Act reads as follows:

“7. Office copy of declaration to be prima facie evidence.- In any legal proceeding whatever, as well civil as criminal, the production of a copy of such declaration as is aforesaid, attested by the seal of some Court empowered by this Act to have the custody of such declarations, or, in the case of the editor, a copy of the newspaper containing his name printed on it as that of the editor shall be held (unless the contrary be proved) to be sufficient evidence, as against the person whose name shall be subscribed to such declaration, or printed on such newspaper, as the case may be that the said person was printer or publisher, or printer and publisher(according as the words of the said declaration may be) of every portion of every newspaper whereof the title shall correspond with the title of the newspaper mentioned in the declaration, or the editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced.” Therefore, from the scheme of the Act it is evident that it is the Editor who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper. Further, every copy of the newspaper is required to contain the names of the owner and the Editor and once the name of the Editor is shown, he shall be held responsible in any civil and criminal proceeding.

Further, in view of the interpretation clause, the presumption would be that he was the person who controlled the selection of the matter that was published in the newspaper. However, we hasten to add that this presumption under Section 7 of the Act is a rebuttable presumption and it would be deemed a sufficient evidence unless the contrary is proved. The view which we have taken finds support from the judgment of this Court in the case of K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham, (2002) 6 SCC 670, in which it has been held as follows:

“20. The provisions contained in the Act clearly go to show that there could be a presumption against the Editor whose name is printed in the newspaper to the effect that he is the Editor of such publication and that he is responsible for selecting the matter for publication. Though, a similar presumption cannot be drawn against the Chief Editor, Resident Editor or Managing Editor, nevertheless, the complainant can still allege and prove that they had knowledge and they were responsible for the publication of the defamatory news item. Even the presumption under Section 7 is a rebuttable presumption and the same could be proved otherwise. That by itself indicates that somebody other than editor can also be held responsible for selecting the matter for publication in a newspaper.” Now reverting to the authority of this Court in the case of K.M.

Mathew v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 SCC 217, relied on by Mr. Dave, in our opinion, same instead of supporting his contention, goes against him. In the said case it has been observed as follows:

“9. In the instant case there is no averment against the Chief Editor except the motive attributed to him. Even the motive alleged is general and vague. The complainant seems to rely upon the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (‘the Act’).But Section 7 of the Act has no applicability for a person who is simply named as ‘Chief Editor’. The presumption under Section 7 is only against the person whose name is printed as ‘Editor’ as required under Section 5(1). There is a mandatory (though rebuttable) presumption that the person whose name is printed as ‘Editor’ is the Editor of every portion of that issue of the newspaper of which a copy is produced. Section 1(1) of the Act defines ‘Editor’ to mean ‘the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper’. Section 7 raises the presumption in respect of a person who is named as the Editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper. The Act does not recognise any other legal entity for raising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief Editor is printed in the newspaper, there is no presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act.” In this case the accused was the Chief Editor of Malyalam Manorama and there was no allegation against him in the complaint regarding knowledge of the objectionable character of the matter published. In the absence of such allegation, the Magistrate decided to proceed against the Chief Editor. On an application by the Chief Editor, the process issued against him was recalled. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the Magistrate and when the matter travelled to this Court, it set aside the order of the High Court. This Court made distinction between ‘Editor’ and ‘Chief Editor’. In no uncertain terms the Court observed that the Press and Registration of Books Act recognizes ‘Editor’ and presumption is only against him. The Actdoes not recognize any other legal entity viz., Chief Editor, Managing Editor etc. for raising the presumption. They can be proceeded against only when there is specific allegation.

We may here observe that in this case, this Court has held that the Magistrate has the power to drop proceeding against an accused against whom he had issued process in the following words:

“8. It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused.” However, this Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338, has specifically overruled K.M. Mathew (Supra) in regard to the power of the Magistrate to recall its order issuing process. It has been observed as follows:

“15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provision of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code.

16. Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this court in the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, 1992 (1) SCC 217, that for recalling an erroneous order of issuance of process, no specific provision of law is required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew’s case (supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law.” Thus our reference to K.M. Mathew (supra) may not be construed to mean that we are in any way endorsing the opinion, which has already been overruled in Adalat Prasad (supra).

Thus the impugned judgment of the High Court is indefensible both on facts and law. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the decision in this case. It does not reflect on the merit of the allegation, which obviously is a matter of trial.

In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the court in seisin of the case shall now proceed with the trial in accordance with law.

……………………..………………………………..J.

(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD) …….….……….………………………………..J.

(V. GOPALA GOWDA) NEW DELHI, MARCH 11, 2013

———————–

Vadilal Panchal vs Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker

Supreme Court of India
Vadilal Panchal vs Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonker … on 6 May, 1960
Equivalent citations: 1960 AIR 1113
Author: S Das
Bench: Das, S.K.
           PETITIONER:
VADILAL PANCHAL

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
DATTATRAYA DULAJI GHADIGAONKER	AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
06/05/1960

BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
BENCH:
DAS, S.K.
KAPUR, J.L.
HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:
 1960 AIR 1113
 CITATOR INFO :
 R	    1962 SC 876	 (24,48,59)
 RF	    1963 SC1430	 (7,11)
 R	    1972 SC2639	 (22)
 R	    1976 SC1947	 (3)
 F	    1977 SC1489	 (10)
 E	    1980 SC 962	 (7)
 R	    1983 SC 595	 (8)
 F	    1992 SC1894	 (11)


ACT:
Criminal     Procedure--Complaint--Magistrate	   referring
complaint     to     Police	for	report--Plea	  of
self-defence--Magistrate dismissing complaint upholding such
Plea   on  the	basis  of  Police   report--Legality--Indian
Evidence  Act,	1872 (I of 1872), S. 105--Code	of  Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), SS. 200, 202, 203.



HEADNOTE:
On June 3, 1956, riots broke out after a public meeting held
in  Bombay  in connection with the  re-organisation  of	 the
State of Bombay was dispersed on account of the disturbances
created	 therein.   The	 car  in  which	 the  appellant	 was
travelling  was stopped by the crowd and some of  those	 who
surrounded  the car caught hold of him by his neck and	hair
and  wanted to drag him out of the car.	 The appellant	then
opened fire with his revolver.	The respondent's brother, S,
who  was  hit  on the chest by one of the  shots  fired	 was
removed	 to the hospital but died before medical  assistance
could  be given.  The police surgeon who made  a  postmortem
examination  expressed the opinion that the shot  must	have
been  fired  from a distance of 2 to 18	 inches	 only.	 The
Coroner's  jury returned a verdict that S died of the  wound
caused	by  a  bullet fired by the appellant  "	 under	such
circumstances  as  would  render the firing  to	 be  in	 the
exercise  of  the  right  of private  defence  and  as	such
justified."
The respondent filed a complaint in the court of the  Presi-
dency Magistrate, Bombay, on the allegation that his brother
died as a result of the firing resorted to by the  appellant
who thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 302  of
the  Indian  Penal  Code and prayed that  process  might  be
issued	against him.  The Magistrate referred the  complaint
to  the	 police for enquiry and report under s. 202  of	 the
Code of Criminal Procedure and after considering the  report
said:  " From the statements recorded by the Police in	this
case  and from the surrounding circumstances of the case,  I
have come to the definite conclusion that the report of	 the
Police	stating	 that the shot was fired by the	 accused  in
self-defence  is  true......  The statement  of	 the  police
surgeon	 conclusively supports the conclusion...... The	 eye
witnesses  brought  by	the  complainant  are  not  credible
witnesses.   It will be harassment to the accused and  waste
of public time if any process is issued in this case ".	 The
Magistrate,  accordingly, dismissed the complaint  under  s.
203 of the Code of Criminal
2
Procedure.  The High Court, in revision, set aside the order
of  dismissal and directed the Magistrate to  issue  process
against	 the appellant and deal with the case in  accordance
with  law, on the grounds that this was not a case in  which
it  was proper for the Magistrate to dismiss  the  complaint
under  S. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that  proof
of  the plea of self-defence could not be held to have	been
established  from  the mere report of the police,  and	that
there  was  nothing  in	 s. 202 or S. 203  of  the  Code  of
Criminal  Procedure which abrogated the rule as to the	pre-
sumption laid down in s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Held,  that under s. 203 of the Code of	 Criminal  Procedure
the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be  based
on  the statements of the complainant and his witnesses	 and
the result of the investigation or inquiry, and in  arriving
at  his	 judgment he is not fettered in any  way  except  by
judicial   considerations   ;  provided	  that	 there	 are
satisfactory and reliable materials on which he can base his
judgment  as  to  whether there	 is  sufficient	 ground	 for
proceeding   on	 the  complaint	 or  not,  if  he  has	 not
misdirected  himself as to the scope of an enquiry under  s.
202  and  has applied his mind judicially to  the  materials
before him, it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea
based  on  an  exception can never be  accepted	 by  him  in
arriving at his judgment.
Held,  further, that on the facts of the present  case,	 the
order of the Magistrate was correct and that the judgment of
the High Court setting aside that order on an erroneous view
of  the	 scope of S. 203 of the Code of	 Criminal  Procedure
must be set aside.



JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 117 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 13, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Petition Application No. 834 of 1957, arising out of the judgment and order dated April 30, 1957, of the Presidency Magistrate, IV Class, Girgaon, Bombay, in Case No. 6/1 & R of 1956.

H. M. Choksi, Rajni Patel, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.

Janardan Sharma, for respondent No. 1.

Purshottam Trikamdas, H. R. Khanna, D. Gupta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2.

1960, May 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. K. DAS, J.-This is an unfortunate case in which a complaint filed in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, on October 31, 1956, by one Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar, respondent herein, has to be finally disposed of in the year 1960 in circumstances which we shall state at once. On June 3, 1956, in the evening, a public meeting was held at a place called Chowpatty in Bombay which was to be addressed by the Prime Minister of India. The meeting was called in connexion with an agitation which was then going on for the reorganisation of the State of Bombay. There was considerable disturbance at the meeting as a result whereof it had to be dispersed, and large crowds of people began to wander about in various localities around Chowpatty including an area round Charni Road Station. The case of the complaining respondent was that at about 8 p. m. his younger brother Sitaram was crossing Queen’s Road Dear a building called Laud Mansion. At that time there was a large crowd on the road and members of that crowd were stopping vehicles passing by that road. One taxi cab which had come from the direction of the Opera House and was going towards Churchgate was already stopped. Sitaram was then accompanied by Sashikant Kamtekar and Nand Kumar Vagal. When these three had crossed the road, they heard the reports of revolver shots and on looking back they found that a person called Bhayya was injured by one of the shots and fell down on the footpath. Sitaram and his friends went to help Bhayya; at this stage, another shot was fired by one of the occupants of a blue car which was near the taxi cab referred to earlier. Sitaram was hit on his chest, and the bullet having entered the chest cavity injured the right ventricle of the heart. Sitaram was removed to the G. T. Hospital but died before medical assistance could be given. Dr. H. S. Metha, Police Surgeon, who made a postmortem examination of the dead body, opined that Sitaram died of shock and hemorrhage as a result of the gun shot wound he had received. The doctor further said that the charring round the wound indicated that the shot had been fired from a distance of 2 to 18 inches only.

The case of the respondent was that Vadilal Panchal, appellant before us, fired the shot from the blue car. The occupants of the car were K. K. Shah, advocate, his son Vinay, and one Ratilal Sanghvi on the back seat, and the appellant and chauffeur Mohiddin on the front seat. K. K. Shah was mentioned in the complaint as one of the complainant’s witnesses. He was examined and said that after the meeting was over, he and his companions were returning in his car to his house. Because of the trouble, the car travelled by a longer route and when it reached Queen’s Road, there were large crowds on that road who were pelting stones. shouting slogans and committing other acts of violence; a public bus was burnt, and a taxi cab which was proceeding ahead of K. K. Shah’s car was stopped. Some three or four hundred people surrounded his car, pelted stones and shouted ” maro ” “maro”. Some of them attempted to drag out Ratilal Sanghvi who occupied a corner seat; some caught hold of the appellant by his neck and hair and wanted to drag him out of the car. The appellant then opened fire with his revolver. The rioters then held back, and the way was clear for the car to pass. The car then drove away and after some time K. K. Shah and the appellant went to Gamdevi Police Station where the latter made a report of what had happened. The appellant was sent to Nair Hospital where he was medically treated and allowed to go.

The Coroner of Bombay held an inquest into the death of Sitaram at which K. K. Shah, Sashikant Kamtekar and several other witnesses were examined. The Coroner’s Jury returned a verdict that Sitaram died of the gunshot wound caused by a bullet fired by the appellant ” under such circumstances as would render the firing to be in exercise of the right of private defence and as such justified “. This verdict was returned on October 16, 1956. Sometime earlier, on July 3, 1956, to be precise, the complaining respondent had made an enquiry through his advocate from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, as to whether the appellant had been arrested: the reply received was that the enquiries made by the police did not reveal any offence having been committed by the appellant and the police proposed to take no action.

On October 31, 1956, the respondent filed his complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate to whom,, the complaint was made referred it to the Superintendent of Police, C. 1. D., for enquiry and report. Presumably, he acted under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On November 15, 1956, the Superintendent of Police submitted the report of his Inspector in which it was stated:

“From the exhaustive enquiries made immediately after the incident it was disclosed that Shri Vadilal Panchal was justified in resorting to firearms in self defence of himself and the other occupants of the motor car “. On January 17, 1957, the learned Magistrate gave the respondent another opportunity to examine his witnesses before the enquiring officer, because by reason of a revision application made to the High Court earlier against the order referring the case to the police for enquiry, the respondent did not produce his witnesses before the enquiring officer. The enquiring officer then examined all the witnesses and submitted his report on March 12, 1957. This time also the enquiring officer said : ” From their statements and other evidence on record, it is clear that Shri Wadilal Panchal opened fire in the exercise of his, right of private defence, which verdict the learned Coroner’s Jury also brought after a protracted hearing of the Inquest Proceedings. Copies of all statements recorded by me, are attached for reference “.

On April 30, 1957, the learned Presidency Magistrate considered the report of the enquiring officer in great detail with reference to the statements of all the witnesses and said:

” The Police have recorded in detail the statements of all witnesses produced by the complainant as well as of all the occupants of the car. There is, therefore, material on record showing fully whether the circumstances existed making out the right of private defence available to the accused. The fact whether the case falls within one of exceptions or not can be established on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the prosecution itself though of course the burden of proof lies on the accused. From the statements, recorded by the Police in this case and from the surrounding circumstances of the case, I have come to the definite conclusion that the report of the police stating that the shot was fired by the accused in self-defence is true. As I have stated the statement of the police surgeon conclusively supports the conclusion. I have come to the conclusion that the state- ments of the four eye witnesses brought by the complainant are false. These eye witnesses are not credible witnesses. It will be harassment to the accused and waste of public time if any process is issued in this case “. Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint under s. 203, Code of Criminal Procedure.

Against this order of dismissal the respondent-complainant moved the High Court. The High Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed the learned Presidency Magistrate to issue process against the appellant and deal with the case in accordance with law, on a ground which the High Court expressed in the following words:

” Now, in the case before us, causing of the death of Sitaram being indisputable, if it was found as the petitioner alleges that it was the shot fired by the res- pondent that caused the death of Sitaram, the accused ,would have to establish the necessary ingredients of the right of private defence as laid down in section 96 and onwards of the Penal Code. We do not find anything in any of the sections in Chapter XVI to show that such an exception can be held to be established from the mere report of the police. That, in our view, is contrary to the provisions of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act which are mandatory provisions. There is nothing in s. 202 or s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code which abrogates the rule as to the presumption laid down in s. 105 of the Evidence Act and the mode of proof of exception laid down in imperative language in that section.

In these circumstances and for the reasons aforesaid, we find that this was not a case in which it was proper for the learned Magistrate to dismiss the complaint under s. 203, there being no evidence before the learned Magistrate as and by way of proof to establish the exception of the right of private defence pleaded by the respondent The appellant then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the High Court dated September 13,1957.

The short question before us is-was the High Court right in its view that when a Magistrate directs an enquiry under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the enquiring officer supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is not open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of witnesses recorded by the enquiring officer ? Must he, as a matter of law, issue process in such a case and leave the person complained against to establish his plea of self-defence at the trial ? It may be pointed out here that the High Court itself recognised that it would not be correct to lay down a proposition in absolute terms that whenever a defence under any of the exceptions in the Indian Penal Code is pleaded by the person complained against, the Magistrate would not be justified in dismissing the complaint and must issue process. Said the High Court: ” As we have already observed, if there is a complaint, which itself discloses a complete defence under any of the exceptions, it might be a case where a Magistrate would be justified in dismissing such a complaint finding that there was no sufficient ground to proceed with the case.” We are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding in this case that as a matter of law, it was not open to the learned Presidency Magistrate to come to the conclusion that on the materials before him no offence had been made out and there was no sufficient ground for proceeding further on the complaint.

The relevant sections bearing on the question are ss. 200202 and 203.

” S. 200. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an Offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath, and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:

Provided as follows:-

(a) ……………………… (aa) ……………………….

(b) where the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate, such examination may be on oath or not as the Magistrate in each case thinks fit, and where the complaint is made in writing need not be reduced to writing; but the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, before the matter of the complaint is brought before him, require it to be reduced to writing ;

(c) …………………………..

S. 202(1). Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other that a Magistrate of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint.

Provided that ………………(it is unnecessary to read the proviso.

(2) If any inquiry or investigation under this section is made by a person not being a Magistrate or a police-officer, such person shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police-station, except that he shall not have power to arrest without warrant. (2A) Any Magistrate inquiring into a case under this section may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of wit- nesses on oath.

(3) This section applies also to the police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

S. 203. The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under section 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such cases he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing “.

The general scheme of the aforesaid sections is quite clear. Section 200 says inter alia what a Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence on complaint shall do on receipt of such a complaint. Section 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of an inquiry under the section is limited to finding out the truth or falsehood of the complaint in order, to determine the question of the issue of process. The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage; for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial. Section 203, be it noted, consists of two parts: the first part indicates what are the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. Section 204says that if in the opinion of the Magistrate there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall take steps for the issue of necessary process.

Now, in the case before us it is not contended that the learned Presidency Magistrate failed to consider the materials which he had to consider, before passing his order under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of fact the learned Magistrate fully, fairly and impartially considered these materials. What is contended on behalf of the respondent-complainant is that as a matter of law it was not open to the learned Magistrate to accept the plea of right of self-defence at a stage when all that he had to determine was whether a process should issue or not against the appellant. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. It is manifestly clear from the provisions of s. 203 that the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry. The section itself makes that clear, and it is not necessary to refer to authorities in support thereof. But the judgment which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This does not mean that the Magistrate is bound to accept the result of the inquiry or investigation or that he must accept any plea that is set up on behalf of the person complained against. The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way except by judicial considerations; he is not bound to accept what the inquiring officer says, nor is he precluded from accepting a plea based on an exception, provided always there are satis- factory and reliable materials on which he can base his judgment as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding on the complaint or not. If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an enquiry under s. 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, we think that it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea has on the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are falsified by the evidence of other witnesses-all these are questions which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions.

In support of its view the High Court has relied on some of its earlier decisions: Emperor v. Dhondu Bapu (1); Emperor v. Finan (2) and Tulsidas v. Billimoria (3). We do not think that any of the aforesaid decisions lays down any such proposition in absolute terms as is contended for on behalf of the respondent. In Emperor v. Dhondu Bapu (1) a complaint charging defamation was dismissed by the Magistrate under s. 203 without taking any evidence, on the ground that the accused was protected by s. 499, exception

8. It was held that the order of dismissal was bad. Patkar, J., significantly observed:

” If the Magistrate in this case had taken evidence on behalf of the prosecution and on behalf of the accused, and passed a proper order for discharge, the order of the District Magistrate ordering a further enquiry without giving reasons might have stood on a different footing. We do not think that, under the circumstances of this case, there are adequate grounds for interfering with the order of the District Magistrate.”

In Emperor v. Finan (2) the accused did not dispute the correctness of the statements made by the complainant, but in justification pleaded the order passed by his superior officer and claimed protection under ss. 76 and 79 of the Indian Penal Code. It is worthy of note that the order of the superior officer was not produced, but that officer very improperly wrote a letter to the Magistrate saying that he bad given such an order. In these circumstances, the same learned Judge who decided the earlier case observed: “It was, therefore, incumbent on the Magistrate to investigate the complaint and to find out whether (1) (1927) 29 Bom. L.R. 713,715. (2) (1931) 33 Bom. L.R. 1182.

(3) (1932) 34 Bom. L.R. 910 the allegation of the accused that he was protected by ss. 76and 79 of the Indian Penal Code was made out by legal evidence before him.”

The facts in Tulsidas v. Billimoria (1) were different, and the question there considered was whether a member of the Bar in India had absolute privilege. That decision has very little bearing on the question now before us. Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of the Lahore High Court where the facts were somewhat similar: Gulab Khan, deceased, through Karam Khan v. Gulam Muhammad Khan and Others (2). In that case also the person complained against took the plea of self-defence, which was accepted. In the High Court an objection was taken to the procedure adopted and it was argued that the order of discharge should be set aside. In dealing with that argument Broadway, J., said :

” Now a Magistrate is empowered to hold an enquiry into a complaint of an offence in order to ascertain whether there is sufficient foundation for it to issue process against the person or persons complained against. In the present case the Magistrate clearly acted in the exercise of these powers under s. 202, Criminal Procedure Code. He allowed the complainant to produce such evidence in support of his com- plaint as he wished to produce, and after a consideration of that evidence came to the conclusion that that evidence was so wholly worthy (unworthy ?) of credence as to warrant his taking no further action in the matter.”

Therefore, none of the aforesaid decisions lay down as an absolute proposition that a plea of self-defence can in no event be considered by the Magistrate in dealing with a complaint under the provisions of ss. 200202 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On the facts, there is very little to be said. Learned Counsel for the State of Bombay supported the order of the learned Magistrate and pointed out that even on the narrow view taken by the High Court, a view (1) (1932) 34 Bom. L.R. 910.

(2) A.I.R. 1927 Lah 30 to which he did not, however, subscribe, the learned Magistrate rightly held that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding; because the earlier version of some of the witnesses for the complainant itself showed that there was a riotous mob on the road which attacked cars, burnt a public bus, pelted stones, etc., which was quite inconsistent with their later version that Sitaram and his companions were quietly crossing the road and a shot was fired from a passing or moving car. There was overwhelming material to show Chat K. K. Shah’s car was surrounded by the mob and some of the rioters tried to drag out and attack the appellant. K. K. Shah was one of the witnesses mentioned by the complainant and so also two of the Inspectors of Police. Their evidence clearly supported the plea of the appellant and in any case, showed that the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent were totally unworthy of credence as to the circumstances in which the shots were fired. We cannot therefore say that the learned Magistrate was wrong in his judgment that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding further on the complaint.

We accordingly hold that the High Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate on an erroneous view of the scope of s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated September 13, 1957, and restore that of the learned Presidency Magistrate dated April 30, 1957.

Appeal allowed.

Supreme Court of India
Chandra Deo Singh vs Prokash Chandra Bose & Anr on 22 January, 1963
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1430, 1964 SCR (1) 639
Author: M R.
Bench: Mudholkar, J.R.
           PETITIONER:
CHANDRA DEO SINGH

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
PROKASH CHANDRA BOSE & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
22/01/1963

BENCH:
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
BENCH:
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
SUBBARAO, K.
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:
 1963 AIR 1430		  1964 SCR  (1) 639
 CITATOR INFO :
 F	    1971 SC1389	 (11)
 R	    1972 SC2639	 (22)
 R	    1976 SC1947	 (3)
 R	    1977 SC2018	 (5)
 RF	    1978 SC1568	 (6)
 R	    1983 SC 595	 (8)
 RF	    1986 SC2045	 (45)


ACT:
Criminal  Law-Proceeding  under s.  202	 Criminal  Procedure
Code-Revision  petition	 by respondent No. 1 and  the  other
persons-Whether respondent No. 1 has locus standi to contest
criminal  case	before issue of	 process-Procedural  defect-
Powers	of  Magistrate	in  committal  proceedings  and	  in
considering  evidence-Recording of reasons-Code of  Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 202, 203.



HEADNOTE:
A  first  information  report was  filed  stating  that	 the
respondent  No.1 and some others committed  murder.   There-
after  a  person claiming to be a relative of  the  deceased
filed a complaint alleging that the first information report
was  false and that certain persons other than those  stated
in  the first information report had committed	the  murder.
It was prayed that process be issued against these  persons.
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate before whom this complaint was
filed  directed the First Class Magistrate to  inquire	into
the  allegation	 and  to make a	 report.   Subsequently	 the
nephew	of  the	 deceased filed a  complaint  alleging	that
respondent   No.1  had	committed  the	murder.	  The	Sub-
Divisional Magistrate directed the First Class Magistrate to
enquire into this complaint also and to report.	 During	 the
enquiry apart from the witness produced
640
by  the	 complainant,  respondent No.1	was  allowed  to  be
represented by a counsel and two persons who had been  named
in the first information report along with respondent No.  1
were	 examined  as  court  witnesses.   The	 First Class
Magistrate  after conducting inquiry under s.  203  Criminal
Procedure  Code,  1898, made a report stating that  a  prima
facie  case had been made out against the persons  mentioned
in  the	 first	complaint.  He made another  report  on	 the
second	complaint stating that no prima facie case had	been
made  against  respondent No. 1.  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate
directed the initiation of committal proceedings against the
persons	 mentioned  in the first complaint.  On	 a  revision
application filed by the complainant in the second complaint
the Sessions judge directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to
conduct	 further inquiry against respondent No. 1  who	took
the  matter  in	 revision to the High  Court.	The  three-.
persons against whom committal proceedings were ordered also
filed revision application before the High Court.  Both	 the
petitions were heard together.	The revision applications by
respondent  No. 1 and one of the three others were  allowed.
The present appeal is under a certificate granted under Art.
134 (1)	  (c) of the Constitution of India.
The main contentions of the appellant before this Court were
(1)  the respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to appear	 and
contest a criminal case before the issue of process (2)	 the
test applied by the High Court for determining the  question
of issue of process was erroneous (3) the Magistrate  making
an  inquiry  under  s. 202 Criminal Procedure  Code  had  no
jurisdiction to weigh the evidence as if it were a trial (4)
the  Sub.   Divisional Magistrate ought to  have  given	 his
reasons under s.    203	  Criminal   Procedure	 Code	 for
dismissing the complaint.
Held, that an accused person does not come into the  picture
at  all	 till  process is issued.  Even	 though	 he  may  be
allowed to be represented by counsel he has no right to take
part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate	jurisdiction
to permit him to do so.	 The Magistrate cannot put questions
at  the instance of a, person named as accused	but  against
whom  no  process  has been issued nor can  he	examine	 any
witnesses at the instance of that person.  The inquiry	made
by the Magistrate was therefore vitiated.
Vadilal	 Panchal v. Dattatrya Dulaji Ghadigsonkar, [1961]  1
S. C. R. 1, referred to.
For determining the question whether process is to be issued
or  not	 the  test  to	be  applied  is	 whether  there	  is
"sufficient
			    641
ground for proceedings" and not whether there is  sufficient
ground for conviction.
Parmand	 Brahmchari v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1930 Pat. 30  Radha
Kishun	Sao v. S. K. Misra, A. I. R. 1949 Pat. 36,  Ramkisto
Sahu  v. State of Bihar, A. I. R. 1952 Pat. 125, Emperor  v.
J. A. Finan, A. 1. R. 1931 Bom. 524 and Baidya Nath Singh v.
Muspratt, (1886) 1. L. R. 14 Cal. 141 discussed.
While acting under s. 202 Criminal Procedure Code it is	 not
open  to the Magistrate to consider the statements  recorded
by  the	 police	 during investigation  or  to  consider	 the
evidence adduced before him in another complaint.  What	 the
Magistrate could not do the High Court also was	 incompetent
to do.
Where  there is a prima facie case even though much  can  be
said  on  both sides, a committing Magistrate  is  bound  to
commit the accused for trial.
Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. State of Bombay, [1958] S.  C. R.
618, referred to.
When a Magistrate dismisses a complaint because there are no
sufficient  grounds for proceeding with the trial  he  shall
record his reasons for doing so.
Willie (Williams) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh,  [1955]
2 S. C. R. 1140, considered.
There  is  nothing  which prevents  the	 undertaking  of  an
inquiry	 against  one  person when  an	inquiry	 is  pending
against	 different  persons  with  reference  to  the	same
offence.



JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 155 of 1960.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 27, 1960, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 620 of

59. Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.

Jai Gopal Sethi, C. L. Sareen and Y.. Kumar, for respondent No. 1.

1963.January 22. The judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR, I.-This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India. The facts which are relevant for the purpose of this appeal are briefly these :

On December 25, 1957, one Panchanan Roy lodged a first information report at I 1.00 p. in. at the police station, Bhangor in the. district of 24 Parganas alleging that respondent No. 1 (Prokash Chandra Bose) who is the proprietor of a fishery had killed a man named Nageswar Singh who was a darwan posted at the informant’s master’s fishery by shooting him with a gun. After the occurrence, the assailants’s party was chased.. but the principal cul- prit namely respondent No. 1 made good his escape in his own car. Two of his associates, Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghosh, were arrested by the local people and produced in the police station. On the basis of the first information report, the police undertook investigation, but ultimately they submitted a final report as late as on September 17, 1958. On November 3, 1958, one Mahendra Singh who claimed to be a distant relative of the deceased darwan, but which fact is denied by the widow of the deceased – filed a complaint before Mr. C. L. Choudhry, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of 24 Parganas Alipore, against the final report of the police and asked for processes to be issued against certain other persons on the allegation that those persons had murdered Nageswar Singh. The complaint further contained a statement to the effect that the first information report lodged by Panchanan Roy with the police on December 25, 1957, was false and that he had done so at the instance of his Master Bidhu Bhusan Sarkar who was an enemy of respondent No. 1. After examining Mahendra Singh on oath and looking into the police papers, the learned Sub- Divisional Magistrate asked Mr. N. M. Chowdhry, Magistrate, First Class, to hold a judicial enquiry into the allegations made by Mahendra Singh and to submit a report to him by a certain date.

During the pendency of the enquiry into the complaint of Mahendra Singh, Chandra Deo Singh, the nephew of the deceased filed a complaint before Mr. Chowdhry on December 30, 1958 stating therein that respondent No. 1 had fired a shot at Nageswar Singh at point blank range and thereby murdered him. After examining him on oath, the Sub- Divisional Magistrate referred the matter again to Mr. N. M. Chaudhry Magistrate, First Class, for enquiry and report to him by a certain date. During this enquiry, respondent No. 1 was permitted by the learned Magistrate to appear through counsel. -Seven witnesses were produced by the complainant Chandra Deo Singh and examined by the learned Magistrate. In addition, Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose who, it might be remembered, are alleged to have been the associates of respondent No. 1, were examined as court witnesses and the suggestion is that the learned Magistrate did this at the instance of the counsel for respondent No. 1. On February 9, 1959, Mr. N. M. Choudhry made a report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the effect that a prima facie case has been made out against three persons, Upendra Neogi, Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal under s. 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code. On the same day, he made another report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate saying that no prima facie case was made out against respondent No. 1. On the basis of the first report, the SubDivisional Magistrate directed summonses to be issued against the three persons named in that report and commenced committal proceedings against them.

The Sub-Divisional Magistrate on seeing the second report dismissed the complaint of Chandra Deo Singh without assigning any reason. Chandra Deo Singh preferred an application for revision before the Sessions judge, Alipore, who, after issuing notice to respondent No. 1 and hearing his counsel, directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to make further enquiry against him. Thereupon respondent No. 1 preferred a revision application before the High Court, which came up for hearing before a single judge of that court. It would appear that the three persons against whom summonses were ordered to issue by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate also preferred a revision application before the High Court. Both the revision applications were heard together. The learned judge granted the application of respondent No.1 as well as that of Upendra Neogy. ‘We are informed by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that eventually two of the three persons against whom summonses were ordered to be issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate were committed for trial before the Court of Sessions. But he was unable to say definitely whether they were actually tried and if so, what the result of the trial was. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single judge, the appellant Chandra Deo Singh made an application under Art. 134 of the Constitution for the grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this court which as already stated, was granted by the High Court. The certificate was sought by the appellant on four grounds. The first ground was that respondent No. 1 had no locus standi to appear and contest a criminal case before the issue of process. The second ground was that the test propounded by the learned single judge for determining the question whether any process should be issued by the court was erroneous. The third ground was that a Magistrate making an enquiry under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no jurisdiction “to weigh the evidence in golden scales” as was done in the present case. The fourth and last ground was that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate acted in contravention of the provisions of s. 203 Cr. P. C. in dismissing the complaint without recording any reason for doing so. The High Court granted the certificate on all the grounds except the first. It has been held by this court that the -High Court cannot limit its certificate in this manner and, therefore, we propose to examine all the four grounds taken by the appellant.

Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation, he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to the Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued ; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. It was, however, contended by Mr. Sethi for respondent No. 1 that the very object of the provisions of Ch. XVI of the’ Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent an accused person from being harassed by a frivolous complaint and, therefore, power is given to a Magistrate before whom complaint is made to postpone the issue of summons to the accused person pending the result of an enquiry made either by himself or by a Magistrate subordinate to him. A privilege conferred by these provisions can, according to Mr. Sethi, be waived by the accused person and he can take part in the proceedings. No doubt, one of the objects, behind the provisions of s. 202Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interests of an absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under s. 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry. It is true that there is no direct evidence in the case before us that the two persons who were examined as court witnesses were so examined at the instance of respondent No. 1 but from the fact that they were persons who were alleged to have been the -associates of respondent No. 1 in the first information report lodged by Panchanan Roy and who were alleged to have been arrested on the spot by some of the local people, they would not have been summoned by the Magistrate unless suggestion to that effect had been made by counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. In this connection; the’ observations of this court in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigsonkar (1), may usefully be quoted “The enquiry is for the purpose of ascertain- ing the truth or falsehood of the complaint that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the ‘accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial.”

Coming to the second ground, we have no hesitation in holding that the test propounded by the learned single judge of the High Court is wholly wrong. For determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is “sufficient ground for proceeding” and not whether there is sufficient ground for the conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. A number of decisions were cited at the bar in which the question of the scope of the enquiry under s. 202 has been considered. Amongst those decisions are : Parmanand Brahmachari v. Emperor (2); Radha Kishun Sao v. S. K. Misra (3); Ramkisto Sahu v. The State of Bihar(4) ; Emperor v. J. A. Finan(5) and Baidya Nath Singh v. Muspratt(6). In all these cases, it has been held that the object (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 1, 9.

(3) A.I.R. (1949) Pat. 36.

(5) A.I.R. (1931) Bom. 524.

(2) A.I.R. (1930) Pat. 30.

(4) A I.R. (1952) Pat. 125.

(6) (1886) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 141.

of the provisions of s. 202 is to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether process should be issued or not and to remove from his mind any hesitation that be may have felt upon the mere perusal of the complaint and the consideration of the complainant’s evidence on oath. The courts have also pointed out in these cases that what the Magistrate has to see is whether +,here is evidence in support of the allegations, of the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. The learned judges in some of these cases have been at pains to observe that an enquiry under s. 202 is not to be likened to a trial which can only take place after process is issued, and that there can be only one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub-s. (1) of s. 202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic quality, of the statements made before him at the enquiry which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the statement on oath made by the complainant and the statements made before him by persons examined at the instance of the complainant. This brings us to the third ground. Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers a, Magistrate to dismiss a complaint reads thus :

” The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and, the result of the investigation or inquiry, if any, under s. 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.”

The power to dismiss a complaint rest% only with a Magistrate who has taken cognisance of it.

If before issue of process, he had sent down the complaint to a Magistrate subordinate to him for making the enquiry, he has the power to dismiss the complaint, if in his judgment, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. One of the conditions, however, requisite for doing so is the consideration of the statements on oath if any made by the complainant and the witnesses and of the result of the investigation of the enquiry which he had ordered to be made under s. 202, Cr.P.C. In the case before us, an investigation by a police officer was not ordered by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, but an enquiry by a Magistrate, First Class. He had, therefore, to consider the result of this enquiry. It was not open to him to consider in this connection the statements recorded during investigation by the police on the basis of the first information report lodged by Panchanan Roy or on the basis of any evidence adduced before him during the enquiry arising out of the complaint made by Mahendra Singh. All these were matters extraneous to the proceedings before him. of course, as we have already stated, the learned Magistrate has not given any reasons for dismissing the complaint and, therefore, we do not know what exactly weighed with him when he dismissed the complaint, but the learned single judge of the High Court who has dealt with the case elaborately has not kept the evidence adduced in the two complaints separate but appears to have been influenced in deciding one case on the basis of what was stated by the witnesses in the other case. The High Court has relied upon the evidence of Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose who ought never to have been examined by the enquiring Magistrate. The High Court has further relied upon the investigation made by the police in the complaint of Panchanan Roy. All this Will be clear from the following passage in its judgment :

“The version of these two witnesses (Pannalal Saha and Sankar Ghose) is supported by the fact that the police when they went to the locality found a dead bird and a pair of shoes and a pair of black half pants in wet condition. This find of the dead bird and the pair of shoes etc. has not explained on the version given by Panchanan Roy, Upendra Mondal and Tarapado Naru. Mr. Ajit Kumar Dutt stated that the inquiring Magistrate was not right in examining Pannalal Saha and Shankar Ghose at the suggestion of an advocate for the accused Chabbi Bose and that the latter should not have been allowed at the inquiry. When however there had already been ‘a full investigation into the case by the officers under the supervision of the’ Superintendent of Police, it was desirable and proper for the inquiring magistrate to make a careful inquiry and not merely an one sided inquiry by examining such witnesses as might be produced by an interested party. Moreover, in this case, the learned magistrate was inquiring into both the complaints simultaneously and necessarily be could look at the evidence as a whole. In fact, two separate cases ought not to have been started at all, even though there were two separate complaints giving two different versions. These complaints were more or less Naraji petitions against the final report submitted by the police. There was only one incident in the course of which Nageswar Singh has lost his life. Therefore on the basis of the two Naraji petitions it would have been proper to hold one inquiry rather than two separate though simultaneous inquiries.”

What the Magistrate could not do, the High Court was incompetent to do, and, therefore, its order reversing that of the Sessions judge cannot be sustained.

Reliance is however, placed by Mr. Sethi on the decision of this court in Vadilal’s case (1), at p. 10 of the report. What was considered there by this court was whether as a matter of law, it was not open to a Magistrate to accept the plea of the right of private defence at a state when all that he had to determine was whether process is to issue or not. The learned judges held that it is competent to a Magistrate to consider such a plea and observed “If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an enquiry tinder s. 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, we think that it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea has on the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are falsified by the evidence of other witnesses,- all these are questions which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions.”

On the basis of these observations it was urged that this court has held that a Magistrate has the power to weight the evidence adduced at the enquiry. As we read the decision, it does not lay down an inflexible rule but seems to hold that while considering the evidence tendered at the enquiry it is open to the Magistrate to consider whether the accused could have acted in self-defence. Fortunately, no such question arises for consideration in this case but we may point out that since the object of an enquiry under s. 202 is to ascertain whether the allegations made in the complaint are intrinsically true, the Magistrate acting under s. 203has to satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In order -to come to this conclusion, he is entitled to (1) (1961) 1 S.C.R. 1, 9.

consider the evidence taken by him or recorded in an enquiry under s. 202, or statements made in an investigation under that section, as the case may be. He is not entitled to rely upon any material besides this. By “evidence of other witnesses” the learned judges had apparently in mind the statements of persons examined by the police during investigation under s. 202. It is permissible under s. 203 of the Code to consider such evidence along with the state- ments of the complainant recorded by the Magistrate and decide whether to issue process or dismiss the complaint. The investigation in that case was made by the police under s. 202, Cr. P.C. at the instance of the Presidency Magistrate. Apparently, the statement of the various witnesses questioned by the police were self-contradictory. That being the case, it was open to the Presidency Magistrate to consider which of them to accept and which to reject. The enquiring Magistrate has not stated nor has the High Court found in the case before us that the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant and his own evidence were self-contradictory and, therefore, it could not be said that there was anything intrinsically false in the allegations made in the complaint, Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the decision of this court in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v. The State of Bombay(1). In that case, after quoting a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 10, 3rd Edn. in art. 666 at p. 365 where the law regarding commitment for trial has been stated, this court has observed :

“In each case; therefore the magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry has to be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out against the accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit, and unless he is so satisfied, he is not to commit, Applying the aforesaid test to the present case, can it be said that there is no evidence to make out (1) [1958] S.C.R. 618,638, prima facie case, or that the voluminous evi- dence adduced in this case is so incredibly that no reasonable body of persons could rely upon it ? As already indicated, in this, case, there is a large volume of documentary evidence-the latter being wholly books and registers and other documents kept or is used by the Mills themselves, which may lend themselves to the inference that the accused are guilty or to the contrary conclusion. The High Court has taken pains to point out that this is one of those cases where much can be said on both sides. It will be for the jury to decide which of the two conflicting versions will find acceptance at their hands. This was pre-eminently a case which should have been committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, and it is a little surprising that the learned Presidency Magistrate allowed himself to be convinced to the contrary.

Thus, Where there is a prima facie case, even though much can be said on both sides, a committing Magistrate is bound to commit an accused for trial. All the greater reason, therefore, that where there is prima facie evidence, even though an accused may have a defence like that in the present case that the offence is committed by some other person, or persons the matter has to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of process cannot be refused. Incidentally, we may point out that the offence with which respondent No. 1 has been charged with is one triable by jury. The High Court, by dealing with the evidence in the way in which it has done, has in effect sanctioned the usurpation by the Magistrate of the functions of a jury which the Magistrate was wholly incompetent to do.

In view of what we have stated above, it is not necessary to say very much about the last ground.

Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the Magistrate dismisses a complaint because in his judgment there ‘is no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial, he shall record his reasons for doing so. Here, as already stated, the Magistrate perused the report of the enquiring Magistrate and then proceeded to dismiss the com- plaint. It is stated on behalf of respondent No. 1 that this is at best an error in his order and, therefore, it is curable under s. 537(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of this view, reliance is placed upon the decision of this court in Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1). Here, the error is of a kind which goes to the root of the matter. It is possible to say that giving of reasons is a pre-requisite for making an order of dismissal of a complaint and absence of the reasons would make the order a nullity. Even assuming, however, that the rule laid down in Slaney’s case (1), applies to such a case, prejudice is writ large on the’ ‘face of the corder’. The complainant is entitled to know why his complaint has been dismissed with a view to consider an approach to a revisional court. Being kept in ignorance of the reasons clearly prejudices his right to move the revisiona1 court and where he, takes a matter to the revisional court renders his task before that court difficult, particularly in view of the limited scope of the provisions of s. 438 and 439, Code of Criminal Procedure. For all these reasons, we hold that the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the Sessions Court and direct that further enquiry be made into the complaint of the appellant against respondent No. 1.

Mr. Sethi, however, contends that since there is only one offence i. e., the murder of Nageswar Singh, there can be only one trial and since other persons are being tried for that offence, there could be no further enquiry. As there was no material on record we could not know what happened to the, (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1140, enquiry against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal after the dismissal of their application for revision by the High Court. We, therefore, called for a report from the Sub- Divisional Magistrate, 24 Parganas. That report has been received. It would appear from that report that on March 22, 1961, the High Court directed that the commitment proceedings against these two persons be stayed pending the disposal of the present appeal by this court. We cannot appreciate the argument that an enquiry against a different person with reference to the same offence cannot be undertaken. It will be open to the court before which commitment proceedings against Asim Mondal and Arun Mondal are pending to consider whether they should be stayed pending the result of the enquiry with reference to the respondent before us, but there can be no legal impediment to the enquiry against the respondent.

Appeal allowed.

Further enquiry directed.

Narottamdas L. Shah vs Patel Maganbhai Revabhai And Anr.

Gujarat High Court
Narottamdas L. Shah vs Patel Maganbhai Revabhai And Anr. on 3 May, 1984
Equivalent citations: 1984 CriLJ 1790
Author: A Ravani
Bench: A Ravani

ORDER A.P. Ravani, J.

1. Some questions of vital public importance have arisen in this petition. On this point at least, the learned Counsel appearing for rival parties appear to be ad idem. The questions are : Does it behave to the lawyers as a class to resort to strike and if anyone publicly comments and publishes the same in a rather unhappy or unpleasant language, would it amount to defamation of an individual member of the class of lawyers? Further, if the insinuating remarks are directed against the entire class of lawyers, would it amount to an offence of defamation so as to attract the provisions of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code?

2. According to the complainant, since September 23, 1983, the lawyers in Gujarat were protesting against the interference of the Government in judiciary. On account of the agitation, they ceased to participate in court proceedings and resorted to “satyagraha”. As stated in the Resolution passed on February 2, 1984 by the Executive Committee of the State Bar Council of Gujarat (hereinafter referred to as “the Bar Council” which is produced on record, the agitation was with respect to the appointment and transfer of Chief Justices of High Courts. Sometime in the third week of October 1983, lawyers decided to extend their strike up to November 6, 1983. Thereupon the petitioner herein wrote and printed an editorial “Whither the Dispute Brokers (Kajia Dalals)”, Kajiya Dalalo Kya Marge, in the issue of “Jay-Hind” daily dt. October 22, 1983.

3. The editorial is in Gujarati and when translated into English reads as follows:

Whither the dispute-brokers (Kajia Dalals)(1) The controversial agitation conducted by lawyers in Gujarat for the last several days has taken a new turn since the lawyers have decided to extend the strike up to 6th November.

Leaving aside for the time being going into the merits of the question which is the subject-matter of the agitation, the question does arise, namely whether the strike of the lawyers is behaving to them?

Lawyers have eroded their own image by resorting to a prolonged strike. It has reduced respect for them amongst their clients.

In reality, who stands to lose on account of such strike? In a sense, lawyers are brokers of disputes. (2) To the extent lawyers are absent, the lesser will be the disputes. (3) people then will be inclined to have their disputes settled by their own mutual efforts.

Where was the system of lawyers prevalent in the past on a wider scale? Even today in some regions, disputes are being settled through people’s courts without the presence of lawyers.

If the strike goes on being prolonged by lawyers like this, a stage may be reached when the people would not find it necessary to retain a, lawyer at all. Is it not that brokers of disputes are necessary only where there are disputes? (4) In reality, lawyers have been encouraging disputes more and more by giving impetus to the disputes. (5) Lawyers may be interested in disputes arising between the parties. However, continuous strike of lawyers is making the clients see for themselves what is what?

Such brokers of disputes exhibit childishness or irresponsibility like going on a long strike on a problem with which lawyers are not concerned directly or indirectly, a question would arise how far the lawyers will be protecting the interests of their clients. (6) It is unfortunate matter that these dispute-brokers have taken a wrong path (7) by disregarding their duties and obligations cowards law, towards the clients and towards the society. People will feel inclined to settle their legal problems by themselves in view of such tendency on the part of lawyers. As far as possible they will avoid approaching lawyers. In other words, lawyers are causing injury to their own interests. If lawyers continue to behave like this by clinging to their caprices or arbitrary ideas without caring for the interest of the society, they will stand to lose their position and status (8) but then it would be too late.

Even now it is in their best interest if those who have resorted to a mistaken path having lost senses, return to wiser course and repent for their mistake. (9)

4. According to the complainant, sentences marked (1) to (9) and which are underlined are defamatory. As stated by the complainant, he read the editorial on October 24, 1983 and filed the complaint for offence of defamation (Section 500 IPC) on October 25, 1983. The learned JMFC, Visnagar, after examining the complainant on oath and recording his statement ordered to issue process under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the editorial in question has been written and published by the petitioner in his capacity as Editor of the daily newspaper ‘Jay Hind’. The same has been published in the issue of October 22, 1983. The complainant himself is a lawyer. As stated in the complaint, he is doing the business of lawyering for last about 20 years and his principal place of business is Visnagar.

6. As per the complaint, “the constitutional peaceful non-violent and disciplined agitation” of lawyers of Gujarat was in progress. With a view to defame such a constitutional and systematic agitation and with an intention mainly to lower down the reputation and prestige of the lawyers in public, the petitioner-accused published the offending editorial. The complainant has extracted nine sentences from the editorial and has reproduced the same in para 3 of the complaint. Hereinabove, the entire editorial is reproduced and the sentences have been marked (1) to (9) and underlined. These sentences, according to the complainant, are defamatory. By making the aforesaid statements, as contended by the complainant, the petitioner-accused has lowered down the prestige of the complainant and that of the class of lawyers as a whole (Vakil Alam). It is further stated that if the entire writing is taken into consideration, the accused has, without going into the merits of the agitation, described the lawyers as ‘Kajia Dalals’ and thereby lowered down the reputation and prestige of the lawyers. The complainant was examined on oath by the learned Magistrate on October 25, 1983 before ordering to issue process. Therein he has again stated that the accused has attempted to lower down the reputation and prestige of the Lawyers’ World (Vakil Alam).

7. The petitioner-accused has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this High Court and prayed that the process issued by the learned Magistrate and the proceedings initiated against him be ordered to be quashed and dropped inter alia on the grounds that the complaint as well as the contents of the editorial published by the petitioner-accused do not disclose any offence whatsoever and the complainant is not an aggrieved person within the meaning of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. and the writing of the editorial is referable to the entire class of lawyers and the same is not referable to any particular person or a determinate group/class of persons.

8. Just after the commencement of arguments by the counsel for the petitioner, Shri G.N. Desai, learned advocate, intervened to make request on behalf of the Bar Council. He placed on record a Resolution dt. February 2, 1984 passed by the Executive Committee of the Bar Council which, as stated at the Bar, has been approved by the General Body of the State Bar council later on. In view of the contents of the Resolution and having regard to the questions involved in the case, request is granted and the Bar Council is permitted to appear as intervener.

9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to deal with two of the submissions made by the counsel for the Bar Council. The counsel for the Bar Council in the beginning of his arguments submitted that the legal profession includes in the system. Yesterday’s lawyers who are today’s judges’ and also includes ‘the yesterday’s judges who are today’s lawyers’. According to him all these persons who are included in the system and who belong to the legal profession are referred to as “Kajia Dalals” in the alleged offending editorial published by the accused. He submitted that the dignity of the profession must be maintained by everyone concerned in the system. The thrust of the argument was clear, since the judges are also included in the legal profession, even the reputation of judges also was affected by the writing in question.

10. Being an important part of the system, the judges also belong to the legal profession. The Supreme Court in the case of The Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, , felt blushed while narrating the conduct of the advocates involved in the case and observed by posing a question-

do we not all together belong to the ‘inner republic of bench and bar?’ Thus in a sense judges do belong to the legal profession. But the question involved in the case cannot and should not be decided by keeping this factor in mind. If this is done, it would amount to becoming a judge in one’s own cause. In the instant case, a citizen is arraigned as an accused He owns a press. He prints and circulates a newspaper. Nevertheless, he does not cease to be a citizen of this country. He has a right to approach this Court for getting his grievances redressed. His case cannot be decided on the basis that the judges are also an integral part of the system and therefore the alleged defamatory statement made in the editorial refers to judges also. Assuming that the editorial covers even the judges, then also the same factor should not be allowed to enter into the mind while deciding the issue involved in the case. If this is done, it would be against the basic tenets of our judicial system. It is one of the fundamental principles of our judicial system that no one can become a judge in his own cause. A citizen has a right to claim impartial justice even when the legal profession is involved in the case. Hence, this aspect, i.e. judges being an integral part of the system though repeatedly advanced during the course of the arguers has to be kept out of consideration as the same is irrelevant.

11. However, incidentally it may be mentioned that in the plethora of literature cited before me in the shape of articles, reports of various committees, speeches, books and law reports, etc., nowhere judges have been associated with lawyers when lawyers have been described by ascribing to them such “Honourable” adjectives like Leeches, expert craftsman. Parasites, etc. somehow, right or wrong, knowingly or unknowingly, people seem to have made distinction and have not considered judges worthy of being conferred such privileged distinction. At any rate, as far as this case is concerned, there is nothing in the editorial or anywhere on the record of the case that the writing in question refers to judges also. The plain reading of the editorial and the complaint shows that the editorial refers to lawyers. The complainant as well as the Bar Council have also understood the editorial in the same fashion, that is to say, referring only to lawyers and not to judges. Since the submission is based on facts non-existing, the same requires to be rejected even on this count.

12. He also submitted that when the president of a Bar Association (Visnagar Bar Association a Taluka level bar association) has filed the complaint, it should not be ordered to be thrown out at the threshold. However, there is nothing on the record of the case to show that the complainant is the president of Visnagar Bar Association. The complaint is filed in his individual capacity. Nowhere in the complaint any reference whatsoever is made to Visnagar Bar Association or to any other Association whatsoever, It is not even mentioned that he is a president of Bar Association. Even in the deposition before the learned Magistrate, the complainant has not stated that the complaint is filed at the instance of or on behalf of Visnagar Bar Association. Therefore, factually it is incorrect to say that the President of Visnagar Bar Association has filed the complaint. The complainant may be the President of the said Bar Association. But he has not described himself as such. However, even if the complainant happens to be the President of Visnagar Bar Association, it does not make any difference whatsoever so far as the merits of the case are concerned.

13. The Counsel for the complainant submits that the question as to whether the editorial refers to a determinate class of lawyers only or as to lawyers’ class as a whole should not be decided at this stage. In his submission this question should be decided after the evidence is recorded in the case. The case has got to be determined on the basis of the writing in the editorial. If the editorial does not refer to any individual or to any determinate class or group of persons, no useful purpose can be served by allowing to proceed further with the case before the trial court. Hence the submission cannot be accepted.

14. Counsel for the complainant (opponent No. 1 herein) has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sewakram v. R.K. Karanjiya, . He has also referred to an unreported decision rendered by me in Criminal Misc. Appln. No. 1583 of 1983 decided on September 14, 1983. The aforesaid decisions have been cited and read in expense with a view to submit that a journalist is in no way a better position than any other citizen. He has the same right of freedom of speech and expression just as any other citizen has. He cannot claim any higher privilege. In this case, the petitioner does not claim any higher privilege whatsoever. His simple case is: “treat me as an ordinary citizen and judge the merits of the case on the basis of normal standards applicable to an ordinary citizen”. Hence these two decisions are of no help to the oopponent-complainant.

15. It is also submitted by the counsel for the complainant that, at this stage the accused cannot avail of the benefit of any of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC. As to whether the petitioner-accused is entitled to any such benefit or not can be decided only after recording evidence. Again the reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sewakram’s case 1981 Cri LJ 894 (supra). The petitioner-accused does not claim benefit of any of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC at this stage. His claim is : read the editorial as a whole, there is no defamation whatsoever of any particular person or a group of particular persons. The criticism made, if any. is that of the entire class of lawyers and at the most some words used may cause resentment but the same would never amount to an offence of defamation.’ In above view of the matter the decisions cited by the counsel for the complainant are of no assistance to him and the contentions made by him do not arise at all in this case, at least at this stage.

16. The counsel for the complainant submitted that applicability of Section 199 of the Cri.P.C. (i.e. whether the complainant is an aggrieved party or not) and as to whether, the alleged insinuating remarks refer to a particular determinate class of lawyers or not, can be decided only after recording evidence. Therefore, at this stage this Court should not interfere. The argument has no merits. As to whether the insinuating remarks are referable to any specified individual or a group of individuals can be ascertained from:

(1) writing of the editorial;

(2) contents of the complaint: and (3) examination of the complainant before the learned Magistrate.

As stated hereinabove, it is not even the case of the complainant, as disclosed in the complaint and in his deposition before the learned Magistrate, that the writing in question refers to himself and/or to a particular individual or a determinate class/ group of individuals. Therefore, this contention also has no basis and the same requires to be rejected.

17. The counsel for the complainant has relied upon the following two decisions of the Supreme Court; 1. Akhilesh Prasad v. Union Territory of Mizoram, , 2. Chandra Deo v. Prokash Chandra :

Questions involved in the aforesaid two decisions were quite different Neither the facts of these cases, nor the principles laid down in either of the two decisions are in any way relevant for the determination of the question involved in this case and hence it is not necessary to discuss them in any further details.

18. In this ease, the petitioner-accused does not dispute the writing and publication of the editorial. His case is : ‘read the editorial as a whole or in any manner you like; the writing printed and published does not disclose any offence whatsoever. The writing is not in respect to the complainant or in respect to any particular individual or a determinate group of persons as distinguished from the rest of the members of the community and whose identity can be established As stated in the Resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the Bar Council identical complaints have been filed by Mehsana Bar Association and Chanasma Bar Association. The counsel for the petitioner-accused has also submitted that in respect of the publication of this very writing, the petitioner-accused is facing prosecutions from other parts of the State also. Since the agitation in respect of which the editorial is written concerned all the lawyers, it is not unlikely that there may be similar complaint against the petitioner-accused from other parts of the State also. In this view of the matter, when the authorship of the editorial is not disputed and the contention is that the averments made in the complaint as well as the writing of the editorial do not disclose an offence of defamation, the ends of justice require that the case should be decided at this stage only. If this course is adopted, both the petitioner-accused and the complainant would know their respective position. Multiplicity of litigation will be avoided and the ends of justice will be secured.

19. At this stage it will be appropriate to have a quick look at the relevant provisions of law. Section 499 IPC in so far as it is relevant reads as follows:

499. Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said except in the cases hereinafter exempted, to defame that person.

Explanation 1 : x x x x Explanation 2: – It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.

Explanation 3 & Expln. 4 : x x x It is not necessary to refer to the rest of the provisions of the section for the purposes of this case.

20. The section is aimed at the protection of the reputation of persons. If one looks at the definition of the offence, it contains three important elements, namely, 1. the person; 2. his reputation, and 3. the harm to reputation of the person with necessary mens rea.

If the imputation is defamatory per se, necessary mens rea will be presumed. No resultant harm may be proved if the expression itself is defamatory per se. The maker of the statement must know that it will harm the reputation of one concerning whom the same is made. Explanation I includes even a dead person. We are not concerned with this explanation. Explanation 2 embraces imputation concerning a company or association or collection of persons as such. The gist of the offence is dissemination of harmful imputation concerning a person. It is not necessary to refer to other explanations for our purposes.

21. In this case, at this stage it may be assumed for the sake of argument that there can be defamation for an indeterminate class of people such as ‘Lawyers’. In that case, the question that would arise for determination would be : Does the editorial lower down the prestige and reputation of the Lawyers” as a class? The term “reputation” means, “what is generally said or believed about the persons or things” character”. The two terms “character” and “reputation” are prone to be confused. Character, in the context, would mean, fortitude or moral constitution or strength of a person. It has no relevance with the belief or opinion of others in respect to a person. Therefore, character is what a person “actually is”, while “reputation” is what neighbours and others say “what he is”. The man may have, in fact, a good character and yet suffer from bad reputation or vice versa. In short, ‘reputation’ is, what is reputed about, that is to say, common knowledge or general opinion in respect to a person. It is the estimation in which a person is hold by others and not the opinion which he himself may have about himself. It may be said that ‘reputation’ is a composite hearsay, being the community’s opinion which implies the definite and final formation of belief by the community. By no stretch of reasoning the term ‘reputation’ can imply ones own belief about himself. A lawyer may think that he belongs to a noble profession and his activity as a lawyer is on the highest stage of the mundane plane. Collectively, all the lawyers taken together, also may hold such opinion about their profession. They may call the profession learned and noble’ and ‘dedicated to the service of the people’. But while determining as to what is their ‘reputation’ in the society, their own opinion about themselves and about their profession is irrelevant even though the same may be “extremely conservative, reasonable and therefore correct”.

22. Hence, before answering the question as to whether the editorial has lowered down the reputation of lawyers as a class, it will be necessary to refer to the different writings which give us an idea as to the opinion of the people or the community at large in respect to the lawyers and legal profession. Therefore the submission made by the counsel for the Bar Council that while deciding the question involved in this matter, other literatures should not be referred to at all cannot be accepted.

23. K. Marx described “lawyer as a paid wage-labourer in a capitalist society”. (Communist Manifesto, Penguin edition, 1967, page821 Mahatma Gandhi, himself a great lawyer, has said about lawyers and legal profession to the following effect:

The profession teaches immorality; it is exposed to temptation from which few are saved…. The lawyers, therefore, will, as a rule, advance quarrels instead of repressing them…. It is one of the avenues of becoming wealthy and their interest exists in multiplying disputes…. They (lawyers) are glad when men have disputes. Petty pleaders actually manufacture them (disputes)…. It is the lawyers who have discovered that theirs is an honorable profession….” (Pp. 143-4, “The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Vol. IV. The Basic Works. ‘Navjivan’).

24. Swift has referred to lawyers as a society of men bred up from their youth in the art of proving, by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white; according as they are paid. To this society all the rest of the people are slaves. (Gullivers Travels).

25. Justice Krishna Iyer’s Committee has noted:

…that the legal profession is merely an aspect of “the capitalistic society”, which is an “acquisitive society” where the “greatness of a lawyer is measured by the amount of the fees he charges and not by the quantum of social service which he renders as lawyer.

26. Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Judge of the Supreme Court, inaugurated the Chandigarh Unit of the Indian Association of Lawyers on May 3, 1982. In this inaugural address he observed:

…In fact, if we but walk across the road, stop a few of the passers-by and ask them what they think of us lawyers, we may learn quite a few home truths. We will learn that they view us as expert craftsman, proficient in the mysteries of the mystic language of the law, generally available for sale to the highest bidder to do the bidding of other men. If the person is gifted with a sour tongue he may even describe us is parasites…. The plain truth of the matter is that ours is an occupation which involves our espousing other people’s causes but always for a nice, round, fat fee…. And, of ten enough, the legal profession has been identified not as the champion of justice, social, economic and political but as the able mouthpiece and the loyal lieutenant of powerful economic, social and political, special interests….

(see ‘Mainstream’, a weekly published from New Delhi, dated May 22, 1982).

27. The Judicial Reforms Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat and headed by Shri P.N. Bhagwati (then Chief Justice of Gujarat High Court) has observed:

…the lawyer though indispensable to society is yet universally unpopular. It was not without reason that Shakespeare made one of his characters in Henry IV say emphatically: “The first thing we do, let us kill all lawyers”. Napolean rudely described them as “nothing but leeches”. Dr. Beniprasad, the famous historian, speaking of Jehangir’s system of administration of justice said : “Mogul justice had a silver lining: it had no lawyers”. The public image of the legal profession is no better to-day.

28. In an article published in “Hindustan times” dt. June 28, 1981 written by Shri Krishan Mahajan, the lawyers have been described as a tribe of fixers. It is further stated therein that the profession has become no more than a business for earning the maximum amount of money with the minimum amount of work.

29. The counsel for the Bar Council has also referred to certain writings of Mahatma Gandhi from the book “the Law and The Lawyers” to show that Mahatma Gandhi never referred to lawyers as Kajia Dalals. This was in reply to the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner that Mahatma Gandhi had used the term “Kajia Dalals” for lawyers. It does appear that Mahatma Gandhi did not use the term “Kajia Dalals” for lawyers. However, the counsel for the Bar Council was requested to refer to Chapter 6 of the same book under the title “The First Shock” wherein Mahatma Gandhi has narrated his experience as lawyer at Rajkot where he had gone to practice after being disappointed at Bombay. It is better to quote the experience about the payment of commission in his own words:

I must confess that here I had to compromise the principle of giving no commission, which in Bombay, I had so scrupulously observed. I was told that conditions in the two cases were different; that whilst in Bombay commissions had to be paid to touts, here they had to be paid to vakils who briefed you; and that here as in Bombay all barristers, without exception, paid a percentage of their fees as commission….

After referring to the argument of his brother Mahatma Gandhi has candidly stated:

I was taken in by this plea, and felt that, if I was to practice as a barrister, I could not press my principle regarding commissions in such cases. That is how I argued with myself, or to put it bluntly, how I deceived myself….

30. Learned counsel for the Bar Council wets requested to show any ethical basis for distinguishing the payment of commission to a tout and the payment of commission to a vakil or a briefing lawyer. In essence, would both the types of payments- i.e. payment of commission to a lawyer and payment of certain share of fees to a tout – would not amount to touting? What else is it? Counsel for the Bar Council tried to explain by stating that those were the different days and Mahatma Gandhi made reference to some experience in Rajkot. This is no explanation whatsoever. Counsel for the petitioner then posed a question : Probably is it not left to the saintly people like Mahatma Gandhi to make confession regarding ‘self deception’ and render satisfactory explanation? Is it a task to be performed by ordinary mortals!

31. The counsel for the Bar Council referred to a lecture given by Mr. Justice Venkataramiah Hon’ble Judge of the Supreme Court AIR 1983 Journal Section, P. 58 wherein the legal profession has been referred to as the only profession in the country, which has found its place of pride in the Constitution of India.

32. True, there is a brighter side of the picture. The counsel for the Bar Council and the complainant could have pointed out the recent developments in Gujarat itself. Gujarat has shown a novel path to the nation in the technique of resolving disputes by innovating and applying the machinery of ‘Lok Adalat’ to the pending cases in courts. It is a matter of common experience and knowledge that under proper leadership and in a congenial atmosphere the ‘Lok Adalat’ has brought about wonderful results. Even now, except for a brief interlude, it is working well Lawyers of Gujarat have shown a superb sense of social awareness and sacrifice. Without their selfless service, the ‘Lok Adalat’ movement would not have reached a take-off stage at all. Similarly lawyers of Gujarat displayed a sense of devotion and sacrifice when (hey whole-heartedly took the cases of dependents of the victims of accident of “Shantinath Silk Mill(Surat)”.

33. The counsel for the petitioner conceded that there is a brighter side of the picture. But (his is not all. There is yet another side of the picture, probably more popular and almost universally accepted. After referring to the various currents of thoughts reflected in literary works as well as in public speeches. Law Reforms Committee Report, etc. all that is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner-accused is that there is also an another aspect of the legal profession. People make their own assessment according to the extent of their knowledge and experience. His submission is that the appraisal and assessment made by the petitioner, an Editor of a daily newspaper regarding the action of the lawyers extending the strike should be judged in the aforesaid background of different currents of thoughts.

34. The occasion for writing the editorial was the decision of lawyers to extend the strike. The cause of agitation was the interference by the Govt. in judiciary or the transfer and appointment of Chief Justices of different High Courts. The main grievance is that the lawyers have been described as “Kajia Dalals”.

35. The petitioners counsel submitted that the term “Kajia Dalai” used in the editorial should be examined from the larger perspective of the place of lawyers in the society and their functions and duties towards the society. In this context their conduct and their day-to-day behaviour, their relations with the clients, their life style, their behaviour pattern and the overall reflection of the people at large should be taken into consideration If there is another aspect also, which is certainly not honourable, should it not be placed by a responsible editor before the public? If the editor fails to place before the public another side of the picture (probably more realistic one), will he not be failing in his duty as a journalist? If he depicts only a partial picture before the public, will he not be guilty of presenting a grotesque and distorted version of general opinion or belief prevailing in the society regarding the reputation of lawyers’ class as a whole?

36. In this background, the following aspects need to be examined:

(1) Is this term “Kajia Dalals” capable of being understood in three-four different meanings? If so, which one is to be taken into consideration? In the context which one fits in?

(2) In which context the editorial was written? The context was – the cause for the strike and the decision to extend the strike.

(3) Does the editorial refer to any individual or to a determinate class of people as distinguished from the rest of the members of the community? Is the writing defamatory and the publication thereof would amount to an offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code?

37. Meaning of the term “Kajia Dalai” as given in different dictionaries, are as follows:

1. One who earns by inciting disputes or by becoming an arbitrator.

2. One who makes arrangement for disputes to fight in court of justice.

3. A man who stays away after inciting quarrels, and

4. The term used for lawyers in derision.

In the editorial it is stated that “in a sense lawyers are brokers in dispute”. After referring to the old system of settlement of disputes, the editor asks, where was the system of lawyers prevalent in the past on a wider scale? A further question is asked, “is it not that the brokers of dispute are necessary only where there are disputes?” In the context it appears that the term “Kajia Dalal” has been used to mean, one who earns by becoming an arbitrator of disputes or to mean that one who makes arrangement for dispute to fight in court of justice. The term does not seem to have been, used even prima facie in derision or in contemptuous sense. True, (he term “Kajia Dalal” if used in respect of lawyers will certainly cause some resentment. But simply because an adjective or description causes resentment, it would not become defamatory.

38. Now the context in which the editorial has been written be examined The lawyers decided to extend the strike and that decision provided an occasion to the petitioner-accused for writing the editorial. When the lawyers take up the weapon of boycott in their hands and resort to cessation of work, how will they be looked upon by the people who have granted monopoly to their profession? The counsel for the Bar Council stated that for just cause the lawyers can and should take up such weapon of boycott in their hands. In support of his submission he referred to the writings of Mahatma Gandhi from the book “The Law and the Lawyers”, Chapters 27, 28 and 36. Mahatma Gandhi exalted the role of lawyers in ‘swadeshi’ movement and called upon them to sacrifice for the cause of nation”. It is not understood, how boycott of courts by lawyers which was considered a good weapon in fighting against an imperialist rule can be justified by the legal profession in the country today.

19. Since 1947, the country has become free from the imperialist yoke. Since 1951, it has set before itself the objectives of rapid socio-economic development through the mechanism of National Plans. The nation has determined to establish social order based on egalitarian and socialist principles. Can this goal be achieved by resorting to strikes? Economic development calls for sacrifice and rapid economic development demands both stricter standards of discipline and sacrifice. One is reminded of Stakhanovite and Subbothik movements of the early days of soviet economic development. Alexander Stakhonovite – a miner, set record by producing 14 times the norm of coal output fixed for average miner. ‘Subbothik’ movement was for voluntary contribution of labour for the benefit of society. It had started in early 1920s and had become popular. Nearer home, Mahatma Gandhi established a tradition in the trade union organized with his blessings and guidance (i.e. Majoor Mahajan in Ahmedabad) that workers should never resort to strike and should always solve their problems by negotiations with the management. Why is this not considered worthy of emulation? Socio economic development is not likely to be achieved by resorting to strike, and the strike which involve no sacrifice, no risk, leads nowhere. When lawyers abstain from work, what do they suffer and sacrifice? They earn well paid rest. Then, who suffers the consequences of strike. At whose risk this weapon is raised.

40. Be it realised that the legal profession is an autonomous self regulating profession. The lawyers have their own self-regulating machinery. The State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India are repositories of the professional ethics. As far as the relation between the members of the legal profession and the public at large is concerned. Bar councils are the custodians of the interests of the people. Here reference may be made to the provisions of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975. A lawyer is an “officer of the court”. He is so described in the Rules framed under the Advocates Act. The Preamble to the Statutory Rules (standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette) shows that an advocate practicing today is expected to show the same high standards of rectitude and moral behaviour as was expected of him in the past, i.e. prior to independence of the country.

41. As per the provisions of Bar Council of India Rules 1975, an advocate is bound to accept a case for reasonable fees, except under special circumstances which may justify refusal, moreover he is not permitted to withdraw from an engagement, once he had accepted the same”, without sufficient cause and unless he has given sufficient notice to his client (see Rules 11-12). In this context, observations made by a leading lawyer of the country be noted:

The boycotting of a court by members privileged to practice, there is virtually holding justice to ransom. It certainly contributes to the law’s delay.

“Do this – or else”: is implicit in an organised abstention from the courts by those who have held themselves out as practising there. It is a threat to the administration of law and undermines the rule of law which is the bedrock of our Constitution.

(see – Boycott – a Lawyer’s Weapon? article by Shri F.S. Nariman) Thus, even a leading member of the Supreme Court Bar and an important office bearer (Shri Nariman was Vice President at the relevant time) of the Bar Association of India, has strongly expressed his views against the strike by lawyers. Then what is wrong if an ordinary citizen also expresses his views and feelings on this question? Is he not required to be heeded to patiently?

42. As stated hereinabove, withdrawal from work by a lawyer without sufficient cause and without sufficient notice to his client may be considered to be even unlawful. In Industrial Law in certain situations and particularly in public utility services there is no distinction between an illegal strike and unjustified strike. A strike may be legal but it may be unjustified, but a strike which is illegal cannot be justified. The two propositions that a strike is illegal and at the same time justified cannot in Industrial Jurisprudence co-exist at least in public utility services and in certain specified situation, (see I.G. Navigation & Rly. Co. v. Their Workmen, . Is it necessary that someone should approach court and law should be laid down in respect to the strike by lawyers?

43. The editor feels that the lawyers had proceeded on an unjustified strike on a question with which they were not directly connected. As disclosed by the complainant in his deposition before the trial court the agitation was in protest against the interference by the Government in judiciary. The Bar Council Resolution states that the agitation was about the appointment and transfer of Chief Justices. The common man and a man of ordinary understanding in life, is likely to ask a question, how the lawyers are concerned with the appointment and transfer of judges? The question may be justified, may not be justified. But the same has got to be viewed from the angle of such ordinary people in life. If lawyers feel that they can become the surest bulwark for the independence of judiciary against the executive inroads in the administration of justice, it is necessary for them to educate public opinion in this regard. And public opinion cannot be cultivated by resorting lo strike which involves no risk, no sacrifice and which is nothing but a well paid holiday. A section of the people may be holding the views as expressed by the petitioner-accused. Like any other common man, the editor has felt that the lawyers who are supposed to argue their cases before any judge, why should they take up the cause of appointment or non-appointment or late appointment of a particular judge? Or, why should they believe that on account of such happenings, the independence of the judiciary is lost or is likely to be lost? Is he not entitled to ask….: “On such occasions, why should lawyers inflict punishment on their clients? Is it necessary that for no fault of the litigants they should be punished? Neither the judges nor the people are responsible for thy interference in judiciary by the Government. Then why boycott the court work and penalise the people?

44. After all what are the dangers to the cause of ‘independence of judiciary’ and from which sources do they emanate? It has got to be conceded that the judges should be insulated from being influenced by the executive. But it should not be forgotten that in modern day complex society, the powerful economic interests are in a position to influence each organ of the State. The public limited companies in private sector come to courts with cases involving stakes of crores of rupees. In matters pertaining to excise and customs duty and such other fiscal laws, the claim of refund of amount which the industrial and big business houses make, run into thousands of crores of rupees. Such claims have probably no parallel in any other country of the world. See 1983 (2) 24 Guj LR 1108 : 1984 Tax LR NOC 52. Para 31. Thus the corporate sector has continuous flow of litigation involving substantial stakes both in terms of money and also in terms of principles.

45. If a Judge after retirement gets some political assignment or position in Government, his conduct is being commented upon. This criticism may be right, may not be right. But if it is right, how can the conduct of a judge, who gets himself engaged in big business and industrial houses after his retirement can be justified? Why such conduct is not criticised? Is it not necessary to ponder over the question that the necessary safeguards are required to be thought out and implemented so that the judges can be insulated from being influenced by big business and industrial houses? Is it also not worthwhile raising a question : are the Judges not required to be independent from the influence of the members of the Bar also? In fact such a voice was raised when this very agitation of lawyers in Gujarat had reached its climax. That was the voice of Shri Kundanlal Dholakiya, a practising lawyer and Ex-Speaker of the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly. Thus, the threat to the independence of judiciary does not emanate only from executive. It also emanates from powerful economic interests in the society who exert their influences by adopting subtle and imperceptible means. Such threat may also emanate in a veiled manner even from the members of the Bar. Is there no threat to the independence of judiciary from print media also?

46. These questions are posed only with a view to indicate that the question of independence of judiciary is not as simple as it is many a times thought to be. It is a many faceted problem. But, in the ultimate analysis, the secret of independence lies in the courage of conviction as well as in the capacity to resist outside interference. And courage is not a commodity which can be bought or borrowed. It is not capable of being advanced on loan either temporarily or on permanent basis. No agitation whether peaceful or violent – can produce and supply this commodity, called courage. It is something inherent and an innate quality of every individual. One who thinks that his independence can be protected by some outside agency is sadly mistaken. Such outside agency may be a strong Bar or sympathetic Executive. It makes no difference. The moment one pins his hope for the protection of his independence on some outside agency, from that moment onwards he loses his independence. And how can Judges look forward to legal profession for the protection of their independence? Even as stated by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy – legal profession is often identified “as the able mouthpiece and the loyal lieutenant of powerful economic, social and political special interests”. How Judges can be made to depend upon the loyal lieutenant and able mouthpiece” of vested interests? Does the question not require deeper study and further research?

47. Yes, as suggested by the counsel for the Bar Council the questions involved in the case were required to be examined from the larger perspective. That is why, certain contours of the wider perspectives have been indicated hereinabove with the hope and trust that all concerned will ponder over the discussion made hereinabove in right spirit without in any way being influenced by narrow consideration of one’s own self. These questions cannot be examined from the view point of the complainant who himself narrates that he is engaged in the business of lawyering and who does not describe his occupation as profession.

48. Now let us consider the question, does the publication of the writing amount to an offence of defamation? To whom does the editorial refer? In respect of whom the alleged insinuating remarks are published? Person in respect of whom the alleged insinuating remarks have been made, must be searched out. After specifically referring to nine sentences (which have been underlined and marked (1) to (9) in the alleged defamatory writing reproduced hereinabove), the complainant alleges in the complaint-

(1) that the accused had an intention to defame the constitutional and systematic agitation;

(2) that the accused had intended to publicly lower down the reputation and prestige of lawyers;

(3) that by the writing in question, the reputation of lawyers’ world (Vakil Alam) and that of the complainant is lowered down;

(4) that the comment has been made without taking into consideration the scope of the functions and duties of lawyers;

(5) that the accused has, without going into the merits of the agitation of lawyers, depicted them as “Kajia Dalals” which term according to the complainant means “tout”, and (6) that by publishing the writing the accused has defamed all lawyers and the complainant.

49. Thus, even according to the complainant, the editorial does not refer to him personally or to any other individual. The same is the position in the deposition given by him before the learned Magistrate. In the complaint at least at six to seven places the grievance is made that the defamation is that of lawyers. In paras 4 and 5 of the complaint, the complainant has referred to himself in conjunction with the defamation of the entire class of lawyers. Reading the complaint as well as the deposition of the complainant, it is absolutely clear that the complaint is not with respect to an offence of defamation of the complainant or any other individual person. The grievance, if any, is not an individual grievance of the complainant. Whatever is the grievance, the same is shared by all the members of the lawyers’ fraternity. The complainant speaks of defamation of lawyers as a class. There is no mention of defamation of a particular section of lawyers. At the most by implication it may be said that the editorial refers to the lawyers of Gujarat. By no stretch of reasoning it can be said that in the complaint or in the deposition of the complainant recorded on oath, anywhere even it is remotely suggested that the alleged defamation is in respect of a determinate or identifiable section/class of lawyers as distinguished from the rest of the members of lawyers’ fraternity and whose identity can be established On the contrary, it is stated in the complaint itself that the editorial is published with an intention to defame the constitutional and systematic agitation and it lowers down the prestige of lawyers’ world (Vakil Alam). Thus, as per the case put up by the complainant, both in his complaint and in his deposition before the learned Magistrate, it is clearly stated that the editorial is in respect of lawyers as a class. It does not refer to a particular section of lawyers or any determinable class/group of individuals.

50. Counsel for the Bar Council contended that the editorial refers to a determinate section of lawyers. According to him, a group of lawyers who had proceeded on strike has been referred to in the editorial and therefore the editorial is in respect of lawyers who were on strike. However, submission is contrary to what is stated in the Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Bar Council. The Bar Council itself has not read the editorial so as to referable only to a determinate section of lawyers. It would be profitable to quote the relevant part of the Resolution dt. February 2, 1984 passed by the Executive Committee of the Bar Council (which as stated by the counsel for the Bar Council, has been approved by the General Body of the Bar Council later on). After referring to the letter of the Vice President of the Visnagar Bar Association, it is stated in the Resolution as under:

…Since the contents of the said Editorial, are concerning all the Advocates. Vice-President of Visnagar Bar has requested this Council to intervene in the said matter by engaging an Advocate. Since the matter is of an urgent nature and final hearing is fixed on 10.2.1984, and since the subject matter of said petition is concerning the Advocates class as a whole, this Committee unanimously resolves that the State Bar Council should intervene in the said matter to support the cause and case of original complainant. It is further resolved that Shri Giriraj N. Desai, Advocate be requested to appear and intervene in the said matter for and on behalf of the Bar Council and to support the cause and case of the original complainant.

Copy of this Resolution along with the necessary papers be entrusted to Shri Giriraj N. Desai. Advocate to do the needful as per the contents of this Resolution.

51. The contents of the Resolution are very clear. The basis of the decision taken by the Bar Council is to be discerned in the following sentences:

(1) “Since the contents of the said Editorial are concerning all the Advocates”, and “Since the subject matter of said petit ion is concerning the Advocates Class as a whole”.

This appears to be quite natural. A statutory body like the Bar Council would not and normally should not be interested in individual cases or the cases pertaining to a group of lawyers. The members of the Bar Council appeared to have felt that since the editorial pertained to all the advocates and the subject matter of the case was concerning the advocates class as a whole, it was necessary to support the case. Moreover, there is clear instruction to the counsel, “to do the needful as per the contents of this Resolution”. There is no ambiguity in the resolution: it speaks of lawyers” class as a whole. Yet the submission is made to the effect that the editorial refers to a group or section of lawyers of Gujarat who had proceeded on strike.

52. The complainant himself nowhere refers to a determinate section or a group of lawyers, in respect of whom the insinuating writing is published. He positively refers to the entire world of lawyers (Vakil Alaml). That is the footing on which the Bar Council proceeds. That is how the instruction is given to the counsel for the Bar Council. As far as the record of the petition is concerned, the fact remains that the Bar Council has proceeded on the footing that the editorial pertained to all the lawyers and the subject matter of the petition was concerning lawyers’ class as a whole. Thus the submission is contrary to the facts stated in the complaint and it is not even supported by the material on record.

53. Examining the record of the case, the following position emerges:

(1) The editorial does not refer to any specific individual whomsoever. It does not refer to any institution of lawyers, that is to say, to any Taluka Bar Association, District Bar Association or High Court Bar Association or State Bar Council of Gujarat, or the Bar Council of India. The editorial positively refers to lawyers in general.

(2) The complaint is filed by the complainant in his individual capacity. He himself is a lawyer of about 20 (twenty) years standing. The complaint is not filed at the instance of or on behalf of any Bar Association. In the complaint or in the examination before the learned Magistrate, nowhere it is stated that the writing in question pertains to a determinate section of agitating lawyers and he being a member of that determinate section of lawyers, has been aggrieved by the writing in question.

(3) On the other hand, it is clear from. the complaint and the examination of the complainant before the learned Magistrate that the allegation is that the editorial is in respect of the entire world of lawyers (Vakil Alam) whose reputation is affected by the publication of the editorial. It is Categorically stated in the complaint that the editorial is aimed at defaming the constitutional and systematic agitation against the interference in judiciary by the Government.

(4) It is also stated in the complaint that the intention of the accused was to harm the reputation and prestige of the lawyers and to lower down the same in public. The complaint refers to lawyers en masse.

(5) Whenever the complainant has referred to the reputation and prestige and the lowering down thereof, the reference is made to the reputation and prestige of lawyers’ class as a whole. Even in the examination before the learned Magistrate the complainant has categorically mentioned that the reputation of our business (Amara Dhandha Ni Abaru) is lowered down and commented upon.

(6) It is further stated in the examination before the learned Magistrate that his lawyer friends and the entire world of lawyers (Vakil Alam) were assisting in the cause of justice and were engaged in the noble and reputed business (dhandha) of providing best possible justice to the people. It is stated that an attempt to bring down the reputation has been knowingly made.

54. The editorial is in respect of lawyers. The occasion for writing the editorial was that the lawyers had decided to extend their strike up to November 6, 1983. The complainant is also clear that the editorial is in respect of lawyers’ class as a whole. According to him, it is aimed at defaming and lowering down the constitutional, peaceful and systematic agitation of lawyers. Moreover, it lowers down the prestige of lawyers as a class. This is the basis on which, the complainant has proceeded. On this very basis the Bar Council has resolved to intervene in the proceedings. The reading of the entire editorial makes it abundantly clear that it does not refer to any particular group of lawyers. It refers to lawyers class as a whole. Therefore, on this basis only the question is required to be examined and answered. If the writing which is published in the newspaper does not refer to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, but if it is in respect to a profession or in respect to a particular agitation, would it amount to an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC? The position is covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Narasimhan v. T.V. Chokkappa, . After referring to Explanation 2 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, the Supreme Court has observed as follows At P. 56 of Cri LJ:

…The language of the Explanation is wide, and therefore, besides a company or an association, any collection of persons would be covered by it. But such a collection of persons must be an identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that a group of particular persons, as distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed. Therefore, in a case where Explanation (2) is resorted to, the identity of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory words or imputations….

In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has also referred to the Law of Crimes (22nd Edition) by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal. It will be profitable to quote the relevant portion from the same book (page 1317):

If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless there is something to point to the particular individual.” Where a writing inveighs against mankind in general, or against a particular order of men. as, for instance, men of the gown, it is no libel, but it must descend to particulars and individuals to make it a libel, e.g. the religious society called the S. Nunnery, or “certain persons lately arrived from Portugal and living near Broad Street.” The imputation must be capable of being brought home to a particular individual or Collection of individuals as such….

55. In this case, it is an admitted position that the editorial does not refer to any particular person. Then, does it refer to “a company or an association or collection of persons as such”? The words “as such” are important. The editorial refers to lawyers class as a whole. Since the occasion for writing the editorial is the decision to extend the strike up to November 6, 1983. there is reference to the said decision. But the term “Kajia Dalal” which is defamatory according to complainant has been used in respect to the “lawyers”. Wherever the term “Kajia Dalal” is written in the editorial, it takes in its sweep all the lawyers. In fact, even the counsel for the Bar Council made submission on the basis that the question involved in the petition concerns every one in the profession. According to him, even the judges are covered by the statements made in the editorial. Therefore the writing is not capable of being brought home to a particular individual or a collection of persons as such. The grievance if any is to be shared by all the members of the profession. It is not distinctive to any particular individual or group of individuals.

56. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this High Court in the case of Raj Kapoor v. Narendra Desai, reported in (1974) 15 Guj LR 125. It was a case in connection with a film known as “Kal. Aaj Aur Kal”. In the picture, an orthodox section of Brahmin community makes certain contemptuous remarks against Bhangi community in general. The complainant fell that he was defamed by such remarks. Therein the Court held to the effect that, uttering contemptuous words against Bhangi community in general, would not amount to defamation as defined in Section 499 IPC. It is further held in that case that, even it ii is believed for the sake of argument that the film “Kal. Aaj Aur Kal” contained sonic imputations against the Bhangi community in general to the effect that the said community was held lower in status in the eyes of the Brahmins, that would not, by itself, amount to an act of defamation. The alleged remarks were not directed against any particular group of members of that community who could be identified. There was no imputation against the complainant as an individual. If he felt that as a member of the “Bhangi” community, he was defamed, that would not entitle him to maintain a prosecution for defamation unless the imputation was against him personally. The impugned scene in the said film was general in nature. It was not directed against any individual or particular group of individuals who could be identified or particularized.

57. In the instant case also, writing published is relatable to the entire class of lawyers. The writing does not refer to any identifiable body of persons. So also the writing is not in respect to any group/class of persons as distinguished from the rest of the community of lawyers. To make out an offence of defamation the writing should be such that a person/persons to whom the writing is relatable can be identified. It is not even the case of the complainant that the writing is referable to particular group of persons as distinguished from the rest of the community of lawyers. Since the imputation, if any, is in respect of the lawyers’ class as a whole and the same is not referable to a person or a group of persons who can be identified and can be distinguished from the rest of the members of the legal profession, there is no offence of defamation.

58. In this case, the complainant himself is not an aggrieved person, since the writing does not relate to him individually. As provided under Section 199 of the Cr.P.C., unless it is prima facie shown that the complaint is filed by an aggrieved person, the Court is precluded from taking cognizance of the case. Thus, in the instant case, cognizance of the case taken by the Court is not in accordance with the provisions of law. Therefore also the trial Court cannot be permitted to record evidence in a case of which cognizance is not taken legally. As per the provisions of Section 199 of the Cr.P.C. cognizance of an offence under Chapter XXI, i.e. defamation, could not have been taken by the trial Court “except on a complaint made by an aggrieved person”. In the instant case, the complainant cannot be said to be an aggrieved person.

59. At this stage it may be considered as to why the imputation made by a person in respect of an indeterminate section of the society would not amount to an offence. Offence of defamation aims at the protection of personal reputation of an individual. Explanation 2 to the section expands the meaning of “person”. But at the same time the expansion does not widen the scope of the term “persons” to such an extent that even persons belonging to an indeterminate class or group may be covered. If this is done, it would amount to putting restrictions on the fundamental right of a citizen regarding freedom of speech and expression. As held by the Supreme Court in Dabholkar’s case (supra) “the integral bond between the lawyer and the public is unbreakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon his probity and professional life-style. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice.” In the aforesaid decision it is further held by the Supreme Court that the legal profession is a public utility of great implications and it is a monopoly statutorily granted by the nation. When members of such a profession proceed on strike and extend the period of strike, can an enlightened citizen whose duty is to express views on public issues remain silent? Would he be not failing in his duty if he remains silent? If he speaks something in exercise of his right of freedom of speech and expression which relates to the entire class of lawyers and which has reference to an action which affects thundered society, would it amount to an offence? If this amounts to an offence, it would directly come in conflict with the fundamental right of citizens. A citizen has right lo say what he feels about I he. function and duties of tlumembers of a profession which is a public utility as held by the Supreme him! So lung as he docs not (ouch any individual or even a group or collection of individuals who can be distinguished from the rest of the members of the profession, he would be within his rights to make comments.

60. In this view of the matter, the language of Explanation 2 to Section 499 I.P.C. cannot be construed so as to cover even an indeterminate class of persons. Doing so would amount to-

(1) crossing the limits of the scope and purpose of the section. The scope and purpose of the section is to protect the personal reputation of an individual and not that of social and public institutions or professions.

(2) as encroachment of ones fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. A citizen cannot be restrained to speak (or print and publish) about a particular profession – be it a legal profession or medical profession. Judging from the aforesaid point of view also once it is held that the editorial is in respect of lawyers as a class and does not refer to any individual person or a determinate collection or group of persons as such, it would not amount to an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C.

61. Counsel for the Bar Council submitted that the editorial is relatable to the section of lawyers of Gujarat who had decided to extend the strike up to November 6, 1983. The submission is that in the editorial there is a specific reference to-

(1) the region of Gujarat, (2) the controversial agitation.

(3) the decision to extend the strike up to November 6, 1983.

(4) the words “advocates and lawyers” expressing that the lawyers have position and status in the society: and (5) the phrase “Aava Kajia Dalalo”, which restricts the reference to lawyers who had proceeded on agitation.

It was submitted that the term “Kajia Dalal” has been used six times and therefore prima facie it should be construed, that the use of the term is deliberate and it is not a casual reference. The argument proceeds that since the writer knew that the lawyers had status and reputation in the society, and even then the term “Kajia Dalal” has been used which indicates that the same has been used contemptuously and to derogate the section of lawyers.

62. The advocates have been described as “Kajia Dalals”. Wherever the term “Kajia Dalal” has been used in the editorial it is in respect of lawyers’ class as a whole. The writer specifically states that in another sense the lawyers are brokers in disputes, i.e. Kajia Dalai. The author does not say that lawyers of Gujarat who have proceeded on strike are “Kajia Dalals”. The controversial agitation in Gujarat and the decision to extent! the strike provided an occasion to the accused to express his views as an editor of a daily newspaper. The subject “boycott of Court work by lawyers” had a topical relevance and value. Simply because the occasion and the subject matter to write the editorial are provided by the lawyers of Gujarat, it cannot be said that the description “Kajia Dalals” given by the Editor is restricted to and relatable to a particular section of lawyers in Gujarat.

63. The title of the editorial is “Whither the dispute-brokers”. There is another sentence occurring in the editorial and that is “in a sense the lawyers are brokers in dispute”. The title and the sentence extracted hereinabove clearly indicate that the term “Kajia Dalal” refers to the entire class of lawyers. It is not permissible to read the sentences containing the term “Kajia Dalal” separately out of context and then construe the same with a view to determine the scope or extent of its coverage. If one reads the editorial in its entirety. It becomes clear that the term “Kajia Dalal” has been used as synonymous with lawyers. The term “Kajia Dalal” as far as the editorial is concerned does not refer to a limited section of lawyers. The editor does not make any discrimination whatsoever. He takes in his sweep all the lawyers when he uses the term “Kajia Dalal”. Therefore the argument that the editorial refers to a determinate section of lawyers in Gujarat, namely, the lawyers who were participating in the agitation, cannot be accepted. As stated hereinabove, even the complainant has not understood the term “Kajia Dalat” in that, sense. So also the Bar Council has not understood in that sense, Independently also, as discussed and pointed out hereinabove. it is not possible to read the term in that restricted meaning. Hence the contention so raised has got to be rejected.

64. It must be remembered that legal profession has a vital role to play. The central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice. The practice of law is a public utility of great implications see . Thus a lawyer by the very nature of his occupation fills in a public character. Those who fill in public positions must be little thick-skinned and learn to ignore certain criticisms. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, , wherein it is observed At p. 947 of Cri LJ-

Those who fill a public position must not be too thin skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and unjust yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood for a time…. Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept an attack as a necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office…. Public men in such positions may as well think it worth their-while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them rather than give an importance to the same by prosecuting the’ persons responsible for the same.

Would it not have been better to ignore the editorial even if one considered the writing of the editorial defamatory?

65. However, a considerable section of the lawyers themselves appear to have forgotten the true nature and character of their occupation. The complainant is an advocate of 20 years standing. According to the Resolution passed by the Executive Committee of the Bar Council he is the President of Visnagar Bar Association. He can be said to be a senior lawyer being in the profession for last about 20 years. In engaged in the business of lawyering (Vakilathno Dhandho) for last about 20 years. He further states that his principal place of business is Visnagar. Even in the examination before the trial Court he stated that the insinuating words in the editorial are likely to harm or lower down the reputation of his business (Dhandhani Abru. Now if the complainant himself describes his occupation as business and not as profession, how can an editor of a newspaper be expected to describe lawyers as anything but dispute brokers? If lawyering is business, then brokerage will be an integral part of the business. If one does business in disputes, would he not be described as a dispute broker?

66. In the aforesaid light the editorial may be examined. The editor puts the profession in an exalted position. He says that the lawyers have a place and position in the society. He reminds them of their role and poses the question, should they go on strike? According to the editor the lawyers have nothing to do with the question on which the agitation was started. The thrust of the editorial is that the lawyers should not have gone on strike. It did not behave to the legal profession to go on strike. Therefore, if one sees the editorial in proper light, ignoring some unpleasant expressions and coarse language, the sum total is that the lawyers should not have resorted to strike. Thereby they were causing harm to their own profession. They were not serving the people by resorting to strike. In the end he wants that before it becomes too late it would be better if the lawyers swerve away from the mistaken path. Thus viewed from this angle, the editorial does not refer to any individual or to a determinate group or class of persons. It refers to the profession as a whole, that it to say, the entire class of lawyers. It refers as stated by the complainant himself, to the agitation started by lawyers. Though some unpleasant words are used, these words would not amount to defamation if understood in proper light. The term “Kasia Dalals” is not per se defamatory inasmuch as it has four different meanings. If read in proper context, it applies to the entire class of lawyers. Therefore it would not amount to an offence under Section 500 of the Penal Code. Even if some resentment is caused in the minds of the members of the legal profession on account of the use of this term or phrase, it is better to ignore the same keeping the high traditions of the legal profession in mind. Since the lawyers have a public duty and function and (hey fill in public positions, it would behave them to ignore such unhappy and unpleasant assertions rather than be touchy over them. If one wishes to take serious view of such remarks, then the case is for introspection and not for prosecution of the maker of the statement. The continuation of the proceedings before the lower Court against the petitioner would surely amount to abuse of the process of Court and the interest of justice demands that the same be ordered to be quashed and dropped.

67. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned JMFC. Visnagar, to issue process against the petitioner-accused in Criminal Case No. 2003 of 1983 is hereby quashed and the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 2001 of 1983 is ordered to be dropped. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.